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Interagency conflict between police and fire departments throughout the country 
has existed for many years and is generally attributable to competition for limited 
municipal dollars and overlapping areas of responsibility. New York City (NYC) is 
frequently cited as the most egregious example of this rivalry. The relationship between 
NYC’s emergency response agencies, and the lack of integrated strategic planning which 
results, has many parallels to the situation that existed within the DoD from the years 
after WW II until the passage the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. That act is widely 
credited with changing the culture of the DoD from one of service parochialism to one of 
jointness and allowing the military to seamlessly coordinate and integrate its war-fighting 
activities across service lines. 
This thesis recommends that NYC adapt several provisions of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act to change the underlying attitudes and cultures of its first responder agencies. 
By encouraging its personnel to focus their planning, training, and operational activites 
on what benefits the City as a whole, as opposed to the individual agency to which they 
belong, the City will profit from the improved coordination, communication, and 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
For there to be an effective response to any emergency situation, from a vehicle 
accident to a terrorist attack involving WMD, there needs to be coordination, 
communication, and a clear understanding of the responsibilities and capabilities among 
responding agencies. In addition, relationships need to be cultivated between members of 
these agencies so that the trust necessary for interagency cooperation to be successful can 
develop. Unfortunately, this is often not the case in New York City (NYC) where a 
“Battle of the Badges” has existed between the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
and the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) for decades over who should be in charge 
and how operations should be conducted at the scene of various emergencies. 
This rivalry has resulted in morale problems where units have responded to on-
going incidents, for which they are properly trained and equipped, only to be told by 
another agency that their services are not required. There have been jurisdictional “turf 
wars,” where both agencies claimed to be in charge. Communication and information 
sharing is essential for successful cooperation;  but a lack of respect between these 
agencies for each others’ roles and responsibilities has even manifested itself, on 
occasion, with physical altercations between members, and a shouting match between the 
commissioners of these two agencies in front of reporters at City Hall.1 Generations of 
police officers and firefighters have come up through the ranks in this atmosphere which 
has helped institutionalize this hostility and has created an environment of competition 
and distrust. 
Several protocols and policies have been put in place by different administrations 
over the years in an effort to establish who is “in charge” at various incidents, but none 
have attempted to address the underlying cause of why this situation exists: a lack of 
strategic coordination in planning, training, and equipment purchases at the City level 
                                                 
1  Sarah Lyall, "Truce Turns into Free-for-all in Police-Fire Feud on Divers," The New York Times, 
sec. A, (May 4, 1988), http://web.lexis- 
nexis.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/universe/document?_m=7def5b3c535013e65f9e45eabcd2b9f3&_docnum
=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVb&_md5=fbaaa3831aa3b04a5acf458ee762d064 (accessed November 28, 
2006). 
2 
that has allowed both agencies to largely duplicate the capabilities of the other for 
responses to many different types of emergencies. This duplication, initiated and 
perpetuated out of competition for resources and influence, has been allowed to continue 
and worsen for political reasons. It is at the heart of this rivalry and continues to cause 
animosity and mistrust between these agencies. 
As a result, millions of dollars have been and continue to be wasted on inefficient 
replication of existing resources. The two agencies continue to be wary of one another. 
Cooperation between them occurs sporadically and information sharing between them is 
virtually non-existent.  
In a post 9-11 world, where communication and teamwork are vital to effective 
planning and response, this rivalry is dangerous, costly, inefficient, and ultimately puts 
lives at risk. Much more needs to be done to promote interagency cooperation, encourage 
mutual understanding of each others’ roles and abilities, share information, and to truly 
work together to ensure the most effective response possible. 
 
B. IMPORTANCE 
While NYC is not unique in having its first responder agencies exhibit some level 
of interagency friction, it is certainly the most egregious example. By carefully 
examining the underlying causes of the problems here, other cities can determine where 
they have similar inter-organizational difficulties and can adapt the recommendations 
made here to their own jurisdictions where applicable. 
It is widely understood and accepted that for there to be effective coordination 
and cooperation between and across jurisdictions and levels of government, organizations 
must work together, recognize and respect the capabilities and expertise that each agency 
brings with them, and mutually agree on the strategic goals to be accomplished. This was 
recognized and incorporated into Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-52 
when it called on the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a 
                                                 
2 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5(HSPD-5) (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2003), 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed August 
19, 2006). 
3 
National Incident Management System (NIMS)3 as part of the National Response Plan 
(NRP).4 NIMS “provides a consistent nationwide template to enable federal, State, local, 
and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work 
together effectively and efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from 
domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of 
catastrophic terrorism.”5 [Emphasis added.] 
Unfortunately, past rivalries, duplicate abilities, desire for supremacy, and 
ultimately politics resulted in NYC adopting the Citywide Incident Management System 
(CIMS).6 This document, written with strong influence by the NYPD, has resulted in a 
system that has been used to largely expand the role of the NYPD and marginalize that of 
the FDNY, further inflaming tensions between the departments and leading the FDNY’s 
Chief of Department, Peter Hayden, to openly criticize the plan in a front page article in 
the New York Times.7 Among the most controversial provisions in the plan is the section 
that mandates that the NYPD be designated as the single Incident Commander (IC) at all 
CBRN / Haz-Mat incidents unless “the NYPD determines there is no actual or suspected 
criminal activity or terrorism”8 at which point a Unified Command will be implemented. 
[emphasis added] Not only does this provision ignore the direction in NIMS that a 
Unified Command be established at multi-agency responses regardless of cause, but it 
actually assumes the cause of every Haz-Mat incident in the City to be related to criminal 
or terrorist activity until proven otherwise. 
This is far more than a power struggle between two agencies with a contentious 
history. This document governs how command of every emergency response in NYC is 
                                                 
3  National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office: 2004), 139, 
http://www.nimsonline.com/docs/NIMS-90-web.pdf  (accessed January 20, 2006). 
4  National Response Plan (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/nrp.pdf (accessed February 12, 2006). 
5  National Incident Management System, ix. 
6  NYC Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) Protocol, (New York, NY: Office of 
Emergency Management, 2005), 51. 
7  Michelle O'Donnell and William K. Rashbaum, "New Terrorism Response Plan Angers Fire Dept," 
New York Times, sec. A, April 22, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/nyregion/22response.html?pagewanted=2&ei=5070&en=38ba3ad4e0
670b06&ex=1133326800 (accessed November 25, 2005). 
8 NYC Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) Protocol, annex A, 3. 
4 
handled. CIMS specifies that “the Command Element is responsible for overall incident 
management and has the authority to make overall strategic and tactical decisions 
regarding the mitigation of the incident, define the Incident Objectives, and determine 
what resources are required for incident operations.”9 [emphasis added] Throughout the 
document it clearly states that life safety operations “are the highest priority Incident 
Objectives and supersede other objectives during the incident.”10 It also clearly states that 
the core competency of life safety belongs to the FDNY.11 However, since the FDNY 
does not participate fully in the command structure, it is tasked with what everyone 
agrees is the most important function, but does not have the authority under CIMS to 
make the necessary strategic decisions or to determine what resources are required. This 
puts lives at risk. 
In addition, the dynamic of “organizational bias” toward members of one’s own 
group and against members of outside groups is magnified under a single command.12 
The “stovepiping”13 of information identified by the 9/11 Commission illustrates the 
same dynamic as the rivalry between the NYPD and FDNY. In both cases, the failure to 
share information, or control of emergencies, is ultimately a quest for superiority of one 
agency over the other.14 CIMS simply cements that superiority by giving sole command 
to the NYPD. 
Aside from the organizational and safety issues posed by this antagonistic 
relationship, there are financial consequences to building up and maintaining duplicative 
abilities in multiple agencies. Even though federal funding grants have given NYC the 
ability to greatly expand its capabilities, particularly in the area of hazardous materials, it 
is absolutely essential for the City to make sure that it properly utilizes those resources to 
                                                 
9  NYC Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) Protocol, annex A, 9. 
10  Ibid., 17. 
11  Ibid., 19. 
12  Joseph Pfeifer, “Understanding how Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders at the World 
Trade Center,” in Psychology of Terrorism, eds. Bruce Bongar, et al. (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 207-208. 
13  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, vol. 1 (New 
York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 403, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf  
(accessed August 19, 2006). 
14  Pfeifer, “Understanding how Organizational Bias Influenced First Responders,” 211.  
5 
ensure an effective response. It must employ the expertise that each agency brings to the 
table and break down the barriers that have kept them at odds for decades. It is incumbent 
upon the City to do this in the most cost effective manner possible so that resources are 
not wasted on needless duplication and instead are available for the training and 
equipment needed to manage emergency situations and maintain competency in these 
skills. In addition, as homeland security funding to the City is inevitably reduced in the 
coming years, the costly duplication that has resulted will become unsustainable and units 
in both agencies will suffer the effects of inadequate training and funding. The City’s 
ability to manage these incidents will ultimately suffer. 
 
C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the pervasiveness of this longstanding rivalry throughout both departments 
and the importance that a coordinated strategy plays in giving the City the ability to 
prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks or man-made or 
natural disasters, it is crucial that all city agencies work together in support of the City’s 
strategic goals instead of their own parochial interests. This is especially true in New 
York where the City saw first hand on 9/11 the consequences of failing to work together 
and share information. 
What is truly needed to resolve this decades-long struggle for supremacy at the 
scene of various emergencies is a paradigm shift in the underlying mind-set of officers, 
particularly the top commanders, in each agency. Any action that stops short of changing 
these attitudes at their root, such as instituting yet another protocol, is tantamount to 
treating the symptom and not the disease. 
The situation in New York is analogous to the conditions faced by the various 
branches of the U.S. military beginning after World War II and continuing into the 
1980’s. Interservice rivalries, competition for limited resources, institutional pride, and 
parochial interests combined to create an environment in which the services operated 
largely independently of each other. This lack of coordination manifested itself in a 
number of military failures in conflicts that included Viet Nam and the Iran-hostage crisis 
6 
and in communications problems identified during operations in Grenada.15 Resolving 
the situation literally took an act of Congress: The Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act (GNA).16 
This act made a number of significant changes to the structure of the Department 
of Defense (DoD) and mandated a number of other changes, perhaps most significantly 
the requirement that officers who wish to ascend to the staff level must first complete a 
tour in a “joint billet”. This had the immediate effect of making these positions coveted 
ones. The result was a dramatic change in the culture of the military from one of 
parochialism to one of “jointness”. While there was initially a great deal of resistance 
from and some sacrifice required by the individual Services, the overwhelming consensus 
of the literature on this topic agrees that the GNA was an enormous success and credits it 
with enabling the armed forces to plan, train, communicate, and operate together 
seamlessly. 
Most of the recommendations contained in this thesis are based largely on 
provisions contained in the GNA, but adapted locally to NYC where applicable. The 
others are based on problems unique to NYC and on the success that past protocols have 
had in resolving them. Other jurisdictions experiencing similar interagency conflict can 





                                                 
15 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 99th Congress, 
1st sess., 1985, Committee Print 99-86, 7; Clark A. Murdock, et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 1 
Report (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf  (accessed February 12, 2006); Peter W. Chiarelli, 
"Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn, 1993): 71, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq1102.pdf  (accessed February 12, 2006). 
16 Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, 99th 
Cong., 2d sess. (October 1, 1986), http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99433pt1.pdf (accessed November 
19, 2005). 
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1.  The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Should Become the 
City’s Central Agency for Coordinating All Prevention, Preparation, 
Response and Recovery Efforts 
This is not to say that OEM should be the Incident Commander (IC) at large scale 
or catastrophic events, but rather that they should coordinate the activities of all the City 
agencies prior to, during, and after the event occurs. The advantage is that since OEM 
does not have any assets of its own to conduct operations, it will not possess the 
organizational bias that first responders with those capabilities have. In much the same 
way that the judicial branch of the government can interpret laws, but is dependent on the 
legislative and executive branches to pass and enforce them, OEM would determine 
which agency should perform what operations but would depend on the individual 
agencies to carry them out. OEM’s mission would be to ensure that the Incident 
Commander(s) on the scene have all the resources needed and that all necessary 
information is being shared across agency lines. To accomplish this several changes need 
to be made in how OEM is organized and what its mission is: 
 
a. The Position of Commissioner of OEM Needs to Be Enhanced 
Much like the role of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) was strengthened 
by the GNA; the position of Commissioner for OEM needs to be enhanced. Currently, 
that position is, at least theoretically, the equivalent of the Fire or Police Commissioner. 
In order for the Commissioner of OEM to truly determine responsibilities and have the 
ability to coordinate the various agencies, he needs to have authority OVER them. 
Therefore, the position of OEM commissioner should be elevated the status of a deputy 
mayor in charge of public safety who reports directly to the mayor. The police and fire 
commissioners (as well as all the other agency heads responsible for public safety) should 
report to him / her. Part of his / her mandate should include ensuring that public safety is 
provided in the most economical means possible. To avoid any perceived or actual bias 
on his / her part, this position should be filled, at least initially, by a recognized public 
safety expert with no ties to either the NYPD or FDNY. 
Since this position would carry such a great deal of responsibility for 
ensuring the safety of the citizens of NYC, the position must be filled with an extremely 
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qualified person who has the experience and credentials to fill that role. That is currently 
not the case. In a world where the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, particularly in NYC, 
the days of awarding commissions in public safety organizations based on political 
considerations is unacceptable and should not enter into designating this responsibility. 
Therefore, the mayor should nominate the persons he / she wants to fill the roles of 
commissioners for OEM, Police, and Fire. The city council would then hold hearing on 
their qualifications and confirm them if appropriate, just as the Congress does for many 
of the President’s nominees. 
 
b. Senior Management at OEM Should be Modeled after the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 
The top level of management at OEM should report to the OEM 
Commissioner, but serve in an advisory capacity to the mayor to offer dissenting opinions 
and alternative advice on public safety matters, much in the same way the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff do for the President. To ensure that these personnel are qualified experts in public 
safety and emergency response and are familiar with local NYC issues, they should be 
made up senior level members from the NYPD, FDNY, and other city agencies. 
However, to overcome the inherent conflict between advocating for the positions of one’s 
agency and making recommendations based on the overarching needs of the City, 
precautions need to be taken in staffing these positions.  
To that end, senior OEM management should be made up members who 
will not be returning to their home agencies either because they have retired from them or 
because they have chosen a separate career path at OEM. This will not only eliminate 
their dual-hatted role, it will also remove any unwanted influence that could be exerted 
by the home agency on an individual who would be returning to it. 
 
c. All Equipment Purchases and Grant Requests Should be 
Coordinated Through OEM 
In order to minimize the duplication of resources that exists, take 
advantage of economies of scale, and ensure that all money spent conforms to the City’s 
overall strategic plans; OEM should coordinate the purchase of all emergency equipment 
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and the submission of all grant requests made by emergency response agencies. OEM, in 
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), would make the final 
determination on if the grant request should go forward and on whether the equipment 
should be purchased by that particular agency. All requests would have to conform to the 
City’s overall plans so that individual agencies do not waste money duplicating existing 
resources and expanding their mission into areas outside their core competencies which 
are already covered by other agencies. Training programs would also be included in this 
policy and be coordinated by OEM. 
The most obvious advantage to a centralized and coordinated approach to 
purchases and grant requests is that it will save millions of dollars in unnecessary 
duplication in training and equipment. Even more important than the financial advantages 
of this arrangement, however, is the effect it will have on interagency cooperation, 
coordination, and efficiency. Empowering OEM by giving it some authority over how 
agencies utilize homeland security funding enables it to ensure that such funding is 
utilized in a manner consistent with the needs and strategic plans of the City, rather than 
the parochial desires of an individual agency. Limiting the capabilities of the agencies 
forces them to work together to accomplish common goals. Controlling the purchase of 
new equipment would also encourage a clear delineation of roles for the individual 
agencies. In addition, a centralized procurement process would allow the City to take 
advantage of its size and purchasing power to negotiate reduced prices for items currently 
purchased and maintained separately by individual agencies. 
 
d. OEM Should Once Again Become a Response Agency 
One of the original missions of OEM when it was established by Mayor 
Giuliani in 1996 was to act as the “on-scene interagency coordinator” at multi-agency 
operations.17 Under the current administration, however, it rarely responds to 
emergencies and leaves it to the individual agencies to work out who will perform what 
functions based on the CIMS protocol. Problems arise, however, when the agencies 
disagree over what the situation requires and which agency should perform what actions 
                                                 
17 The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 9, ff 29. 
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due to their duplicate capabilities. OEM needs to be on-scene to make that determination 
based on the conditions present when the agencies cannot agree. 
 
e. OEM Should Conduct Far More Interagency Exercises Than are 
Currently Being Held 
The large majority of those interviewed for this thesis identified the need 
for more interagency drills and training as the best way to foster cooperation and 
understanding between agencies. Doing so not only improves how the agencies function 
together at operations, but also helps to develop trust and interpersonal relationships 
between members of these agencies. This sets the stage for more efficiency and 
collaboration at future events. 
The true benefits of interagency operations are attained when the actions 
of the groups are synchronized, but this requires a great deal of training and coordination. 
This is how the present-day military plans and fights and is a direct result of the reforms 
enacted under the GNA. In order to maintain their capabilities, however, the services 
continually conduct joint training exercises.  
If NYC is to be prepared for future emergencies that will require multi-
agency responses and overcome the institutionalized rivalry between its primary response 
agencies, it, too, must conduct frequent joint training exercises. These do not necessarily 
need to be large scale, expensive exercises. They can also take the form of local drills 
conducted at the battalion / precinct level. To coordinate these, OEM could establish 
localized offices in each of the five boroughs that would organize these drills and bring 
together the various agencies who would respond to different emergencies in these areas. 
In addition to simply conducting more interagency drills, however, these 
drills need to be more realistic and designed to identify the gaps, overlaps, and seams that 
will occur at real events. Carefully scripted exercises designed to conceal problems may 
impress the media, but if they are not brought to light during exercises and addressed, 
they will develop at actual events.  
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2. Model NYC’s Personnel Provisions and Promotion Policies on Those 
of the GNA 
Studies and hearings conducted by Congress in the years leading up to enactment 
of the GNA identified the dominant influence of the individual services over 
organizations responsible for joint military preparation and planning as the greatest 
hindrance to integrating the branches of the military. Congress further recognized that as 
long as military officers gave the highest priority to the interests of their service while 
losing sight of broader, more important national security needs, and believed their actions 
were correct, this behavior would not change.18 
They felt that something had to be done to instill a joint culture among the officer 
corps that would lead to an appreciation and understanding of how the services could and 
should operate together. As a result of these conclusions, Congress incorporated several 
provisions into the GNA designed to reduce service influence and increase the 
desirability of joint duty in an effort to change the culture of the services.19  
Given the success of these provisions in achieving a “joint culture” within the 
DoD and close parallel between the situation identified by Congress and the current 
situation in NYC between its emergency response organizations, similar measures should 
be taken. Therefore, the following recommendations, based on provisions in the GNA, 
should be implemented:  
 
a. A Detail to OEM or Other Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) Should 
be a Prerequisite for Promotion to the Staff Ranks of an Agency 
Just as the GNA mandated a military officer perform a tour in a “joint” 
billet, NYC should require those who wish to ascend to the top ranks in all agencies with 
ties to public safety, particularly the NYPD and FDNY, to accept a detail either to OEM 
or other Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) for a period of at least two years. This requirement 
would have the effect of making these positions highly coveted ones so as to attract 
quality applicants. It will also encourage the agencies to send only highly qualified 
                                                 
18 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 3-4. 
19  John F. Schank and others, Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List, vol. 574 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1996), 45-46, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR574/MR574.appa.pdf  (accessed November 15, 2005). 
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personnel since only they will be eligible for promotion to the top positions in that 
agency later on. This provides a number of advantages to the City in its quest to change 
the current culture of parochialism in its agencies. Among them are: 
It Will Build Personal Relationships Between These Members 
By getting mid-level managers and officers into these positions and 
requiring them to work alongside their counterparts from other agencies prior to reaching 
the top of their professions, they will build personal relationships with each other. This 
will break down some of the stereotypes and barriers that are built up early in one’s 
career. It will also afford them an opportunity to network with the future leaders of all the 
other city agencies. 
It Will Familiarize These Members with the Priorities, Concerns, and 
Goals of other Agencies  
Oftentimes, disputes between agencies occur as a result of differing 
priorities and a lack of familiarity with the role each agency has to play. Working side by 
side with representatives from other disciplines allows a better understanding of the 
capabilities, concerns, and needs of that group. It also allows those members to gain a 
better perspective of what each agency is trying to accomplish, making consensus on how 
to achieve these goals easier. 
It Will Place Members from Each Agency in an Environment Where 
They Can Collaborate Freely 
The pressure and influence that can be exerted by an organization on its 
members can cause them to pursue the interests of that organization even at the expense 
of the greater good. Likewise, the peer pressure associated with loyalty to one’s own 
organization should not be underestimated. Human nature leads people to identify with 
the group to which they belong. The subconscious effect of being surrounded by 
members from that group leads one to pursue the group’s interests, and to believe that 
that is the right thing to do. The City can use this dynamic to its advantage by placing 
members into a group environment, surrounded by others in a similar situation, where 
they identify with the overall needs of the City rather than their individual agency. 
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b. Safeguards Need to be Established to Prevent Retaliation Against 
Members by Their Sponsoring Agency 
There is naturally a concern by members of an agency that if they are seen 
as not advocating hard enough for that agency or as embracing a city-centric mind-set 
that works to the detriment of the home agency, that they may face retribution upon 
return to that agency. It does not matter whether those concerns are real or merely 
perceived to affect their behavior, it is enough that they exist. Therefore, this type of 
punitive action must be discouraged and safeguards established to ensure that these 
members feel protected. This will assist in encouraging these members to adopt a non-
parochial attitude. To accomplish this, the following policies should be put in place: 
• Agreements between members and their agencies regarding 
promotions, assignments, etc. which will take effect upon 
successful completion of a JDA should be approved, in writing, 
prior to the detail commencing. 
• The determination as to whether the member has successfully 
completed the detail would be based solely on personnel 
evaluations conducted by that member’s supervisor(s) at the JDA.  
• Good performance evaluations would guarantee the promotions 
and assignments agreed to whereas poor evaluations would negate 
them. In addition, poor evaluations would prevent the member 
from receiving credit for the JDA, thereby ending their chances for 
promotion to the staff level. 
• Officers who demonstrated exceptional commitment to joint 
concepts during their JDA would be offered the opportunity to 
pursue a separate career path at OEM including the opportunity for 
promotions and salary increases within OEM. Members who chose 
this path would eventually make up the senior management 
positions at OEM (as described in recommendation 1b, above). 
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3. The City Should Mandate a Professional Education Program 
Emphasizing “Joint Doctrine” 
The personnel provisions of the GNA also made use of the military education 
system as a means of emphasizing and institutionalizing “jointness” among the services 
by focusing military science courses on emerging joint doctrine.20 While NYC does not 
have a direct parallel to the military education system for its employees, it does help 
finance the City University of New York (CUNY) system. It also maintains educational 
requirements for appointment to both the NYPD and FDNY and for each promotional 
step above that. 
NYC should develop a public safety curriculum devoted to promoting interagency 
cooperation and collaboration based on the military model, and use that curriculum as a 
means of educating officers in each agency, in the City’s strategic plans, and in joint 
operations. It should require a set number of credits as a prerequisite for promotion to 
each rank and customize the courses so that they correspond to the phases of one’s career 
and the requirements of each position.  
Doing this would serve to reinforce the City’s emphasis on the importance of 
approaching homeland security from a city-centric perspective and better educate its 
employees on its strategic goals. Where practical, these courses should be taught jointly 
by current and former members of the NYPD and FDNY to give the curriculum 
credibility with these groups. 
 
4. Additional Recommendations Not Based on the GNA 
Although there are many similarities between the pre-GNA environment within 
the DoD and the current environment in NYC between the NYPD and FDNY, there are 
obviously some local issues that do not have a direct correlation. The following 




                                                 
20 Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, "Emergence of the Joint Officer," Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Autumn 1996): 53-54, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1213.pdf (accessed November 15, 2005). 
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a.  Independent Oversight Must be Established  
Due to the highly political nature of the circumstances that have led to this 
rivalry and the intentional duplication of capabilities, independent oversight will be 
required during the implementation of these recommendations and subsequently to ensure 
they are not being circumvented or ignored. To that end, the City Council should 
establish a committee with oversight powers to watch over how these recommendations 
are implemented, to address non-compliance by any agency, to hold hearings if 
necessary, and to make public its findings. In addition, outside consultation should be 
sought to review and comment on implementation and quality of the plan. This process 
should be as open, inclusive, and transparent as possible to avoid the pitfalls of politics 
and parochialism that have plagued response protocols for the past few decades. 
 
b. CIMS Needs to Be Revised to be More Logical, to Truly 
Recognize Core Competencies of Agencies, and to More Closely 
Follow NIMS 
For the most part CIMS does follow the template of NIMS and only 
relatively minor (although significant) changes need to be made to the document as a 
whole. It also provides for some very positive features such as After Action Reviews 
(AAR’s) and interagency training. However, the manner in which these provisions are 
practiced and the areas where CIMS deviates from NIMS are critical failings in this 
system. 
As will be shown, the justifications used for making such controversial 
decisions as initially placing the NYPD in Single Command of every Haz-Mat / CBRN 
incident simply do not stand up to scrutiny. The inconsistent applicability of this 
provision and the confusion and criticism it generates warrant a revision of it. By 
following the national model and initially establishing a Unified Command at all such 
incidents, the conditions discovered at the scene, rather than potential causes and 
parochial interests, will dictate the command structure and the resources required to 
manage it. 
In addition, the evidence strongly suggests that decisions made regarding 
what constitutes the “core competencies” of the individual agencies were specifically 
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designed to marginalize the role of the FDNY by failing to recognize its true capabilities. 
This list must also be revised to more accurately reflect the experience and expertise of 
the individual agencies. 
Creating a system that makes the agencies mutually dependent on each 
other to accomplish their respective missions fosters interagency cooperation as the need 
for it is recognized. Simply building up the capabilities of both agencies so that they 
operate independently of each other has the opposite effect. CIMS has to be revised so 
that it clearly delineates the roles of agencies based on their true core competencies and 
eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort and the friction it creates. 
 
c. The 911 System Needs to be Revamped to Include Fire 
Department Representation and Dispatchers 
The 911 system in NYC is currently staffed entirely by civilian employees 
of the NYPD. All calls to 911 go to these dispatchers who, depending on the nature of the 
call, may conference in an FDNY dispatcher at another location. Each agency then 
dispatches units in accordance with its own response matrix. At the very least, this delays 
FDNY response. Many times FDNY units are not dispatched at all to emergencies at 
which they could play an integral part. 
Despite repeated requests by the fire department to station an officer 
inside the 911 center to act as a liaison, ensure calls are routed appropriately to FDNY, 
and provide expert advice to callers trapped in burning buildings, the NYPD has refused 
to allow this.21 
The City needs to revamp the 911 system so that both PD and FD 
dispatchers are working side by side in the same control center. In addition, it needs to 
institute a response matrix for emergencies that simultaneously dispatches units from 
multiple agencies including the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS based on the needs of the 
incident as determined from the information received. The current system not only wastes 
valuable time, but also leads to mistakes in the information given or simply failing to  
 
                                                 
 21 This information was from interviews with three FDNY staff chiefs who do not wish to be 
identified. 
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make the required notifications. As an interim measure, however, until the technical 




In arriving at the recommendations advocated in this thesis, a variety of sources 
and methods were used. The first few chapters analyze the history of this rivalry, its 
underlying causes and consequences, and the reasons it has been allowed to continue. 
The next sections look at previous attempts to manage this rivalry, the events that led up 
to enactment of CIMS, and the strengths and weaknesses of that document. The final two 
chapters examine the circumstances and conditions leading up to passage of the GNA, 
their similarity to the current situation in NYC, the successes and failures of that act in 
achieving its stated goals, and finally, how to apply provisions of that act to resolve the 
interagency conflicts in NYC by changing the culture of its two largest emergency 
response agencies. 
To determine the underlying causes of and potential solutions to this rivalry, 
interviews were conducted with 20 current and former mid- and high-ranking officials in 
the FDNY, NYPD and OEM. Interviews were also conducted with police and fire 
officials in other large cities to determine if and where similar rivalries exist. In addition, 
over 25 New York Times and other newspaper articles dating back to the mid-1980’s 
provided a historical context to this rivalry and a record of it.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) report entitled 
Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: The 
Emergency Response Operations22 and the Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States23 (The 9/11 Commission Report) documented 
how this rivalry affected operations at the World Trade Center (WTC) and also made 
recommendations on how to improve interagency operations. 
                                                 
22  Randall J. Lawson and Robert L. Vettori, Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the 
World Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2005), http://wtc.nist.gov/NISTNCSTAR1-8.pdf  (accessed January 4, 2007). 
23  9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report. 
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The chapters on CIMS naturally reference that document and compare and 
contrast it with the national model, NIMS. In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
CIMS, this thesis again relies on interviews with members of the NYPD, FDNY, OEM, 
and others. However, in an effort to capture the official position of the administration and 
of the commissioners of these agencies, it also relies heavily on testimony these officials 
gave to the 9/11 Commission and to the City Council during hearings held on CIMS. It 
also includes testimony by prior administration officials and recognized public safety 
experts. 
The chapters pertaining to the GNA and applying that model to NYC utilize 
various government documents and reports which identify the problems that existed 
within the DoD prior to the GNA and the successes and failures noted in the years since 
its enactment. Interviews were also conducted with military personnel assigned to 
USNORTHCOM to gain perspective on their personal experiences with the provisions of 
this act. In addition, numerous articles specifically dealing with the effects that the GNA 
had on military culture, planning, education, and operations were found in Joint Force 
Quarterly, a journal dedicated to promoting integrated operations of the armed forces.24 
                                                 
24 Joint Force Quarterly Homepage, Institute for National and Strategic Studies, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/ (accessed 02/28, 2007). 
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II. THE CAUSES OF AND SOLUTIONS TO INTERAGENCY 
CONFLICT 
A great deal has been written on what is needed for different organizations to 
successfully collaborate and cooperate with each other. Since 9/11, much of this literature 
has focused on how these theories can be applied to emergency responders. Entire theses 
and books have been written on the subject. While the focus of this thesis is establishing 
first, that there is a problem in NYC that needs to be addressed, and second, offering a 
solution to it; determining what is required for successful collaboration to occur, and 
studying the effects when those components are missing, deserves some discussion. 
Ultimately, the recommendations made here will incorporate the factors that enhance 
relationship building. 
 
A. FACTORS AFFECTING INTERORGANIZATIONAL 
COLLABORATION 
A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 surveyed 25 mid- to 
senior-level homeland security leaders enrolled in a master’s degree program in 
Homeland Security. The respondents represented a diverse group of organizations 
including USNORTHCOM, U.S. Coast Guard, Center for Disease Control, Directors of 
Offices of Emergency Management, and city-level police and fire departments, to name a 
few. Each was asked to identify three factors that created conditions for successful 
interagency collaboration, based on their personal experiences. They were then asked to 
identify three factors that inhibited collaboration. The results of the study are shown on 
the table below. The factors in each category were all identified by at least three (i.e., 12 
percent) of the participants. The ones listed in bold font were named by at least six (i.e., 









“Success” Factors “Barrier” Factors 
“Felt need” to collaborate Divergent Goals 
Common goal or recognized 
interdependence 
Focus on local organization over 
cross-agency (e.g. regional) 
concerns 
Adaptable to interests of other 
organizations 
Lack of goal clarity 
Purpose and 
Strategy 
 Not adaptable to interests of other 
organizations 
Formalized coordination 
committee or liason roles 
Impeding rules or policies 
Sufficient authority of participants Inadequate authority of 
participants 
 Inadequate resources 
 Lack of accountability 
Structure 
 Lack of formal roles or 
procedures for managing 
collaboration 
Social capital (i.e., interpersonal 
networks) 
Lack of familiarity with other 
organizations 
Effective communication and 
information exchange 
Inadequate communication and 
information sharing (distrust) 
Lateral 
Mechanisms 
Technical interoperability  
Collaboration as a prerequisite 
for funding or resources 
Competition for resources 
Leadership support and 
commitment 
Territoriality 
Absence of rivalries Organization-level distrust 
Acknowledged benefits of 
collaboration (e.g. shared 
resources) 
Lack of mutual respect 
Incentives 
 Apathy 
Appreciation of others’ 
perspectives 
Lack of competency 
Competencies for collaboration Arrogance, hostility, animosity 
Trust  
People 
Commitment and motivation  
 
                                                 
25  Susan P. Hocevar, Gail F. Thomas and Erik Jansen, Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness, eds. M. M. Beyerlein, S. T. Beyerlein and F. A. 
Kennedy (New York: Elsevier, 2006), 255-274. 
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1. Success Factors 
It is not surprising to find that most of the factors that were identified as important 
to successful collaboration seem intuitive. While there may be some disagreement as to 
the order of importance in which they are ranked, no one would disagree that they would 
all help to build a foundation for interagency collaboration. 
Among the most commonly identified factors (those chosen by at least 25 percent 
of these Homeland Security professionals) were a “felt need” to collaborate, a common 
goal or recognized interdependence, social capital (interpersonal relationships), effective 
communication, funding as an incentive, and leadership support. As will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, the majority of these success factors are lacking in the relationship 
between the NYPD and FDNY. In the final chapter, the recommendations made will 
address these issues. 
 
2. Barrier Factors 
Similarly, the types of issues that were identified as a hindrance to collaboration 
do not require much explanation. They are also quite prevalent in NYC. The most 
commonly cited barriers were lack of familiarity with other organizations, inadequate 
communication and information sharing (distrust), competition for resources, “turf 
battles”, and perceived incompetence. Once again, the solutions recommended will seek 
to eliminate these obstacles or limit their influence on interagency relationships. 
These results mirror the 2002 findings of the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report looking into the challenges facing the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) as it attempted to unite 22 individual agencies under one umbrella. The 
report stated that organizations fail at collaboration for several reasons: organizations 
have their own missions with goals and incentives that often conflict with one another; 






support collaborative efforts; and coordination systems and structures that might support 
collaboration are often lacking (United States Government Accountability Office, 
December 2002).26  
 
B. THE PSYCOLOGY OF INTERAGENCY RIVALRY AND CONFLICT 
BETWEEN FIRST RESPONDERS 
It has long been recognized that operations at the scene of emergencies can 
sometimes be hindered by rivalries between agencies, particularly police officers and 
firefighters. For over a century, competitive and sometimes strained relations between 
police and fire departments have been common in many U.S. cities. To a certain degree it 
is an unavoidable result of the competition for the same municipal dollars which sets the 
stage for this adversarial relationship.27 NYC is oftentimes held up as the quintessential 
example of this problem. 
For the most part, these agencies work through these tensions and NYC is no 
exception. As the mayor and his commissioners often point out, the agencies respond 
together to hundreds of calls a day, and almost all responses are without conflict. 
However, there is a difference between tolerating each other and working cooperatively 
and collaboratively. 
Anytime two or more individuals interact, the potential for conflict arises. When 
one person wants something that is at odds with what another wishes or holds ideas 
contrary to another’s beliefs, disputes may occur.28 Similarly, differing ideas about how 
to protect public safety, how to best resolve an emergency situation, and what the 
priorities of the incident are, are all potential causes of conflict as well. Having more than  
 
 
                                                 
26 Hocevar, et al., Building Collaborative Capacity, 255-274; Government Accounting Office, 
Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership, GAO Report 03-260 
(Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, December 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03260.pdf. (accessed June 26, 2006). 
27  John Buntin, "Battle of the Badges," Governing Magazine (September 2005), 46, 
http://www.southampton.liu.edu/homeland/governing_news.html (accessed June 27, 2006). 
28  Walter Mischel, "Psychodynamic Theories: Freud's Conceptions," Introduction to Personality, 3rd 
ed. (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 38. 
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one agency capable of performing the same actions increases the likelihood that there 
will be differing opinions about what should be done, and nowhere is the overlap in 
capabilities more prevalent than in NYC. 
Adding to this dynamic is the fact that emergency scenes are inherently stressful 
events. The more complex and dangerous the scene, the greater the level of stress will be. 
The human body responds to stress by releasing adrenaline which increases heart rate, 
respirations, and blood pressure in a “fight or flight” response. It is in the midst of this 
environment that personnel from different agencies arrive in separate vehicles, 
emblazoned with different agency logos, and wearing different uniforms. Nevertheless, 
they are told have a common mission.29  
In addition, the intensive re-socialization that takes place in the police and fire 
academies produces a strong sense of “in-group” unity and affinity for other members of 
the agency, and typically a sense of antagonism for those outside the group.30  Social 
identity, that promotes the power of one organization over another produces two social 
outcomes, especially during complex or stressful incidents. First, it creates a positive in-
group bias toward those who are part of the same group and a negative out-group bias 
against those who are part of a different group (Deaux, 1996, Zimbardo, 2004).31 When 
providing information across groups or agency lines, people are prone to give more 
information to those in their own group and less to those outside it. Second, when people 
are under stress, they feel very little obligation to share important information with those 
outside the group since the responsibility for doing so is diffused within their group. This 
dynamic was clearly shown between first responder groups who operated at the WTC on 
9/11.32  
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C. THE EFFECTS OF INTERAGENCY RIVALRY ON OPERATIONS AT 
THE WTC 
New York City’s long history of rivalry between its police and fire departments 
over command of operations at the scenes of various emergencies is well known and well 
established. The question is what, if any effect did the years of interagency rivalry have 
on operations at the WTC on September 11, 2001? 
As was noted by the 9/11 Commission, despite Mayor Giuliani’s directive entitled 
“Direction and Control of Emergencies in the City of New York” which attempted to 
eliminate “potential conflict among responding agencies which may have areas of 
overlapping expertise and responsibility”, and despite the designation of OEM as the 
“On-Scene Interagency Coordinator”, the “FDNY and NYPD each considered itself 
operationally autonomous.”33 In addition, the Commission found that command posts set 
up by the FDNY and NYPD were in different locations. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) report on Emergency Response Operations at the 
WTC concluded that “the FDNY and NYPD department chiefs [did not work] together at 
the same command post, and that they did not formulate unified orders and directions for 
their departments.” The report also found that “there is no record that the ICP [Incident 
Command Post] had any senior NYPD personnel assigned to it to provide liaison or assist 
with operations”.34 
As a result, the 9/11 Commission determined vital information that would have 
aided in making crucial decisions was not shared among the agencies and that the 
“FDNY chiefs would have benefited greatly had they been able to communicate with 
personnel in a helicopter.”35 The ultimate consequence of this failure to share information 
was a far greater sense of comprehensive situational awareness at the NYPD’s command 
post than at the FDNY’s. Consequently, although both departments ordered evacuation of 
their members from the North Tower after the collapse of the South Tower, the sense of 
urgency exhibited by firefighters was far less than those exhibited by NYPD officers. 
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The NIST investigation concluded “a preponderance of evidence indicates that 
emergency responder lives were likely lost at the WTC resulting from the lack of timely 
information sharing and inadequate communications capabilities.”36 [emphasis added] 
The 9/11 Commission determined that “many of these firefighters died, either because 
they delayed their evacuation to assist civilians, attempted to regroup their units, lacked 
urgency, or some combination of these factors.”37  
Despite the contentious history that existed between the NYPD and FDNY, it is 
unthinkable to believe that information that could save the lives of personnel from 
another agency would intentionally be withheld. So, why did NYPD commanders 
urgently give evacuation orders to their own members, but fail to inform the FDNY about 
the dangers observed by its aviation unit? One reason is the organizational bias that 
existed between these agencies due to their long standing rivalry. This is an unconscious 
bias that stems from the desire to belong to an omnipotent group that is capable of 
excluding those who are not part of the group. It is very similar to the turf battles and 
failure to share information that occurred between the FBI and CIA leading up to 9/11. In 
both cases the reason for failing to share information is ultimately a quest for the 
superiority of one agency over the other.38 Information is viewed as power, and that is 
not something that is readily shared, particularly between agencies that have an 
uncooperative history.  
 
D. OVERCOMING INTERAGENCY RIVALRY THROUGH THE USE OF A 
UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE 
While noting that the magnitude of the crises at the WTC and at the Pentagon 
were not comparable, the 9/11 Commission did observe that there are lessons to be 
learned about integrating multiagency response efforts by studying the response at the 
Pentagon. The Commission concluded that “while no emergency response is flawless, the 
response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three 
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reasons: first, the strong professional relationships and trust established among 
emergency responders; second, the adoption of the Incident Command System; and third, 
the pursuit of a regional approach to response.”39 
In part, due to the relative success of operations at the Pentagon, and the tragic 
lack of cooperation and loss of life at the WTC, President Bush issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 in February 2003. This directive mandated that 
all municipalities become “NIMS-compliant” (an essential component NIMS is the 
Incident Command System or ICS) in order to qualify for federal homeland security 
funding. Central to the success of ICS is the use of a Unified Command structure at 
multiagency events. This point was echoed by the 9/11 Commission when it 
recommended “Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident 
Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, 
they should adopt a unified command.”40 
In order to overcome organizational bias, agencies need to end their attempts to 
control each other and gain superiority over each other and, instead, work together as 
partners at emergency operations. A unified command structure allows agencies with 
different functional responsibilities to work effectively together without affecting their 
individual authority.41 It allows the Incident Commanders to combine their knowledge 
and share information as they jointly develop operational objectives.42 In addition, it 
gives the individual members operating at the tactical level the confidence that their 
leaders have helped develop the strategic plans they are now being tasked with 
accomplishing. 
A Unified Command also fosters an atmosphere where information is shared 
readily since it makes all participants into members of the same group. Just as the 9/11  
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Commission recommended intelligence agencies promote a culture of “need-to-share”43, 
emergency responders must share information that may be critical to the operations of 
another agency.  
Similarly, a Unified Command helps alleviate blind spots that develop in the 
command capacity of leaders during times of crisis. Studies have shown that as incidents 
become more complex and stressful, people tend to narrow their focus on the aspects they 
feel are most important to them. As a result, information was shared within a group, but 
not across groups.44  
A major weakness of placing only one agency in charge at complex incidents is 
that the Incident Commander is unlikely to have a full understanding of the qualifications 
and equipment carried by other agencies on the scene. For reasons of institutional pride 
and familiarity with its own resources, that agency will look to its own personnel to 
accomplish a mission, even though other resources may be available (and even superior 
to its own). This is especially true where these agencies have similar or overlapping 
capabilities. 
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III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. “BATTLE OF THE BADGES” – A CHRONOLOGY 
“Disputes between members of the [NYPD and FDNY] at rescue scenes have 
been common for decades. They have been so numerous that the phrase ‘battle of the 
badges’ was coined to describe them”.45 This quote from an article in the New York 
Times on yet another clash between these agencies at the scene of an emergency 
illustrates that, despite the contention of mayors, past and present, and their police and 
fire commissioners, that relations between the departments are generally good, they are in 
fact strained, and tensions can boil over at any incident. 
NYC is alone in its decision to give its police department predominance in 
emergency responses over its fire department. It is also alone in its national reputation for 
interagency conflict and documented cases of failing to communicate and cooperate at 
emergencies, culminating with the tragic loss of over 400 first responders on 9/11. That is 
not a coincidence. But in order to understand this rivalry as it currently exists, we must 
first look at how it originated and how it has been allowed to persist and worsen over the 
years.  
The FDNY established the nation’s first heavy rescue unit, Rescue 1, in 1915 and 
equipped that unit with a wide variety of specialized tools. In 1928, twelve police officers 
were detached to the fire department to receive specialized training in the use of these 
tools. Two years later, in 1930, Police Commissioner Whalen established the Emergency 
Services Division of the NYPD and equipped its vehicles with dozens of tools and 
ladders so that they closely resembled fire trucks.46 
The real controversy began in 1948 when Mayor William O’Dwyer officially put 
the NYPD in charge of all emergencies, except fires, at the urging of his long-time friend 
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and police academy classmate, Police Commissioner Arthur W. Wallander. From that 
point until the mid-1980’s, fire officials occasionally protested the policy, but no changes 
were ever made. This is attributable largely to the fact that the position of fire 
commissioner does not have the same political clout as police commissioner. In addition 
an increasing number of fires (particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s), preoccupied fire 
department officials so that they did not pursue this matter.47 
Due to a dramatic increase in crime, a decrease in the number of fires, and ever-
widening budget gaps in NYC during the early- and mid-1980’s, however, the issue was 
revisited. Early in 1987, Nicholas Mancuso, the firefighter’s union president, was facing 
the prospect of losing pay parity with police officers in addition to firehouse closings. He 
began a campaign to document conflicts between the two agencies at emergency scenes 
and the tardy notification to firefighters of these emergencies by police 911 operators. As 
a result, a series of news stories regarding these issues brought them to the public’s 
attention.48 Unable to ignore the situation, Mayor Ed Koch ordered his First Deputy 
Mayor, Stanley Brezenoff, to officially review the situation and make recommendations. 
In August of 1987, a panel of experts assembled to study the situation 
recommended putting the fire department in charge of rescue efforts at the scene of any 
incident in which there was a potential for fire, while the police would handle traffic and 
access to the site. These incidents included vehicle accidents, gas emergencies, hazardous 
material spills, building collapses, and the like. Police officials were so outraged at the 
draft of the proposal that they leaked copies of it to selected reporters along with a 
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scathing criticism of it authored by Assistant Chief John J. Holmes who oversaw the 
NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit (ESU).49 
For three more months, the two departments argued back and forth the merits of 
their case. That November, Mayor Koch sided with the police. “Bowing to police 
pressure and historical precedent, Mr. Koch overruled his aides last fall, leaving the 
police in charge of virtually all disasters except fires.”50 That, however, did not end the 
dispute. Several more minor incidents kept the story alive until, on May 1, 1988, both 
agencies responded to an incident “in which police officials barred fire department divers 
from helping police divers search for a man trapped in a helicopter in the East River.”51 
The man died several hours after being removed to an area hospital. That resulted in 
widespread criticism of the event and in Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward being 
publicly rebuked in a letter from Mr. Koch that said the police's handling of Sunday’s 
operation “defies common sense”.52 
Mr. Ward responded that according to the agreement signed in November, the 
FDNY divers were not called to the scene, were not needed, and should not have even 
been there. He and Fire Commissioner Joseph Bruno were called to a meeting with the 
mayor to resolve their differences on May 3 after which they met with reporters. During 
the questioning tempers flared again “as the two began yelling at each other in City Hall 
and Mayor Koch yelled back, rebuking them as if they were unruly children.”53 
Shortly after that, Mr. Brezenoff attempted to test the relative response times of 
the two agencies to vehicle accidents by giving them simultaneous notification of their 
occurrence. However, Mr. Ward rejected the idea claiming it would lead to the two 
agencies recklessly responding to these calls in an effort to beat the other there, a claim 
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that the deputy mayor rejected.54 Ultimately, however, the police commissioner prevailed 
and the idea was never tested, even to this day. 
In September of 1988 the feud ignited again when the fire commissioner, in 
response to a mayoral request to reduce the fire department’s budget by $9.5 million to 
help pay for an anti-crack program run by the police department, suggested that 50 fire 
marshals be reassigned to narcotics enforcement and that firefighters “be allowed to 
respond to all non-fire rescues”55 (an idea that anywhere else in the country would be 
considered long overdue). The result was another series of public exchanges between 
police officials and fire officials culminating with the fire commissioner reading a letter 
of apology for “causing distress to the mayor and police commissioner”.56 
Public displays of rivalry between the departments largely subsided after that until 
a December 1992 incident in which a firefighter was arrested at the scene of a car 
accident, but released without charges after a scuffle at the scene made the papers. Unlike 
their predecessors, however, Mayor David Dinkins, Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly, and Fire Commissioner Carlos Rivera refused to discuss the issue and the story 
went away.57 Although tensions between the departments persisted in the early 1990’s, 
public disputes between the agencies remained relatively few and far between. 
Recognizing the need to better coordinate the City’s resources, Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani removed the Office of Emergency Management from its status as a unit within 
the NYPD and established the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management in February of 
1996.58 OEM was given three basic functions: to monitor key communications channels, 
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including NYPD and FDNY frequencies; to improve NYC’s response to major incidents 
by planning and conducting drills and exercises involving multiple agencies, particularly 
the NYPD and FDNY; and to manage the City’s overall response to an incident.59 This 
agency was given the full authority of the mayor’s office to coordinate the response and 
determine which agency was to act as the Incident Commander if there was any dispute. 
And although there was little improvement in the relationship between the police and fire 
departments during this time, outright fighting at the scene of emergencies was very rare 
because OEM was acknowledged as having final say in this matter. The 9/11 
Commission concluded, however, that “nevertheless, the FDNY and NYPD each 
considered itself operationally autonomous. As of September 11, they were not prepared 
to comprehensively coordinate their efforts in responding to a major incident. The OEM 
had not overcome this problem.”60 
When Michael Bloomberg was elected mayor in November, 2001, the first 
appointment he announced was that of Ray Kelly to serve as police commissioner, a role 
he held previously from October 1992 until January 1994 under former Mayor David 
Dinkins. He had also served as an NYPD ESU commander under Ben Ward during the 
late 1980’s when the public battles between the NYPD and FDNY were at their peak. 
Almost immediately upon taking office, Mr. Kelly used his considerable clout 
with the mayor to begin expanding the NYPD’s sphere of influence. “Insiders say Kelly 
was a key force behind reducing the role of the Department of Emergency Management 
to a ‘planning’ agency from what it had once been - the mayor's commander at 
emergency scenes.”61 With OEM out of the way as the “on-scene” interagency 
coordinator, relations began to sour further between the NYPD and FDNY as several 
more publicized fights occurred at incidents.  
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In June of 2003 a burglar attempting to break into a restaurant by climbing down 
a chimney became stuck. The agencies argued over whether this constituted a rescue or 
crime scene and resulted in the arrest of a firefighter.62  Two weeks later, both agencies 
arrived at the scene of a person missing in the waters near the East River. Despite 
warnings by the FDNY captain that he had men in the water, police officers in a launch 
began dropping a grappling hook into the water, striking an FDNY diver and knocking 
off his mask.63 An investigation was conducted, but no punitive action was ever taken. 
In light of these incidents and, to a greater degree, in light of the requirement in 
HSPD-5 that all municipalities become NIMS-compliant in order to qualify for federal 
homeland security funding, the following day the police and fire commissioners agreed to 
adopt a formal protocol to establish rules for operating at incidents involving multiple 
agencies.64 This was a complete reversal from their testimony before the city council on 
October 8, 2002 in which they stated that such a system was not appropriate for NYC.65 
They originally predicted that the agreement would be completed and signed by 
the end of the summer in 2003. However, that estimate proved to be overly optimistic 
considering the long-standing rivalry between these two agencies. In April of 2004, The 
New York Times reported: 
…documents and interviews show that the dispute over control of such 
scenes among the City's main emergency response agencies -- the police 
and fire departments and the Office of Emergency Management -- remains 
profound. An exchange of letters in January between the police 
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department and the O.E.M., in fact, shows that the police insist that they 
should control virtually every major emergency.66  
The article goes on to explain that the letters were leaked to The Times and were 
written by then Assistant Chief Phil T. Pulaski (largely seen as the architect behind the 
NYPD’s aggressive power grab). In them he says “O.E.M. should have neither the 
authority to choose which city agency would take the lead role, nor the authority to 
resolve interagency disputes…Moreover, it is the position of the NYPD that the 
coordinating agency should have no operational authority whatsoever.”67 
With the 9/11 Commission scheduled to meet in NYC to discuss the response to 
the WTC that May, pressure mounted to have the plan, known as the Citywide Incident 
Management System (CIMS), in place before then. The mayor, despite years of 
interagency rivalry and all the evidence to the contrary, suggested that “there was little 
need for an agency to coordinate the work of the police and fire departments”68 and 
ultimately sided with the police. “‘The truth of the matter is they don't have big 
coordinating problems,’ he said on Feb. 20, 2004 during his weekly WABC radio 
program. ‘The City,’ he said, ‘needs more planning from the OEM, rather than having it 
simply respond to events.’”69 
Mayor Bloomberg officially announced that a formal agreement had been reached 
on the first draft of CIMS on May 14, 2004, just four days before the 9/11 Commission 
began its hearings in NYC. The plan was immediately assailed by Fire Department and 
fire union officials and by several emergency response experts. A police department 
official, however, announced “we’re very pleased with the outcome”.70 
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Less than a year later, in April 2005, Mayor Bloomberg officially signed CIMS 
after a few minor revisions to it and over strong objections to several aspects of it by the 
FDNY. This prompted the highest ranking uniformed officer in the FDNY, Chief of 
Department Peter Hayden, to publicly criticize the document on the front page of the New 
York Times on April 22, 2005, leading the New York City Council to hold public 
hearings on the protocol.71 
 
B. WHY THIS STRUCTURE EXISTS 
Simply put, this arrangement exists for two reasons: Power and Politics. The 
prestige that comes with holding the office of NYC Police Commissioner is nothing new. 
Teddy Roosevelt held this position from 1895-1897 and used it as a stepping stone on his 
way to governor of New York and eventually to president of the United States.72 The 
power and clout of this position only increased from the 1960’s through 1980’s as crime 
and a sense of lawlessness rose dramatically and mayoral re-election bids were 
increasingly tied to crime statistics. Because police officers are more visible to the public 
than firefighters, their presence and activities are more politically charged, giving police 
commissioners a degree of influence not shared by their counterparts in the fire 
department. (Mayors do not get re-elected based on how many fires their fire department 
puts out).  
In addition, the racial tensions of that period reinforced the perception in minority 
neighborhoods that the predominantly white police force was more of an occupying army 
than public servants. Several police officials interviewed noted that the NYPD never 
referred to their special operations officers as “SWAT teams” specifically for this reason. 
Police commissioners wanted these members to remember that their primary mission was 
“to protect and to serve” and did not want them to develop an “Us vs. Them” mentality. 
They carefully guarded their designation as the agency in charge of all emergencies  
 
 
                                                 
71  O'Donnell and Rashbaum, “New Terrorism Response Plan Angers Fire Department,” 1. 
72  Steve Avery, Theodore Roosevelt 1858-1919, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h959.html  
(accessed 10/20, 2005). 
37 
(except fires) both in an effort to reinforce that message to their members  and to improve 
the image of the NYPD as a whole through the favorable press that such rescue work 
generates. 
The current police commissioner, Ray Kelly, is arguably the most powerful police 
commissioner the City has ever had. A recent New York Times article made the following 
comments about Mr. Kelly: 
…a city official with unparalleled influence in the Bloomberg 
administration…he wields enormous clout in City Hall…Unlike nearly 
every other city commissioner, Mr. Kelly literally answers to no one but 
Mr. Bloomberg. He refuses to take even mundane requests from senior 
mayoral aides, several officials said, and is equally insistent on imparting 
information to the mayor directly…his advice to the mayor, unlike that of 
other commissioners, is almost always accepted without 
qualification…The police commissioner is also widely seen as the 
architect of Mr. Bloomberg's recently announced plan to dismantle many 
of the core functions of the Office of Emergency Management, which 
many experts believe should be the lead agency in catastrophic incidents 
involving public safety and health.73 
These observations were mirrored in an article by Newsday about Mr. Kelly 
around the same time: 
The mayor has made no secret of the fact that he defers to Kelly in all 
matters of law enforcement, even as the commissioner's influence 
widens… One source with political ties to the mayor once described 
Bloomberg as “in awe of tough guy Kelly.” Others have said the mayor 
takes Kelly's word as “gospel.”… Insiders say Kelly was a key force 
behind reducing the role of the Department of Emergency Management to 
a “planning” agency from what it had once been - the mayor's commander 
at emergency scenes.74 
It is the dependence that NYC mayors have on their police force, not only for 
their own personal protection, but for their ability to make the citizens of New York feel 
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safe and ultimately generate votes, that has created a situation in which they often defer 
to the wishes of their police commissioners in matters of jurisdictional turf wars. 
It is the desire to remind their members of their duty to serve the public as well as 
to garner positive media coverage for their organization; expand their sphere of influence; 
and stave off budget cuts that has led a long line of police commissioners to jealously 
guard their atypical responsibility of being in charge of most emergencies. 
This dynamic might explain why Mayor Koch ignored the recommendations of 
the committee that he himself empanelled to study the issue of emergency response. It 
would also explain why the current mayor has chosen to bow to the wishes of his police 
commissioner by giving command of all Haz-Mat / CBRN responses solely to the police 
department despite well reasoned arguments from the fire department to the contrary and 
widespread criticism of the plan from public safety experts around the country. 
 
C. THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE RIVALRY 
 
1. Competition for Resources 
As is the case between agencies and departments in any organization, there is 
always a degree of competition for limited resources. In the private sector scarcity 
encourages thrift, drives prices up, and seeks other ways to satisfy demand. In 
government, however, dwindling budgets have usually stimulated battles between 
agencies that reward the bureaucratically adept and end only when resources once again 
start to flow.75 
During “good” times, organizations often seek to expand their roles in order to 
increase their budgets to give them a cushion against the funding cuts that will eventually 
come. This creates a natural enmity between agencies, particularly as one expands into 
“turf” traditionally belonging to another. This is a common source of tension between 
first responders around the country as they compete for funds to perform their missions. 
It is also one of the “barrier” factors to interagency collaboration identified by a 
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significant percentage of the homeland security leaders discussed in Chapter II. But this 
alone does not explain why that rivalry is so much more intense in NYC than elsewhere. 
 
2. Overlapping Spheres of Responsibility 
The fundamental reason for this decades-long conflict can be summed up in one 
cause: the overlapping spheres of responsibility that these two agencies have. A look at 
the training that members of the FDNY’s Special Operations Command (SOC) and the 
NYPD’s Emergency Service Unit (ESU) receive illustrates this duplication and gives 
some indication of where areas of potential conflict lie: 
 
Table 2. A comparison of FDNY (SOC) and NYPD (ESU) training 
FDNY76 NYPD77 
Medical (CFR-D) Medical (EMT) 
Haz-Mat (various courses ranging 
from Technician level – 80 hrs to 
Specialist level - >500 hrs) 
Haz-Mat (minimum 80 hrs) 
SCUBA SCUBA 
USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) 
Auto Extrication Auto Extrication 
Trench collapse operations Trench rescue operations 
High angle rope rescue High angle rope operations 
Ice Rescue Ice Rescue 
Confined space rescue Confined space rescue 
Water rescue Water rescue 
“Bomb School” (1 week course) 
(EMRTC – Univ. of  New Mexico) 
“Bomb school” (1 week course) 
(EMRTC – Univ. of  New Mexico) 
Firefighting (hundreds of hours of 
initial and review courses for 
various types of structural and non-
structural fires 
Subway firefighting  
(1 week Port Authority course) 
                                                 
76 Information obtained from FDNY course curriculum for state certifications and from Special 
Operations Command Technical Rescue School and Haz-Mat Operations course offerings. (Note: this is 
only a partial list for illustrative purposes.) 
77 Barry Galfano, retired NYPD ESU Captain, interview conducted  November 6, 2006. (Note: this is 
only a partial list for illustrative purposes.) 
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“Rad School” (1 week course) 
(Bechtel – UNLV? Nevada test site)
Special weapons and tactics 
“Live Agent” (1 week course) 
Aniston, Alabama  
Hostage negotiations  
(1 week course John Jay College) 
Building Collapse Operations  Emotionally disturbed persons 
(1 week course John Jay College) 
Elevator Emergencies Animal control 
(Note: This list is by no means comprehensive and is presented to highlight areas of duplication.) 
 
All of this training is in addition to the standard 13 week academy (soon to be 
changed to 23 weeks) for firefighters where they learn basic emergencies and firefighting 
and the 23 week academy for police officers where they learn basic law enforcement 
procedures. 
As can be seen from the list above, both departments invest a tremendous amount 
of time (and related expenses) in training their members to operate not only at their 
traditional missions of firefighting and crime fighting, but also at a wide variety of non-
conventional emergencies. The problem is that each agency has developed its capabilities 
independently of the other, based on what it perceives as its role, rather than on a 
coordinated approach to the needs of the City as a whole. In addition, each feels that it is 
better qualified to manage these incidents when they occur due to this training. As a 
result, both agencies maintain a pool of several hundred highly motivated and highly 
trained individuals who belong to their “Special Operations” divisions. Predictably, this 
duplication has led to many situations where both agencies compete for control at 
incidents rather than communicate and work together to resolve them. 
It is not surprising to learn that if the individual agencies are given the training 
and equipment to operate independently of each other that is exactly what they will do. It 
should also come as no surprise that when they arrive on the scene together each will 
attempt to perform operations in accordance with how they were trained and that they 




needed to ensure cooperation is the development of a mutual dependence on each other to 
provide the impetus to work together and to foster an atmosphere of respect and 
appreciation for each others’ roles. 
In an article for Gotham Gazette entitled “Revisiting 9/11, Reworking 911”, 
Joshua Brustein illustrates this point when he writes: 
The reason that the City has not been able to decide how to divide control 
over large emergencies is that the police department and the fire 
department are competing to carry out the same tasks, according to many 
experts. In this regard, New York is unique among large American cities. 
Until this is resolved, they say, the City will not be able to accomplish the 
kind of sensible command system that Mayor Bloomberg had hoped to 
create with [CIMS].  
It’s a large problem because when you have two different agencies doing 
the same things, it is certainly not efficient, and not cost effective,” said 
Glenn Corbett professor of fire science at John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice. “And more importantly, it’s an impediment to a really well-
defined incident command structure.78 
In addition, because the overlap exists in areas that are considered the “marquee 
missions”, the competition is all the greater. Oftentimes media coverage accompanies 
these rescue operations and serves as a form of recognition for the dedication these 
members put into training for just these types of incidents. It is human nature to be 
resentful of those who not only deny one that recognition but take it for themselves. 
The irony is that prior to joining either the NYPD or FDNY these members are 
indistinguishable from each other and possess no bias toward either organization. They 
come from similar backgrounds and are genuinely motivated by a desire to help people. 
In fact, traditionally about 10%79 of each new fire academy class is made up of police 
officers who have decided to switch agencies. And, a large percentage of the ESU 
officers who live in the suburbs are members of volunteer fire departments in their home 
town. This animosity toward the other organization is an entirely learned phenomenon 
which has now become institutionalized over several generations. 
                                                 
78  Joshua Brustein, "Revisiting 9/11, Reworking 911," Gotham Gazette, 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/20040524/200/989 (accessed 11/20, 2005). 
79 Source: FDNY Department of Personnel. 
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The City’s attempts at resolving this rivalry over the years has come in the form 
of a variety of protocols intended to designate which agency should be “in charge” at the 
scene of various emergencies, but none have attempted to address the underlying issue: 
that both agencies train their members to do many of the same jobs. This approach is 
tantamount to treating the symptoms rather than the disease. Predictably, these protocols 
have been largely ignored as members of both agencies perform their duties in 
accordance with their training.  
It is not realistic to expect cooperation between these agencies when both have 
developed the same capabilities and arrive on the scene expecting to use them only to be 
told that their services are not required because another agency is “in charge”. The 
situation is only exacerbated when it is clear that those resources are not being used 
because of parochial considerations. 
 
D. THE CONSEQUENCES 
The consequences of this failure to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities and 
end this needless duplication are as predictable as they are tragic. The long history of 
tensions between these agencies is a direct result of the City’s failure to address this issue 
in any meaningful way. As a result, there is a great degree of resentment and distrust 
between the agencies.  
 
1. Lack of Information Sharing 
As was noted by the 9/11 Commission, this relationship manifested itself on 9/11 
with the two agencies failing to coordinate their efforts.80 As a result, “information that 
was critical to informed decision making was not shared among agencies.”81 
While CIMS does seem to address the lack of information sharing to a degree by 
mandating that a single command post be established with representatives from all 
responding agencies, it neglects to mandate that that information is actually shared when 
it allows a Single Command structure to be established at Haz-Mat / CBRN incidents. In 
                                                 
80 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 285. 
81  Ibid., 321. 
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this type of structure, all information flows to the top commanders of the lead agency (the 
NYPD), however, they are under no obligation to share it and will only do so as they 
deem necessary. Information that may appear insignificant or unimportant to an NYPD 
commander in conducting their operations may in fact be critical to an experienced fire 
chief. For example, reports from police helicopters at the WTC on 9/11 stating “about 
fifteen floors down from the top, it looks like it’s glowing red”82 could possibly have 
saved lives if the FDNY had been made aware of them. 
The 9/11 Commission, in studying the lack of coordination between the NYPD 
and FDNY on September 11th, stated “The experience of the military suggests that 
integrated into such a coordinated response should be a unified field intelligence unit, 
which should receive and combine information from all first responders—including 911 
operators. Such a field intelligence unit could be valuable in large and complex 
incidents.”83 By bringing all the respective agencies into the information loop, the 
Incident Commander(s) would benefit from the relative expertise of each group. 
Unfortunately, the experiences of the last several decades give little indication 
that information will be shared any more willingly in the future than it has been in the 
past. The manner in which the 911 system is structured in NYC is indicative of the way 
that information is not shared. All 911 operators are civilian employees of the NYPD. All 
calls coming into 911 are taken by these operators. Fire department dispatchers only 
receive calls that are forwarded by 911 operators. Although guidelines are in place to 
determine which calls are to be forwarded, numerous anecdotal stories,  FDNY unusual 
occurrence reports, and personal experience demonstrate that this is not always done and 
not always in a timely manner when it is. 
The 911 center has a police captain and platoon commanders on duty around the 
clock to supervise and give information to operators that they can pass along to callers as 
                                                 
82  Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, 102 Minutes: The Untold Story of the Fight to Survive Inside the Twin 
Towers, ed. Henry Holt (New York: Times Books, 2005), 223. 
83 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 322. 
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necessary.84 The FDNY has made repeated requests to station a fire department 
representative in the 911 center but those requests have been rebuffed.85 As a result, the 
fire department has no means of ensuring it receives timely notification of all 
emergencies. This is largely the same system that was in place during the late 1980’s 
when the very public battles between the NYPD and FDNY were taking place. Many of 
these battles centered on claims that fire department units were not being notified about 
certain emergencies.86 When Deputy Mayor Brezenoff attempted to have both agencies 
receive simultaneous notification of emergencies, those plans were successfully thwarted 
by Police Commissioner Ward.87 Since then, the guidelines have changed somewhat, but 
the procedure has not. 
As recently as last year this failure to share information continued. In the wake of 
the anthrax attacks in 2001, the FDNY and NYPD set up joint Haz-Mat Response (HMR) 
or “hammer teams” with members from each agency to respond to calls for suspicious 
powders. After a few months, when the FBI withdrew its participation, the teams were 
split and the NYPD ceased to notify the FDNY about these calls. The FDNY’s teams 
took it upon themselves to monitor the NYPD’s special operations frequency to attain 
this information. However, due to the failure to share this information and the 
implementation of CIMS, the FDNY’s hammer teams were eventually disbanded. The 
practice of monitoring the police frequency in firehouses continues, however, and leads 
to faster response times to these and other incidents by FDNY units.  
Another example of this institutionalized rivalry leading to a lack of information 
sharing is in the area of intelligence regarding terrorist threats to NYC. The NYPD 
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maintains an Intelligence Division that is unparalleled by any other city, and probably 
most states, in the country. They regularly cite numerous investigations into terrorist 
activity and claim to have disrupted several planned attacks on NYC since 9/11.  
In early October, 2005, the NYPD received intelligence, later found not to be 
credible, regarding a specific threat to detonate explosives in the NYC subway system on 
or about October 9th. In response, the mayor and police commissioner decided to hold a 
press conference to alert the public about the threat on October 6th.88 Despite having 
seven chiefs and fire marshals with Top Secret clearances, the first notification the FDNY 
received regarding this threat was that press conference. In fact, to date, the FDNY has 
never received a single classified briefing from the NYPD Intelligence Division, although 
it has begun to receive some unclassified, open-source briefings.89 
This type of adversarial relationship and information hoarding does not bode well 
for the prospect of information sharing at the scene of a large-scale terrorist attack. As 
discussed earlier, this was plainly evident at operations at the WTC and confirmed by the 
findings of the 9/11 Commission and the NIST.90 One of the theories advanced to 
account for this is a lack of radio interoperability. Mayor Bloomberg alluded to this when 
he testified to the Commission “Even the shortcomings that the have been identified by 
the Commission in the City's response to 9/11 were the results of problems in 
communications, not the result of any battle of the badges.”91 
However, the 9/11 Commission Report refuted that claim when it said “we 
conclude that the technical failure of FDNY radios, while a contributing factor, was not 
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the primary cause of the many firefighter fatalities in the North Tower.”92 [emphasis 
added] Similarly, the investigation conducted by NIST noted that the NYPD command 
post was only a short distance from the FDNY command post.93 Communications 
between the top levels of the agencies were primarily hampered not by a lack of 
interoperable communications but by the culture of the departments. 
To its credit, the City has made an enormous effort to overcome the technical 
issues with the FDNY portable radios identified after 9/11, and has had considerable 
success in addressing many of them. While some problems still remain, the general 
consensus is that the current system is vastly superior to what was in place in 2001. In 
addition to resolving many of the issues associated with fire ground communications, the 
new radios are also equipped with several interoperable channels which allow 
communications between agencies. However, interviews conducted indicate that use of 
these channels is more the exception than the rule. This is especially true at the tactical 
level where a dedicated channel known as “Tac-U” has been reserved to allow 
communications between NYPD and FDNY members making joint entries into an area. 
To date, this channel has never been used at an operation. 
The most unfortunate consequence of the relationship between the NYPD and 
FDNY is that it has resulted in a lack of trust between the agencies. It is this lack of trust 
that leads to the failure to share information, not the radios. NYC has developed 
interoperable communications, and that is not to be overlooked. Interoperability is a vital 
aspect of deepening trust. It is the technical side of trust. Without it, trust evaporates 
quickly in times of crisis.94 “Technical interoperability” is one of the “success” factors 
identified in Chapter II by at least 12 percent of the group. However, “Inadequate 
communication and information sharing (distrust)” was identified as a “barrier” by at 
least twice that number. It is important to understand that the ability to communicate on a 
common frequency does not guarantee that communication will occur, it merely makes it 
possible.                                                   
92 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 323. 
93  Lawson and Vettori, Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center 
Disaster, 162. 
94 Lawrence B. Wilkerson, "What Exactly is Jointness?" Joint Force Quarterly, no. 16 (Summer 
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2. Reduction in Competency 
Another negative consequence of this intentional duplication is the degree of 
competency these members are able to maintain in their skills as their missions 
encompass more and more training that is unrelated to their core profession of 
firefighting or police work. Most first responders spend their entire careers becoming 
skilled at firefighting, police work, or as medical care providers. Hazardous materials 
response can be a career in itself as can bomb technician, SCUBA diving, and a wide 
variety of other areas in which both departments train their special operations members. 
The question is, at what cost? A Jack-of-All-Trades is master at none. The more new 
skills are learned and practiced, the less time is available to practice the old ones. 
Training one agency to perform certain tasks and another to perform different ones would 
allow both to become more specialized in those responsibilities. 
The City would be better served by designating only one agency to perform each 
one of these functions. This would eliminate any question of who should be performing 
that task and allow both agencies to concentrate on the missions that pertain to their 
organization. It would have the added benefit of creating a need to cooperate as the two 
agencies to become mutually dependent on each other to accomplish their missions. 
“Recognized interdependence” is another “success” factor identified by at least one-
quarter of the group discussed in the last chapter. The cost savings generated by 
eliminating duplication could then be used to provide more training and equipment 
related to the duties that remain.  
 
3. Wasted Resources 
This duplication of effort is not only harmful to interagency cooperation, but it is 
also extremely expensive to maintain. Millions of dollars are spent each year by both 
agencies to train and equip their members to perform functions that the other agency can 
also carry out. And despite the comparative size of New York City’s budget to smaller 
jurisdictions, it is difficult to justify spending money to provide a service that already 
exists. 
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The overlap of responsibilities has only worsened since 9/11 as homeland security 
funding has allowed both agencies to purchase millions of dollars worth of Haz-Mat 
equipment and training, previously an area where the FDNY had undisputed 
responsibility. This runs contrary to Secretary Chertoff’s statements that jurisdictions 
should be moving toward a “regional approach”95 to Homeland Security. In a speech on 
January 3, 2006 on UASI grant funding, Secretary Chertoff said “The fact of the matter is 
the public has a right to expect that even when a city is in a high-risk category, the money 
it gets under this program has to be spent wisely and effectively.”96 NYC has instead 
used some of its funding to duplicate capabilities it already has. 
For example, CIMS designates the FDNY as the agency having a core 
competency in “Mass Decontamination”97 (although it does not define what this term 
means). To meet this responsibility the FDNY has purchased over 30 decon shower tents 
and five decon shower apparatus. It has also provided 24 hours of training in the use of 
this equipment and in decontamination procedures to over 1500 of its members.  
The NYPD, however, has no competency that mentions decontamination at all. 
Yet, the NYPD is currently in the process of purchasing three decon shower apparatus 
from Advanced Containment Systems, Inc. (ACSI) at a cost of approximately $1.5 
million. Experience suggests that this will ultimately result in a dispute over who will 
perform decontamination of victims at a scene since both agencies will possess the 
capability and the term “Mass Decontamination” is open for interpretation. The only 
thing that is certain is that there is $1.5 million less available for other homeland security 
initiatives. 
This type of action is typical of the interagency rivalry that exists between these 
agencies. Rather than call FDNY resources to scenes where decontamination is required, 
the NYPD has decided to purchase its own. Rather than take advantage of an opportunity 
that requires mutual cooperation as a means to promote teamwork and trust between the 
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agencies, the NYPD has chosen to operate independently. Rather than utilize $1.5 million 
dollars on equipment and training directly related to its core competencies, it has chosen 
to spend that money duplicating an existing resource and creating another potential area 
of conflict. 
In May of 2004, Mayor Bloomberg testified to the 9/11 Commission while 
discussing new technologies that “This will make them more efficient, eliminate 
duplication, and do a better job of protecting the public.”98 [emphasis added] On the 
contrary, the evidence suggests that just the opposite has occurred. Secretary Chertoff 
also commented “…the fact that you are eligible as a high-risk city doesn't end the 
analysis, it begins the analysis. And the analysis then has to consider, what are the needs 
you're going to be addressing with the particular investments you want to make?  Only 
when we get a justified investment is the money going to flow to the cities that are 
otherwise eligible.”99 It can be argued that choices to purchase equipment, such as the 
one described above, may have contributed the decision to reduce NYC’s homeland 
security funding by some 40 percent in 2006. 
As grant funding inevitably decreases from the federal government in coming 
years, equipment and training will need to be maintained and upgraded. That burden will 
ultimately fall to the City. Doing so for two agencies will be all the more expensive. It is 
in the City’s interest, not only for reasons of efficiency and improved interagency 
relations, but also financially, to eliminate this duplication once and for all.  
 
E. REDUNDANCY AND DUPLICATION ARE NOT THE SAME THING 
Some officials have argued that New York is fortunate to have more than one 
agency with these specialized capabilities. They claim that redundancy makes the system 
more resilient, as if it were a piece of critical infrastructure. In the case of emergency 
response, having more than one agency capable of performing the same function may, on 
its face, appear to be beneficial. That is because the term “redundancy” implies some 
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form of internal safeguard is built into a system in case part of it fails (or is 
overwhelmed), so that it can still function. Examples would include having a back-up 
power generator for when electric service is interrupted or having data saved in a separate 
location in case a computer crashes.  
And if these duplicate capabilities were used as a “back-up system”, they might 
have a point. But they are not. And as has been illustrated in countless anecdotal 
examples, this arrangement breeds contempt, distrust, and an overall lack of cooperation 
and communication. The situation in NYC is more analogous to a computer with more 
than one anti-virus program installed. It would appear that the user has additional 
protection; however, in practice it results in internal conflicts. It is not the case of the 
back-up system coming into play when the primary fails; it is a case of the two fighting 
over primacy. Similarly, a power generator has a transfer switch to ensure that only one 
source (either the generator or the primary power) can supply the circuits at a time. If 
both supplied power simultaneously, it would create a power surge that would trip the 
circuit breakers. 
An example of true redundancy is illustrated in the map below that shows the 
location of FDNY units with Haz-Mat capabilities above the “Operations” level (i.e., the 




Figure 1.   Map of Unit Locations of FDNY Haz-Mat Group 
 
As can be seen, these units are spread throughout the City so that if a catastrophic 
event (or multiple events) occurs, units can be drawn from other areas to respond. Each 
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of these units has five to six firefighters working in them at a time. This is true 
redundancy because all these units have identical training, equipment, and SOP’s so that 
they are virtually interchangeable. A few score of ESU officers who are on duty at a 
given time do not add real redundancy to this system when responding to a Haz-Mat 
incident. This is especially true when one considers that those same members will also 
have responsibilities at the scene that are more closely related to their core missions of 
site security, investigation, evidence collection, etc. which will limit their availability for 
assessment, mitigation, and rescue operations. 
 
F. OFFICIAL DENIAL 
“[Mayor Giuliani’s] creation of the Office of Emergency Management and the 
issuance of his Incident Command Directive were attempts to address the long-standing 
rivalry between the NYPD and the FDNY. This rivalry has been acknowledged by every 
witness we have asked about it.”100 [Emphasis added] This statement, read into the record 
on Day 1 of the 9/11 Commission hearings in NYC by the Commission’s staff, clearly 
indicates that the Commission, after extensive interviews, had confirmed that this rivalry 
did in fact exist. 
There are two reasons that, up to this point, so much time has been devoted to 
describing the origins of the historical relationship between the NYPD and FDNY, the 
reasons it still exists, and the regrettable consequences of it: The first is because many of 
those at the top levels of city government either deny that it exists at all or downplay the 
significance of it. And while this is done for political reasons, until there is an admission 
that there is in fact a problem, there will be no impetus to resolve it. The second is 
because understanding the nature of this institutionalized rivalry is critical to 
understanding the environment in which CIMS was created and the process used to 
develop and implement it. 
For example, NYPD Commissioner Kelly began his question and answer period 
before the 9/11 Commission by stating, “I would say that the competition--the whole 
issue of rivalry is overblown. There is mostly friendly competition. Just last Sunday, we 
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had a football game, for instance, between the police and the fire department.”101 It is as 
if he is implying that that one event negates decades of rivalry and distrust. Of course he 
understands that that is not the case, but that type of soundbite serves to distract the 
public from the problem. 
Commissioner Kelly goes on to state: 
But I think there have been some incidents. They've been few and far 
between. They've been overblown. But I think that the system we're 
adopting now [CIMS] will go a long way to address some of the public's 
concerns and I guess some of the real issues concerning turf. I don't want 
to say they don't exist, but I think they are overblown. But this is a 
management system. It envisions incident commanders for the agencies 
that respond to a big event, and it envisions a unified command structure 
where the executives of these agencies get together and make collective, 
collaborative decisions.102 [emphasis added] 
Unfortunately, that statement is misleading. If these major incidents did in fact 
envision a Unified Command, perhaps operations and relationships would improve. 
However, one of the most controversial aspects of CIMS is that at any CBRN or Haz-Mat 
incident, a Single Command is established with the NYPD as the Incident Commander. 
CIMS clearly states “the Incident Commander is solely responsible for establishing 
incident management objectives and strategies”103 [emphasis added] contradicting 
Commissioners Kelly’s assertion that decisions are made collectively or collaboratively. 
Similarly, OEM Commissioner Bruno told the Commission that “What you're 
hearing about that there are disputes is lower level people who are arguing about who 
should rescue who, who should do what.”104 [emphasis added] While it may be true that 
the disputes the public hears about usually involve major controversy or physical 
altercations at the scene involving these members, the arguments over strategic decisions 
and interpretations of CIMS that go on out of the public arena are far more common and 
involve the upper levels of these agencies.  
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Mayor Bloomberg, likewise, testified to the 9/11 Commission: 
The armchair quarterbacks forget that New York City police officers and 
firefighters work together hundreds of times a day on such incidents as 
building collapses, fires, and traffic accidents. And although much has 
been made of the so-called battle of the badges, these are isolated episodes 
that are the result of individual, low-level breakdowns in discipline. They 
are not the problem of systemic problems and don't occur higher up, 
where it would jeopardize the mission of each agency.105 [emphasis 
added] 
On the contrary, the “low-level breakdowns in discipline” (i.e., the incidents that 
make the newspapers) are merely symptoms of an institutionalized rivalry that permeates 
all levels of both organizations. The claim that these are not systematic problems or that 
they do not occur at higher levels is simply untrue. Examples such as the Police and Fire 
Commissioners yelling at each other at City Hall in front of Mayor Koch or of former 
FDNY Chief of Department, Peter Hayden, publicly criticizing CIMS on the front page 
of the New York Times106 belie these claims.  
The assertions that the overwhelming majority of the incidents to which the 
FDNY and NYPD respond together go very smoothly are entirely true. However, that is 
because the overwhelming majority of incidents are clear cut and do not require any 
highly specialized training. It is clear who is in charge and the agencies have different 
responsibilities. Almost all of the problems occur at scenes where ESU is involved 
because they perform many of the same functions and have many of the same capabilities 
as FDNY units. And over the past few years, this duplication has only increased with the 
use of federal funds to purchase Haz-Mat equipment. 
The embarrassment caused by public displays of interagency friction explains 
why mayors go to great lengths stifle public dissention from their commissioners and 
chiefs. But stifling dissent and eliminating the cause of it are two entirely different things. 
Until the underlying causes of this rivalry are addressed with meaningful reforms, 
relations will not improve.  
                                                 
105 Transcripts from Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, Day Two sess., 78. 
106 O'Donnell and Rashbaum, “New Terrorism Response Plan Angers Fire Department,” 1. 
55 
On day two of the hearings, after receiving a much more disconcerting assessment 
of NYPD-FDNY relations from Report from Ground Zero author, Dennis Smith, among 
others, 9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick pointedly observed “So we should not take 
too much comfort in the fact that they had a football game?”107 
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A. PREVIOUS PROTOCOLS THAT GOVERNED NYC EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE 
 
1. Koch Protocol  
As was discussed in Chapter III, during most of the 1980’s, the police department 
was in charge not only of operations at virtually every emergency in NYC, but also of 
notifying the fire department that the emergency even existed, by forwarding that 
information from its 911 center to fire dispatchers. Much of the heated rhetoric of that 
time centered on the claim that fire units were receiving this information late (to allow 
ESU time to arrive there first) or not at all. This is a claim that persists today and is 
evidenced by the NYPD’s refusal to notify the FDNY about suspicious powders and 
packages or to allow a FDNY representative in the 911 center. 
Despite the findings of an expert commission assembled specifically to study the 
issue, Mayor Koch ignored the panel’s recommendation and allowed the police 
department to remain in charge of most emergencies. The only change in that policy was 
the promise to notify the fire department of more emergencies than they had previously 
and the assurance that if ESU gave an ETA of more than five minutes to incidents such as 
vehicle accidents or persons in the water, the FDNY would be notified to respond. Not 
surprisingly, ETA’s of greater than five minutes were never given. 
 
2. Dinkins Protocol 
In an effort to clarify the roles of each department further and to avoid the 
embarrassing public disputes that had plagued the previous administration, Mayor 
Dinkins issued a response protocol of his own, signed by both departments, which kept 
the police department in charge of most emergencies and made some minor changes to 
the notification process. The mayor promised that this protocol would work “because it 
involved persons of good will”108  
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As can be expected, however, little changed since none of the underlying causes 
of the conflict were addressed. Each agency continued to operate in accordance with its 
own objectives and procedures, never attempting to coordinate its efforts with the other. 
 
3. Giuliani Protocol 
When Rudy Giuliani became mayor, he took a very strong stance on issues related 
to public safety and appointed two very competent men to head the police and fire 
departments: William Bratton and Howard Safir, respectively. He also made it clear that 
when it came to matters of public safety, he was the ultimate authority in the City, as 
opposed to the police or fire commissioners. The consensus of opinion from interviews 
conducted with former administration officials is that Mr. Bratton was focused mainly on 
the NYPD’s core mission of reducing crime, which had risen to record levels under the 
previous administration. Mr. Safir, meanwhile, had convinced the mayor to spend tens of 
millions of dollars to upgrade firehouses, install computers, increase training, and 
purchase emergency equipment for firefighters, to make up for years of neglect under 
prior administrations.  
By early 1996, halfway through his first term as mayor, Mr. Giuliani was in the 
process of merging the NYPD from three separate departments (NYPD, Housing, and 
Transit) into one, and merging EMS into the FDNY. Yet, despite these sweeping changes 
in the way the departments were organized and the strong leadership style of the mayor, 
institutionalized tensions between the two departments continued unabated at the scenes 
of emergencies. As a result, in February of that year, Mr. Giuliani established the 
Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management under its first director, Jerry Hauer. 
Around this time, the mayor also issued a response protocol designed to end the 
interagency squabbling. (This protocol entitled “Direction and Control of Emergencies in 
the City of New York” was later updated in July of 2001 just prior to the attack on the 
WTC.)  For the first time, the FDNY was put in charge of certain emergencies other than 
fires. These included building collapses and Haz-Mat incidents. While it was only a two-
page document, it did attempt to address the problem by assigning a single agency, either 
NYPD or FDNY in most cases, as the Incident Commander.  
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However, simply creating another protocol that stated which agency was “in 
charge” did not eliminate the underlying tensions between these departments. Despite this 
document being a directive from the mayor’s office, frequently ESU officers would tell 
FDNY chiefs at one of these scenes that “the NYPD did not sign off” on the new 
protocol, or later, when the NYPD was ordered to sign it, that they “only signed the first 
page” (the list of emergencies with the agency assigned as the IC was on the second 
page).109 
What this document did do, however, that had never been done before was to 
designate another agency, the Office of Emergency Management, as the “on-scene 
interagency coordinator” for all emergencies.110 This essentially put OEM in the position 
of “referee”, for lack of a better term, at incidents where there was some dispute as to 
who the IC should be. The directive stated that when an incident is “so multifaceted that 
no one agency immediately stands out as the Incident Commander, OEM will assign the 
role of Incident Commander to an agency as the situation demands”.111 
Having an empowered OEM on the scene to make this designation was essential 
because they were recognized as having the authority to determine who was in charge in 
addition to their ability to bring additional resources to the scene as needed. And since 
they did not have any resources of their own with which to resolve the situation, they did 
not possess the organizational bias that either the NYPD or FDNY did. OEM knew it was 
dependent upon these agencies to accomplish their mission and, as a result, ensured that 
information was shared among them. It also chose the agency to act as the IC based on 
which one was best suited to resolve the particular situation, rather than on parochial or 
political considerations. 
However, despite the major progress in coordinating interagency operations that 
this arrangement led to, the 9/11 Commission rightly noted that OEM had not been able 
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to convince the agencies to work as a team.112 The attack on the WTC was clearly 
beyond the capabilities of any single agency. Therefore having the FDNY alone 
designated as the incident commander was a flaw in this protocol. The 9/11 Commission 
observed “Certainly the FDNY was not ‘responsible for the management of the City’s 
response to the emergency’ as the mayor’s directive would have required”.113 In 
retrospect, former FDNY Chief of Department Peter Hayden stated that he believes that 
the entire operation should have been handled using a Unified Command.114 
 
B. GENESIS, HISTORY, AND EVOLUTION OF CIMS 
Incident management systems are a relatively new creation designed to coordinate 
resources to enable them to operate cooperatively and collaboratively at a variety of 
incidents. They are especially useful at large-scale events that involve multiple agencies 
and multiple jurisdictions. In April, 2005, the City of New York formally adopted the 
Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) as “an incident management doctrine for 
managing emergency incidents and planned events in New York City.”115  
This system has its origins dating back to the early 1970’s and was developed in 
response to a need to coordinate multiple agencies across several counties in combating 
wildland fires in California. At the time, hundreds of thousands of acres of forest were 
being consumed by fire each year and causing several deaths and hundreds of millions of 
dollars in property damage. A lack of coordination between responding agencies led to 
chronic and systemic problems at these fires. The primary reasons for these problems 
were that each of the dozens of emergency service agencies that responded had its own 
jurisdictional strategic goals and objectives. Communications remained within each 
jurisdiction’s vertical chain of command. Planning and resource allocation were handled 
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independently by each jurisdiction and there was no mechanism to coordinate and 
manage the vast number of jurisdictions that had a part in the incident.116 
As a result of one particularly disastrous blaze, known as the Laguna Fire, which 
lasted from September 26 to October 3, 1970, a cooperative work group was formed to 
study how interagency, multi-jurisdictional wildfires could be better managed. The group 
called itself Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). FIRESCOPE was chartered by an act of Congress in 1972 
and charged with a national mandate to develop a system for multi-agency coordination 
of complex emergencies that exceeded the responsibilities of any single jurisdiction. This 
eventually led to the development of the Incident Command System (ICS).117 
By the end of the 1970’s, FIRESCOPE ICS had transformed into an efficient 
organization and decision making process. It was adopted by the National Fire Academy 
and incorporated into its training curricula in 1980. Also in 1980, the federal government, 
recognizing the potential of ICS, transitioned it into a nationwide program called the 
National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) which became the basis for 
a response management system for all federal agencies involved with wildfire 
management responsibilities. In 1982, the National Fire Academy incorporated NIIMS 
into its training curricula. In 1996, the U.S. Coast Guard adopted NIIMS for response to 
oil and hazardous substance releases and in 1998, adopted it for use throughout the entire 
Coast Guard.118 
All through the 1980’s fire service leaders debated the merits of FIRESCOPE ICS 
and compared it to another system, the Fireground Command System, which had been 
developed to manage structural fires. Beginning in 1990, a consortium of 23 major fire 
service organizations worked on merging the two systems into a single command system 
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to derive the benefits of both. In February of 1993, the consortium completed the merger 
and called it the Incident Management System (IMS).119 
Prompted by the attacks of 9/11 on the WTC and Pentagon, President Bush issued 
HSPD-5 on February 28, 2003, directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop 
and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). Section 20 of that 
directive states “Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, federal departments and agencies shall 
make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing 
federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The 
Secretary shall develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a State or local 
entity has adopted the NIMS.”120 
In response to this provision in the directive, the city of New York abandoned its 
long-standing opposition to a formalized Incident Command structure and the following 
year issued its first draft of the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS). 
 
C. HOW CIMS WAS DEVELOPED AND WRITTEN 
 
1.  The Timing 
The long-standing rivalry between the NYPD and FDNY, the disagreements over 
who should be responsible for various types of emergencies, and the Police 
Commissioner’s desire to expand the power and influence of the NYPD initially led him 
to testify against implementation of any form of Incident Management System in NYC. 
On October 8, 2002, he told the city council:  
Incident Command, if by that you mean, or unified command, by that you 
mean that one agency is telling other agencies what to do in a particular 
situation, I don’t think it works…I think looking for one incident 
commander, in this world that we face is difficult to identify. There’s a 
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fires, focused on municipalities that can’t handle an incident by 
themselves…I don’t think that type of system is appropriate for New York 
City.121 [emphasis added]  
However, less than five months later the issuance of HSPD-5 caused the 
commissioner and the City to rethink their opposition or risk the loss of Homeland 
Security funding. As was noted earlier, this event, in addition to a series of embarrassing 
clashes at several emergencies, led the Police and Fire Commissioners to promise to have 
a protocol in place by the end of the summer, 2003.  
In order to accomplish this, OEM was charged with brokering an agreement 
between these agencies (in addition to others) to determine who would be the lead for 
various types of emergencies and the command structure that would be used at these 
incidents. This negotiation brought the duplication of capabilities to a head as both the 
NYPD and FDNY each believed they should be in charge of most emergencies. 
Despite assurances that the protocol would be completed before the fall of 2003, 
negotiations over it lasted well into 2004 with the most contentious issues remaining 
unresolved as the OEM Commissioner John Odermatt, left that position in December 
2003. Instead of naming a successor during these crucial negotiations, the mayor named 
OEM’s First Deputy Commissioner, Calvin Drayton, as Acting Commissioner for two 
months. It was not until March 4, 2004 that the mayor appointed civil court judge and 
former fire commissioner Joseph Bruno to head the Office of Emergency Management. 
With the 9/11 Commission scheduled to hold hearings in NYC in mid-May and 
no protocol yet agreed upon, the pressure mounted to produce a document. On May 14, 
2004, just four days before the 9/11 Commission met in New York, the first draft of 
CIMS was released to the public amid a flurry of criticism both from the fire department 
and the 9/11 Commission itself. 
 
2.  The Process 
Perhaps learning from the experience in the 1980’s of having an independent 
group look at how to make the most efficient use of city resources (and then having to put 
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pressure on the mayor to ignore the findings of that panel), the Police Commissioner used 
his considerable influence with the mayor in the drafting of CIMS and in making the key 
determinations as to the wording of the document and what the core competencies of the 
individual agencies were. And rather than seek any outside expertise or opinion, the City 
instead chose to develop CIMS internally, minimizing any public review or commentary 
on it until it was completed and signed by the mayor.  
After CIMS became finalized in April, 2005, the city council’s Public Safety 
Committee and Committee on Fire and Criminal Justice Services held joint hearings on 
it. During the opening remarks, Chairperson Vallone commented: 
Let me say this from the outset that, Commissioner Bruno, Chairwoman 
Clarke and I were very disappointed on the manner in which this protocol 
was provided to us. 
On numerous occasions, through letters and personal requests, we asked 
for this protocol. Yet upon arriving in our offices on Friday, April 20th, 
we read in The Times that the mayor signed the protocol on April 11th. 
We were not informed by you or anyone else that the protocol was signed 
into existence. 
In addition, we requested to review the protocol and did not receive a copy 
until Tuesday, May 3rd, six days before this hearing, despite amending our 
hearing date to accommodate your schedule.122 
These comments were immediately followed by the remarks of Co-Chairperson 
Yvette Clarke who observed: 
In preparing for this hearing, Council Member Vallone and I reached out 
to experts in emergency preparedness around the country. There was a 
consensus among those experts that CIMS has fatal flaws and fundamental 
ones. In fact, in preparing for this hearing, and I'm trying to arrive at as 
balanced a viewpoint as possible, I personally asked the mayor's office to 
put us in contact with any third party experts that they have consulted to 
approve of CIMS. How many of the mayors's experts do you think we've 
spoken with? None. They could not provide us with one single outside 
expert who supports CIMS.123 [emphasis added] 
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When the first draft of CIMS was made public just prior to the 9/11 Commission 
Hearings in NYC, it was met with a great deal of cynicism by the 9/11 Commissioners 
themselves.  
Former Navy secretary and 9/11 Commission member, John F. Lehman, 
commented:  
I'm aware of the history and of the traditions and of the politics that have 
shaped the public service agencies in this city over many, many years… 
And I think that the command and control and communications of this 
city's public service is a scandal… It's not worthy of the Boy Scouts, let 
alone this great city… It's a scandal that after laboring for eight years, the 
City comes up with a plan for incident management that simply puts in 
concrete this clearly dysfunctional system.124 
Lee H. Hamilton, the vice chairman of the panel, described the portion of CIMS 
that designates multiple agencies as “primary agencies” as a "prescription for 
confusion."125 
Commissioner Gorelick remarked “I remain troubled by the timing, both how 
long it took to get the system in place and the timing of its issuance last Friday”126 
In response to this criticism, the administration tried to reassure the Commission 
that this was only a first draft and that revisions would be made to it to improve the 
document. Mayor Bloomberg, while not taking any questions at the hearings, did read a 
prepared statement into the record. In it he said: 
Certainly any system can be improved. CIMS is no exception. We will be 
constantly evaluating and monitoring CIMS in order to do just that. That’s 
why I picked Joe Bruno to head that commission. There will be extensive, 
ongoing training to ensure its success. We will adopt new technologies, 
match resources to changes in population density and other conditions, 
and reduce duplicative services.127 [emphasis added] 
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Yet despite these promises, no substantive changes to the command structure or to 
the core competencies listed for each agency were made before the final version was 
released;128 and no changes at all have been made in the two years since. In addition, no 
reduction in duplicative services has occurred. In fact, the purchase of additional Haz-
Mat equipment by the NYPD, including the three decontamination apparatus mentioned 
earlier, will only increase the amount of duplication that exists. 
When called to testify before the city council after CIMS was officially signed by 
the mayor, Fire Commissioner Scoppetta told the Council: 
…I strongly advocated that the City adopt the Unified Command structure 
in response to CBRN/Haz-Mat incidents where crime or terrorism was 
suspected…These proposals were not adopted in the final CIMS 
protocol… 
Although the Department did not prevail on issues of importance to us, we 
do believe that the final CIMS protocol, if implemented in good faith by all 
involved agencies, can and will protect public safety.  
Of course, this will require cooperation, coordination, communication, and 
common sense and respect for the mutual expertise of all agencies, 
particularly the fire department and the police department.  
Good faith in this context also means that the fire department’s 21 years 
of accumulated expertise in responding to Haz-Mat incidents and 
extensive response resources will be properly utilized…I am confident 
that good faith and common sense will prevail and that the FDNY’s and 
NYPD’s expertise will be mutually acknowledged and respected.129 
Given the historical rivalry that has existed for decades between these agencies, 
creating a protocol that relies on the “good faith” of all agencies involved does not bode 
well for its prospects for success. In fact, if all the involved agencies acted in good faith 
on a regular basis, there would be no need for this protocol. In much the same way that  
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Mayor Dinkins promised his protocol would work “because it involved persons of good 
will”,130 assurances that “good faith and common sense will prevail” seem overly 
optimistic. 
 
D. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT ON CIMS 
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, while attempting to be deferential to New York in light of the losses it 
suffered in the attacks on the WTC, still explicitly criticized CIMS as it was written in 
May of 2004 because the document “expressly contemplates two or more agencies jointly 
being lead agency when responding to a terrorist attack but does not mandate a 
comprehensive and unified incident command that can deploy and monitor all first 
responder resources from one overall command post.”131 Neither of those shortcomings 
was revised in the final draft of CIMS.  
The report continues, “In our judgment, this falls short of an optimal response 
plan, which requires clear command and control, common training, and the trust that such 
training creates.”132 The authors conclude: 
…if New York and other major cities are to be prepared for future terrorist 
attacks, different first responder agencies within each city must be fully 
coordinated, just as different branches of the U.S. military are. 
Coordination entails a Unified Command that comprehensively deploys all 
dispatched police, fire, and other first responder resources.133 [emphasis 
added]  
The report also compares the relative success of the response to the Pentagon with 
the tragic loss of first responders at the WTC. While noting that the magnitude of the two 
events makes them difficult to compare, the Commission nonetheless concluded that 
“While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the 
Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: first, the strong professional 
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relationships and trust established among emergency responders; second the adoption of 
the Incident Command System; and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to 
response.”134 It went further by stating among their list of recommendations that 
“Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System 
(ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved, they should adopt a 
Unified Command.”135 [emphasis added] 
If individual groups are to overcome their organizational biases, they need to end 
their attempts to control each other and gain superiority over each other and work 
together as partners at emergency operations. A Unified Command structure allows 
different agencies to work together effectively and allows the Incident Commanders to 
combine their knowledge and share information as they jointly develop objectives 
without affecting their individual authority.136 In addition, it gives the individual 
members operating at the tactical level the confidence that their leaders have helped 
develop the strategic plans that they are now being tasked to carry out. 
A Unified Command also fosters an atmosphere where information is shared 
readily since it makes all participants into members of the same group and holds them 
equally responsible for all aspects of the operation. Just as the 9/11 Commission 
recommended intelligence agencies promote a culture of “need-to-share”,137 emergency 
responders must share information that may be critical to the operations of another 
agency. 
NYC’s resistance to adopting ICS, due to turf battles between the NYPD and 
FDNY, led to an uncoordinated response to the attack on the WTC. That attack ultimately 
resulted in the deaths of over 400 first responders. This tragic experience was the impetus 
for the President to mandate the adoption of NIMS through his issuance of HSPD-5, and 
the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations that all jurisdictions adopt ICS and utilize a 
Unified Command. It is therefore ironic that NYC would create an Incident Management 
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System that directly contradicts NIMS and the recommendations of the Commission in 
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V. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIMS 
“Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.”138 
This quote from chapter 13 of the 9/11 Commission Report was specifically 
referring to the need to reorganize the country’s national security institutions to better 
deal with the threats now facing the nation. However, it is equally applicable to first 
responders struggling to deal with those same threats. It is especially pertinent in NYC in 
light of the recently enacted CIMS. Traditional threats such as criminal activity, Haz-Mat 
incidents, and medical emergencies that were clearly the province of police, fire, or EMS 
only a few years ago may now have a nexus to all three. The emergency response 
systems that were designed to manage these threats need to be adapted to cope with the 
hazards of the next century. 
To that end, NIMS was selected as the national template that all jurisdictions were 
to follow in order to allow them to work together effectively and efficiently. CIMS, 
which is largely based on NIMS, does do that to a certain degree, but it also deviates 
from this template in certain crucial respects. Below is an analysis of how CIMS varies 
from NIMS both in language and in practice and shows both the advantages and 
disadvantages of NYC’s decision adapt NIMS to its own design. 
 
A. STRENGTHS 
CIMS is largely based on NIMS and therefore provides many of the same benefits 
of ICS as the national model. These include: conducting operations from a single 
command post; a common terminology; a modular organization; a chain of command and 
unity of command; a manageable span of control; a means to manage resources, 
information and intelligence; and integrated communications. These offer tremendous 
advantages at interagency operations compared with the lack of coordination and 
communication that occurred at the WTC on 9/11.  
In addition, NYC has made certain modifications to the NIMS model to address 
concerns specific to NYC. These include: 
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1. The Use of “Core Competencies” to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities 
In an effort to address some of the duplication of capabilities that exists and the 
confusion and disagreements at the scene of operations that resulted from it, CIMS 
utilizes the concept of “Core Competencies”. Core Competencies are defined as 
“functional areas of expertise” that various agencies have. CIMS states: 
Agencies have the authority to direct operations related to their Core 
Competencies at incidents. If more than one agency is capable of 
performing the same tactical operations at an incident, the agency with the 
Core Competency will give tactical direction, by the ranking officer, to 
other agencies performing operations within that competency.139 
While this concept does not eliminate the duplication that exists, particularly 
between the NYPD and FDNY, it does designate only one agency as having the “Core 
Competency” for certain tasks. This recognition of duplicate capabilities and the attempt 
to assign overall responsibility for particular functions to a specific agency are positive 
steps toward managing multi-agency responses to emergencies.  
 
2. The Introduction of a “Coordinating Agency” 
Although no such position exists in NIMS, CIMS has designated OEM as the 
City’s Coordinating Agency. Among the responsibilities it has at multi-agency incidents 
are: to ensure that a CIMS command structure is in place; to coordinate resources from 
response and recovery agencies; to relay situation information to the City’s Emergency 
Operations Center and to the mayor; to support logistics and communications needs; to 
obtain subject matter expertise; and to facilitate transition of command and resolution of 
interagency differences.140  
While OEM is no longer a “response” agency as it was under the Giuliani 
administration, CIMS states that OEM may respond to multi-agency incidents and 
participate in a Unified Command, if established.141 They are also given authority to 
identify the Primary Agency(ies) if required. Having an agency on-scene to assist in 
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coordinating a large-scale incident is an asset that can allow agencies involved in the 
response to concentrate on other tasks and improve coordination. 
 
3. The Inclusion of Law Enforcement Specific Concerns 
Primarily owing to the fact that NIMS grew out of the fire service’s efforts to 
combat wildfires, its primary focus is managing large-scale events requiring a multi-
jurisdictional, multi-agency response. However, since these events were mostly natural 
disasters occurring in the wilderness, certain aspects that could pertain to a terrorist event 
in an urban area were not a primary concern in its initial development. Due to the heavy 
police influence in the development of CIMS and the concern over another terrorist 
attack, additional elements are added to address these concerns. 
For example, the issue Site Access is specifically addressed by CIMS to prevent 
unauthorized access, provide crowd control, control traffic, provide for the protection of 
responders, and to delineate crime and investigative scenes. Included in these activities 
are the establishment of physical perimeters and access points and the credentialing of 
occupants and workers in a restricted area if long-term operations are required.142 
Similarly, CIMS devotes an entire section to Investigative Operations which may 
be responsible for intelligence collection / analysis; processing crime and investigative 
scenes; electronic communications, surveillance and evidence collection; missing / 
unidentified persons; and human remains processing. It also explains the different ways 
in which the “Intelligence” function can be incorporated into the ICS organizational 
chart.143 
 
4. Provisions for an After Action Review 
CIMS also allows for an After Action Review (AAR) to take place after large-
scale or complex responses if requested by either a participating agency or recommended 
by OEM. AAR’s serve to document response activities; identify issues arising during 
emergency operations; analyze the effectiveness of CIMS; recommend changes to CIMS 
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or interagency protocols and internal agency procedures; and identify best practices.144 It 
basically serves as an opportunity to evaluate an interagency response, air any grievances 
that may have come up as a result, and resolve the situation to allow for better responses 
in the future. 
 
5.  Interagency Training 
The CIMS protocol also requires joint training to be conducted between agencies 
to ensure that they can implement an incident management structure and interact 
effectively within their Core Competencies. This training can take a number of forms 
including incident management courses, tabletops, drills, functional exercises and field 
exercises.145 Again, the purpose is to ensure that all participants can operate together 
successfully at multi-agency events. 
 
B. WEAKNESSES 
Since CIMS is largely based on NIMS, most of the strengths of the protocol stem 
from where it follows NIMS. It is primarily in the areas where CIMS deviates from 
NIMS that problems occur. And although certain provisions were included in CIMS that 
could serve to improve interagency cooperation and coordination, the manner in which 
they were implemented and practiced has undermined their stated intent.  
As was mentioned earlier, NIMS is the national template for coordinating 
interagency and inter-jurisdictional response to emergencies. Originally developed for 
directing firefighting efforts at wildfires in California, it has, over the past three decades, 
incorporated best practices and lessons learned, to refine and adapt these procedures, so 
that they are equally effective at managing any other incident.  
Rather than simply follow this template, however, an approach that was strongly 
advocated by the FDNY, the City of New York has chosen to incorporate certain aspects 
of it, but to make some rather serious deviations from it as well. For example, the very 
first paragraph in the preface of NIMS reads: 
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On February 28, 2003, the President issued HSPD-5, Management of 
Domestic Incidents, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
This system provides a consistent nationwide template to enable federal, 
state, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and 
nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and 
efficiently to prepare for, prevent, respond and recover from domestic 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of 
catastrophic terrorism.146 [emphasis added] 
However, despite this intent, CIMS makes as series of highly questionable 
modifications to NIMS that the evidence strongly suggests are attributable to local 
politics and the level of influence that the police commissioner has on the mayor. Given 
Commissioner Kelly’s October 2002 statement regarding NIMS, that “I don’t think that 
type of system is appropriate for New York”147, it is not difficult to understand the 
motivation for these changes. 
 
1. The Use of a Single Command Structure at Haz-Mat / CBRN 
Incidents  
 
a. The NYPD’s Rationale for a Single Command at Haz-Mat / 
CBRN Incidents  
Despite clear guidance in the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) that a Unified Command should be established at multi-jurisdictional and multi-
agency operations, CIMS requires that a Single Command initially be established at all 
Haz-Mat / CBRN incidents and that it remain a Single Command until the NYPD 
determines the incident does not involve crime or terrorism. If it is determined to involve 
crime or terrorism or if that determination cannot be made readily, the operation remains 
a Single Command. 
This aspect of CIMS, probably more than any other, has generated the 
most criticism and controversy. The NYPD and other administration officials have 
attempted to justify this decision by citing the possibility that a Haz-Mat event may have 
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some nexus to terrorism as the rationale for designating the NYPD as the IC at all such 
incidents. During his prepared remarks to the New York City Council in May 2005, 
Police Commissioner Kelly testified: 
We must treat any incident involving [chemical, biological, and 
radiological weapons] or suspected substances as a criminal or terrorist 
event, even if it appears first to be an accident. There is no room for error 
here. 
An investigation must begin. The substance must be identified, evaluated, 
and processed possibly as evidence. If we fail to do that at the outset, the 
criminal or terrorist may escape detection and apprehension and 
potentially cause far worse destruction in the future. 
This is why the police department has been designated a primary agency 
for CBRN / Hazardous Materials incident until the Department determines 
that there is no actual or suspected criminal activity or terrorism.148 
The rationale given by a variety of administration officials defending this 
decision is that NYC is “different” from every other municipality in the country. 
Commissioner Kelly’s testimony illustrates this point: 
The genius of the National Incident Management System is that it allows 
New York City, which is really unique from any other municipality in the 
country, to take the ICS model and adapt it appropriately for our use. 
Why don’t other police agencies in the United States have the overall 
responsibility for CBRN / Haz-Mat incidents? For one thing, their cities 
have not been the target of repeated and successful terrorist attacks. For 
another, the New York City Police Department is larger than the next four 
major cities combined, and all of our uniformed personnel have the 
necessary training and equipment to undertake this responsibility.149 
When pressed later by Council Speaker Miller as to why the NYPD is 
designated as IC if Life Safety is the top priority and that is the core competency of the 
FDNY, Commissioner Kelly responded:  
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…but the difference, as far as hazardous material and CBRN is concerned, 
is because the stakes are so high…we want to do an investigation…so, it’s 
the stakes that are involved here that make this different.150  
He later told Councilmember Clarke: 
I think Unified Command, as I say, is at the essence of CIMS. In this one 
instance we’ve determined that, as I say, the stakes are so high, the cost is 
so great, that we want to have an investigation before we go to Unified 
Command.151 
While these arguments may seem persuasive on the surface, they do not 
hold up under closer scrutiny. Even conceding the point that every Haz-Mat scene, no 
matter how seemingly insignificant, must initially be treated as a potential criminal or 
terrorist event and must therefore initiate an investigation, there is no reason this cannot 
be accomplished while utilizing a Unified Command. CIMS specifically addresses this 
point when it states “Investigative Operations may be initiated concurrently with Life 
Safety Operations”152 There is simply no need for a Single Command structure for an 
investigation to take place. 
This point was illustrated in a heated exchange between Commissioner 
Kelly and Speaker Miller. The Speaker cut directly to the heart of the issue as the 
Commissioner tried to explain that a Single Command is necessary so that the NYPD can 
immediately begin an investigation. 
SPEAKER MILLER: And wouldn’t that all be true at a Unified Command 
as well?...What’s the difference then?...why is it necessary for the police 
department to be directing the fire department…? 
COMMISSIONER KELLY: Again, we’re not directing per se. Life safety 
actions are going forward initially. What we're doing is preserving 
evidence, doing interviews, checking into it with the databases, doing 
essentially investigative things, talking to witnesses. 
A decision [has been] (sic) made that the police department is going to be 
the primary agency here. If in fact the determination is made that it's not 
terrorism, not criminal in nature, it goes right away to a unified command. 
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SPEAKER MILLER: And why is that? If there's no terrorism, and no other 
criminal activities suspected, why would we need unified command? Why 
wouldn't the fire department just be in charge? 
COMMISSIONER KELLY: CIMS is all about communication, it's all about 
unified command, it's all about being together to communicate. That's a big 
difference. 
SPEAKER MILLER: But if it's all about communication and unified command 
and all the rest of that, then why is it the police department is in charge in 
terrorist incidents? 
I mean, unified command is such a great structure, then why don't we use it in 
case of terrorist incidents? 
And if you can have all that kind of communication in a case in which is not 
unified command, then why wouldn't you want the fire department to be the lead 
agency in incidents in which the New York Police Department is determined that 
there is no criminal activity whatsoever? 
COMMISSIONER KELLY: Well, because as I say, we can talk in circles here. 
Unified command is what CIMS is all about.153 [emphasis added] 
 
Not only does the Commissioner not answer the question, the answer he 
does give seems to bolster the need for a Unified Command. 
The argument that NYC is “different” from any other city in the U.S. is 
also a specious claim. Any city in the U.S. is a potential target for terrorism and the fact 
that NYC has already been attacked and is a likely target for future attacks has no bearing 
on the type of command structure that needs to be implemented to effectively manage the 
consequences. That statement assumes that if other cities were attacked that they would 
adopt a similar command structure. As illustrated by the Unified Command structure in 
place in the National Capital Region, both before and after the attack on the Pentagon, 
that is clearly not the case. 
And the fact that the NYPD is larger than the next four major city police 
departments combined is not relevant. The FDNY is also larger than the next four major 
cities’ fire departments combined and its Haz-Mat capabilities are nationally recognized 
as among the best in the country. NYC’s police and fire departments are proportional in 
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size to those of any major city. Simply having more members does not provide a 
justification for wasting valuable resources by duplicating existing capabilities in an 
effort to provide rationalization for seizing control of Haz-Mat events.  
In making its recommendations, the 9/11 Commission concludes that 
“even the most robust emergency response capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack 
is large enough. Teamwork, collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical 
to a successful response. Key decision makers who are represented at the incident 
command level help to ensure an effective response, the efficient use of resources, and 
responder safety.”154  [emphasis added] 
Essentially what the police commissioner is arguing, in defending the 
decision to utilize a Single Command structure at Haz-Mat / CBRN incidents, is that the 
more catastrophic the event and the more resources and expertise are required to handle 
it, the less participation you would want at the command level because the “stakes are so 
high”. But, at any other type of catastrophic event, including bombings, hurricanes, major 
transportation accidents, etc. you would want their participation. There is a reason that no 
other city in the country performs ICS in this manner and it has nothing to do with the 
threat level they face or the size of their first responder agencies. 
When Assistant Chief Pulaski (the NYPD’s point man on CIMS) testified 
to the city council, he suggested that, in addition to the reasons cited by Commissioner 
Kelly, the NYPD needs to be the sole Incident Commander because “[t]he NYPD in an 
incident like this has numerous incident objectives, some of which are core competencies 
that reside solely with the NYPD.” He went on to say that a Single Command structure 
allowed the NYPD to conduct “site management operations” which includes such things 
as force protection, site access, and crowd control. He then argued that having the NYPD 
in command allows the FDNY (with regard to life safety operations) “to inform [the 
NYPD’s] decision-making, but not control their decision-making with regard to site 
management issues”.155 
                                                 
154 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 396. 
155 Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Public Safety (held jointly with) Committee on Fire 
and Criminal Justice Services, 138-168. 
80 
One point he overlooks when he makes this argument is that the purpose 
of a Unified Command is not to “control” decision-making or to “inform” it. It is to bring 
the major participants in an emergency together to jointly determine what those incident 
objectives should be. The core competencies do not come into play until the tactical 
decisions on how to carry out those objectives are made. The other point which he 
ignores entirely is that at any major incident which will involve multiple agencies, these 
same site management issues will be present. But in every other type of emergency 
except Haz-Mat / CBRN, a Unified Command will be established.  
Once again, the arguments used to justify a Single Command do not hold 
up when they are applied to other emergencies. The fact that every administration official 
who testified acknowledged the benefits of a Unified Command structure and 
emphasized that as soon as crime and terrorism are ruled out, a Unified Command is 
established, demonstrates that they realize this system works. To illustrate how 
operations would (or would not) change under these different command structures, 
Speaker Miller asked the following hypothetical question: 
SPEAKER MILLER: I want you to imagine that the mayor just changed 
his mind and decided that it was going to be a unified command in the 
case of hazardous materials…how would the management of that incident 
change? 
ASSISTANT CHIEF PULASKI: In terms of tactical direction, it would 
not change. In terms of the formulation of the incident objectives, the 
overall strategy…and the management objectives, in terms of making sure 
that all aspects of this incident are taken into consideration wouldn't 
change drastically. 
A few minutes later, in trying to explain this difference further, Chief 
Pulaski noted “it’s a very subtle difference”.156 
In practice, the only difference in operations that a Single Command 
structure has at Haz-Mat / CBRN incidents that a Unified Command does not is that it 
gives the NYPD authority to prevent the FDNY from operating barring any immediate 
life safety operation. This has resulted in numerous occasions in which FDNY resources 
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have been tied up at a scene but not allowed to operate, only increasing the level of 
frustration and animosity that exists between the agencies. 
 
b. The Problem withThis Command Structure 
The organizational social biases discussed in Chapter II will create a great 
deal of opposition to accepting a single incident commander who is not “one of their 
own” when the group believes its right to command is equally important to the outcome 
of the incident.157 Placing the FDNY in charge of life safety operations, which everyone 
agrees is the most important aspect of any operation, but refusing to allow them to 
participate in the command structure has resulted in exactly that kind of resistance. 
NIMS is quite clear in its recognition that at large-scale events involving 
multiple jurisdictions and / or multiple agencies, that a Unified Command structure is the 
model to be used to manage the incident. It states: 
In incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with 
multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multiagency 
involvement, unified command allows agencies with different legal, 
geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work 
together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, 
responsibility, or accountability.158 
Probably the least logical and most contentious aspect of CIMS is the 
decision to place the NYPD in single command of all Haz-Mat / CBRN incidents until 
they have determined no nexus to criminality or terrorism exists. The rationale provided 
in earlier drafts of CIMS and in testimony from OEM and NYPD officials for this 
decision is based on the potential for criminal / terrorist involvement in these incidents. 
In closed-door negotiations during the period between May 2004 when the protocol was 
first released and April 2005 when it was officially signed by the mayor, the FDNY tried 
unsuccessfully to have this provision of the protocol changed to allow for a Unified 
Command from the outset. The final draft, however, only provides for a unified 
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command after the possibility of criminality / terrorism is excluded and does not allow 
for a unified command at all at actual terrorist events involving Haz-Mat / CBRN. 
Under the Giuliani protocol, Haz-Mat incidents were one of the few areas 
where duplication between the NYPD and FDNY was at a minimum, and the FDNY was 
the lead agency for these incidents. The events of 9/11 and the potential use by terrorists 
of WMD introduced a possible criminal aspect to some of these events and an 
opportunity for the NYPD to expand its authority. CIMS not only brought the NYPD into 
the command structure at these incidents, but removed the FDNY from it, until such time 
that criminal activity was ruled out by the NYPD. 
Taking into account that a reported Haz-Mat incident either does or does 
not involve criminal / terrorist activity and does or does not involve an actual or potential 
release of the material, the FDNY recommended a simple, easily understood matrix for 
determining command at a Haz-Mat / CBRN incident: 
 
Table 3. FDNY’s Proposed Command Matrix for CBRN / Haz-Mat 
Incidents159 
 Suspected Crime / 
Terrorism 
No Suspected Crime / 
Terrorism 
Actual or Potential Haz-
Mat release 
Unified Command FDNY Single Command 
No Actual or Potential 
Haz-Mat release 
NYPD Single Command Command Determined by 
CIMS Matrix 
 
However, despite the logic and simplicity that this matrix offered, the 
demands of the NYPD, that they be designated as the sole incident commander, 
prevailed.  
Not only is this section of CIMS illogical and vague in its application, it is 
also inconsistent with the rest of the protocol. Nowhere else in the document is the 
potential for criminal or terrorist activity substituted for an actual assessment in 
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determining the command structure. Command designation at every other incident type 
listed, including many which could involve crime or terrorism such as explosions and 
aviation and rail incidents, all base this decision on the actual incident type, not on 
whether crime or terrorism could be involved.160  
This part of the protocol also ignores its otherwise consistent reliance on 
core competencies to determine which agencies should direct the response. Throughout 
the document, CIMS consistently identifies life safety operations as the highest priority at 
all incidents including Haz-Mat / CBRN. However, despite the FDNY having a core 
competency in “CBRN / Haz-Mat Life Safety”, unless and until the NYPD declares that 
there is no criminal intent, the FDNY has no command authority.161 It is tasked with 
directing all life safety operations, but without the authority to develop or set incident 
objectives. And since most of the Haz-Mat incidents which occur in the City involve a 
significant threat of fire due to the presence of flammable or combustible material, having 
the NYPD designated the single incident commander over all of them requires them to 
manage operations beyond their CIMS-specified core competencies.162 
In addition, this designation contradicts best practices in place throughout 
the country and conflicts with the basic principles of ICS and NIMS. In every other city 
in the United States fire departments are responsible for incident command due to their 
training, equipment, and experience in handling these types of incidents. The sole 
justification for excluding the FDNY from incident command at Haz-Mat / CBRN 
incidents is the potential for criminal / terrorist involvement. Only in NYC is possible 
criminal intent of those creating the hazard, as opposed to the actual nature of the release, 
the sole factor in making this determination. NIMS clearly establishes that the command 
structure is determined by the nature of the incident itself, not the mental process of those 
who caused it.163 “The incident command organizational structure develops in a top-
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down, modular fashion that is based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as 
the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident.”164 [emphasis added] 
Once a release has occurred, dealing with the effects of that release must 
be accomplished based on conditions found on arrival, regardless of the cause. Therefore 
determining the command structure should be done in the same way. 
Another troubling aspect of having only one agency designated as the 
incident commander at a large scale event, particularly one in which their commanders 
have little or no experience in managing such as a Haz-Mat event, is that their view is 
bound to be more narrowly focused and based on their own priorities and experiences. A 
Unified Command allows for a more balanced and well-rounded perspective in setting 
strategies, plans, and priorities. 
CIMS itself recognizes that:  
Unified Command is an important element in improving multi-
jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management. As a combined 
command and management effort, Unified Command overcomes much of 
the inefficiency and duplication of effort that can occur when agencies 
from different functional and geographic jurisdictions, or agencies at 
different levels of government, operate without a common organizational 
framework.165  
Yet, despite this acknowledgement, it mandates a Single Command at 
large-scale terrorist events involving CBRN. 
By contrast, NIMS states that “when an incident occurs within a single 
jurisdiction and there is no jurisdictional or functional agency overlap, a single IC should 
be designated with overall incident management responsibility by the appropriate 
jurisdictional authority.”166 [emphasis added] Clearly, CBRN and large-scale Haz-Mat 
incidents do not fall into this category. 
NIMS lists the following advantages to utilizing a Unified Command: 
• A single set of objectives is developed for the entire incident 
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• A collective approach is used to develop strategies to achieve 
incident objectives 
• Information flow and coordination is improved between all 
jurisdictions and agencies involved in the incident 
• All agencies with responsibility for the incident have an 
understanding of joint priorities and restrictions 
• No agency’s legal authorities will be compromised or neglected 
• The combined efforts of all agencies are optimized as they perform 
their respective assignments under a single Incident Action Plan167 
A large part of the problem with utilizing a Single Command at a large-
scale CBRN / Haz-Mat event is that a lack of familiarity with other agency’s resources 
and capabilities hampers the IC’s ability to properly allocate those resources. In addition, 
particularly in NYC, the organizational bias of the agencies creates an environment in 
which a single incident commander from one agency is likely to control as much of an 
incident as possible using only his own agency’s resources. Only when he recognizes that 
events are beyond that agency’s ability to control them will others be utilized.  
Similarly, this organizational bias also leads to a lack of information 
sharing because information is viewed as power. In a Single Command structure, the IC 
is not mandated to share any information he does not deem necessary. In fact, CIMS 
specifically states “Investigative Operations may be initiated concurrently with Life 
Safety Operations; however, life safety concerns will supersede investigative concerns. 
Upon completion of Life Safety Operations, the investigating agencies may exclude non-
essential personnel from the site.”168 This failure to mandate that information is shared 
and the explicit authorization to exclude virtually anyone the NYPD deems “non-
essential” puts their commanders in a position where they will only share information 
that they believe is necessary for the FDNY to perform immediate life safety operations  
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and hold back all other information. This can ultimately lead to a compromise in safety as 
fire department commanders will not have the full situational awareness available to their 
police counterparts. 
 
2. The Manipulation of “Core Competencies” to Marginalize the 
FDNY’s Role 
Although the goal of trying to clarify roles and responsibilities at incidents 
through the use of “core competencies” is a laudable one, political pressures and 
considerations corrupted this process and turned it into a means of marginalizing the 
responsibilities of the FDNY and enhancing those of the NYPD. This was accomplished 
by manipulating the wording of certain core competencies and refusing to acknowledge 
others so that the NYPD could exert control over operations involving hazardous 
materials. These blatantly parochial actions undermine the goal of creating a cooperative 
environment in which these agencies can operate and undermine the credibility of the 
document as a whole.  
To illustrate this point, the table below lists the Core Competencies of four 
agencies: the FDNY, the NYPD, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and 
the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) as they appear in CIMS. 
 
Table 4. Core Competencies of Several NYC Agencies169 
Agency Core Competencies 
FDNY • Fire Suppression 
• Pre-hosptial Emergency Medical Care 
• Search and Rescue 
• Structural Evacuation 
• CBRN / Haz-Mat Life Safety and Mass Decontamination 
• Arson Investigation (Cause and Origin) 
NYPD • Law Enforcement and Investigation 
• Intelligence Collection and Analysis 
• Crime Scene Processing / Evidence Preservation 
• Site Management 
o Perimeter Control 
o Traffic Control 
o Crowd Control 
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o Site Security and Force Protection 
o Evacuation (Area and / or Law Enforcement Related) 
• Water Search and Rescue 
• CBRN / Haz-Mat Assessment and Investigation (Crime Scene / 
Terrorism 
• Accident Investigation 
• VIP Protection 
• Arson Investigation (Major Case) 
DEP • Environmental Monitoring, Sampling, Evaluation, and Analysis 
• Environmental Mitigation (Chemical) 
• Environmental Law Enforcement 
• Water and Wastewater: Infrastructure Assessment, Repair, and 
Reconstruction 
DOHMH • Disease Surveillance and Epidemiology 
• Public Health Orders, Clinical Guidance and Risk Communication 
• Mass Prophylaxis / Vaccination 
• Laboratory Testing (Biological and Radiological) 
• Public Health Assessment 
• Environmental Mitigation (Radiological and Biological) 
• Animal-Related Surveillance and Vector Control 
• Mental Health Needs Assessment and Service Coordination  
 
As can be seen from the list above, each of these four agencies are designated as 
having a Core Competency pertaining to some type of Haz-Mat / CBRN event. However, 
they are very carefully worded and narrowly interpreted so that the effect is to minimize 
the authority of the FDNY at these events. Much of the delay in establishing this protocol 
centered on the disagreement over the wording of these Core Competencies.  
The FDNY argued strenuously that included in its Core Competencies should be 
“Hazard Assessment” and “Mitigation, Reduction or Elimination of Immediate Threats to 
Public Safety”170 This was based on the fact that the FDNY had over 20 years experience 
performing exactly these types of actions at thousands of Haz-Mat incidents during that 
time and that its dedicated unit for these types of incidents, Haz-Mat Co. 1, was 
recognized as one of the premier Haz-Mat units in the country. However, the wording of 
these Core Competencies was crucial to the NYPD’s strategy to gain control over Haz-
Mat incidents. 
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a. Mitigation 
During the city council hearings held in October 2002, Commissioner 
Kelly was asked specifically about which agency would respond to a Haz-Mat or 
bioterrorism event. He responded that the NYPD’s main concern would be evidence 
preservation. Regarding the hazards of the incident, however, he stated “mitigation is 
clearly the role of the fire department. Their Haz-Mat unit does that…[m]itigation, in 
other words, taking care of the dangers that are brought about by biochemical attack is 
clearly the purview of the fire department.”171  
Despite this admission and the FDNY’s vast experience in mitigating 
literally thousands of Haz-Mat scenes over several decades, recognizing that as a Core 
Competency of the FDNY would have required the NYPD to at least share command 
over these incidents. Rather than allow this, the NYPD insisted that the DEP, not the 
FDNY, be given the Core Competency of “Environmental Mitigation (Chemical)”. 
Similarly, DOHMH was given the Core Competency of “Environmental Mitigation 
(Radiological and Biological)”. However, the term “Environmental Mitigation” is vague 
at best, is not defined in CIMS, and no examples are given. The Fire Commissioner 
argued:  
…the First Draft Protocol avoided the use of the term ‘mitigation’ 
altogether. Now, absurdly, this term appears in DEP’s list of core 
competencies, but not FDNY’s…DEP does not have a core competency of 
‘environmental mitigation’ in an emergency response scenario. DEP lacks 
the equipment, training and experience in this area, cannot respond to 
incidents within five minutes and does not have a true round-the-clock 
response capability. Historically, DEP is responsible for environmental 
clean-up, not mitigation…DEP should be utilized as it always has at such 
incidents, as a subject matter expert.172 [emphasis added] 
Similar arguments were made against the decision to give DOHMH the 
Core Competency of “environmental mitigation (Radiological and Biological). However, 
when the final version of the document was issued, no changes were made in this area. 
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b. Assessment 
Because assessment of the hazards involved is a critical element in 
determining the actions to take during Life Safety Operations, the FDNY argued strongly 
that “Hazard Assessment” should also be listed as one of its Core Competencies. In 
addition, it argued that the NYPD’s Core Competency in this area should be changed to 
read “assessment of scene/hazard/intelligence for criminal/terrorism activity”173 so as to 
clarify the NYPD’s assessment role. However, neither recommendation was incorporated 
into the final document. No mention of “assessment” appears in the FDNY’s list of Core 
Competencies and the NYPD’s Core Competency now reads “CBRN / Haz-Mat 
Assessment and Investigation (Crime Scene / Terrorism)” which is intentionally less 
explicit. 
Despite the way these competencies were written over FDNY objections, 
OEM Commissioner Bruno testified to the city council three months later that what is 
meant by immediate life safety hazards to the public is:  
[The FDNY] will assess what the hazard is; they will take whatever action 
they need to reduce or eliminate the hazard…they will set the zones 
initially for the life safety aspect of the operation. 
The police department assesses the scene, the hazard and the intelligence 
for criminality for terrorist activity…and they will exclude unnecessary 
personnel…[t]hat does not include the fire department because they are 
doing the work during life safety. 
DEP and DOH are subject matter experts. No one expects them to be first 
responders…when they arrive, they will be looking to make final 
assessment… 
Assuming…they do take some time…to get there, we will rely on the fire 
department and the Life Safety phase and the investigator phase for the 
police department to take care of that job which is what they do today. 
What we do here is utilize the expertise of two important agencies in the 
city to add subject matter expertise. 
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No one expects them to respond like the fire department or the police 
department. They are subject matter experts.174 [emphasis added] 
The Commissioner’s claims that DEP and DOH are subject matter experts 
and that the FDNY can take “whatever action” it needs to reduce or eliminate the hazard 
stand in direct contrast to what is written in CIMS. CIMS specifically states that these 
agencies will “adjust or set ‘hot’, ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ zones and direct all mitigation 
efforts.”175 When interpreted as written, these efforts may not begin until those agencies 
arrive, barring an immediate life safety issue.  
 
c. Decontamination 
In spite of the FDNY’s long experience in performing decontamination of 
members and civilians at Haz-Mat incidents and the obvious connection this has to Life 
Safety Operations, this is another area in which the NYPD would not allow the FDNY 
list this as a Core Competency. The most they would allow was the term “Mass 
Decontamination”, although that term, as well, in completely undefined in CIMS. It also 
stands to reason that if an agency has a Core Competency that allows them to perform 
decontamination on many people, they are also capable of performing it on individuals. 
Rather than face this point, CIMS simply ignores the issue and does not give any agency 
a core competency in decontamination. Once again, these arguments were ignored for 
political purposes. As mentioned earlier, the NYPD’s decision to purchase three 
decontamination apparatus only serves to exploit this loophole, further increase the level 
of duplication that exists, and will undoubtedly lead to additional interagency discord in 
the future. 
In practice, what this manipulation of Core Competencies has resulted in 
is numerous situations in which FDNY resources respond to the scene of Haz-Mat 
incident where they are told to wait while the NYPD conducts an “investigation”, during 
which DEP is notified to respond. Units often wait on scene for up to an hour while this 
takes place. Once DEP arrives, the investigation is concluded, DEP is put in charge of 
mitigation, and FDNY units are told that their services are not required. 
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Similarly, when FDNY units respond to “powder runs” (i.e., calls 
involving potential biological agents such as anthrax) they are told that it is a “crime 
scene” and that since any persons potentially exposed are not an immediate life hazard, 
they are to stand by. If the NYPD determines that decontamination of the person is 
appropriate, it is the NYPD (despite the fact they have no competency pertaining to 
decontamination) and not the FDNY (since this is not considered mass decontamination) 
who performs this function. Once again FDNY units are told that their services are not 
required. 
Despite the fact that the FDNY has over 1800 Haz-Mat technicians and 
over 1500 members trained in technical decontamination procedures on individuals, these 
resources are often intentionally left unutilized at incidents. This has negative 
consequences on interagency relations at operations as well as on the morale of 
firefighters and only serves to reinforce the rivalry that exists between the NYPD and 
FDNY. 
 
3. The Weakening of the Role of OEM 
Although CIMS solidifies the role of OEM as the city’s coordinating agency, the 
list of responsibilities designated for OEM such as coordinating resources, relaying 
information, supporting operations, and obtaining subject matter expertise are nothing 
new. These are all responsibilities the agency had since it was first established as an 
office of the mayor in 1996. The most dramatic change in OEM’s role is that it no longer 
has the authority it previously had to make a determination as to which agency should 
perform what operations. That decision was intentional and has severely undermined 
OEM’s credibility and power. 
At first glance it may appear as though OEM still has this power since the 
wording of its role is left somewhat ambiguous in this regard. CIMS assigns OEM 
responsibility to “Facilitate transition of command and resolution of interagency 
differences”.176 [emphasis added] The follow exchange between 9/11 Commissioner 
John F. Lehman and former Mayor Rudy Giuliani illustrates the confusion on this point: 
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MR. LEHMAN: …one of the problems that our staff and we see in the 
new Incident Command System that has just been promulgated on Friday 
is that it's really a formula for negotiation between strong and powerful 
and heroic agencies as to who's going to be in charge at the time… this 
plan does not provide clear unity of command. It's a negotiating document. 
And I would like your personal view on whether it's not time…to adopt a 
more clearly defined and unambiguous command and control 
system…among the agencies?  
MR. GIULIANI: I think that because incidents are complex that's why you 
need OEM, and that's why I created OEM, to— 
MR. LEHMAN: But it doesn't have the authority. That's the problem. 
MR. GIULIANI: Yes, it does. It has the— 
MR. LEHMAN: It can dictate who's going to be in charge? 
MR. GIULIANI: Yes. Yes, it has the authority to decide who's in charge 
until the mayor gets there…177 
This line of questioning ended with the following observation by Mr. Giuliani: 
I mean, the only thing I would recommend--and I think the present mayor 
is doing this, I think Mayor Bloomberg is doing this -- you've got to have a 
very strong OEM…If they arrived at an emergency and there was any 
doubt, they had the authority to say, police department in charge, fire 
department in charge…So I mean I think that is the best way to handle it 
in New York.178 [emphasis added] 
Similarly, Richard Sheirer, OEM’s director at the time of the attack on the WTC, 
testified to the Commission that “The only way that that is a unified command where 
agencies have very different functions and there can be this tension of who's in charge, 
the only way that works is if you have a very strong and empowered Office of Emergency 
Management. If you don't, it won't, period.”179 [emphasis added] 
Likewise, when OEM’s first director, Jerome Hauer, was asked by Commissioner 
Gorelick if his recommendation was for “both a very strong central command in the form 
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of an OEM that can make decisions and a mandating of bringing together of the 
command centers”, Mr. Hauer replied “Yeah. Absolutely.”180  
However, despite the recommendations of these recognized experts in the area of 
emergency management in NYC, the current OEM commissioner, Joseph Bruno, told the 
New York City Council that OEM does not have the authority to make these decisions. 
The following exchange at a council hearing on CIMS illustrates the current 
commissioner’s understanding of OEM’s role in this regard: 
SPEAKER MILLER: …but why is it that there is no tie breaker?...what 
happens if there is a disagreement? A fundamental disagreement? 
COMMISSIONER BRUNO: …the agencies will operate under their core 
competencies. In their area of competency, they direct the operation. 
SPEAKER MILLER: …what happens in a situation in which one agency 
feels that there’s a life safety matter, and another agency feels that this is a 
criminal investigation issue… 
COMMISSIONER BRUNO: …we would always refer back to the core 
competency. If it’s an area where core competencies are in control, then 
that agency would make that decision… 
If there is a point where two agencies disagreed, then the two agencies are 
going to have to sit there…and they are going to make decisions based 
upon the best information they have, there is no tie breaker there. 
In other words, OEM is not going to come in from the street and say to a 
fire chief with 40 years experience and to a captain or a chief at the police 
department, we’ll tell you how to do it. We will do the best we can to 
encourage a decision to be made.181 [emphasis added] 
After reluctantly acknowledging that this role was a change from how OEM 
operated under the Giuliani administration, Commissioner Bruno added “I don’t have 
authority over either agency, but what I do have is strong authority out of CIMS that they 
are going to have to look at what we’re saying. However, there is no tie breaker out 
there.”182  [emphasis added] 
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Once again, in bowing to the wishes of the Police Commissioner by removing 
OEM’s power to designate which agency should perform what operations, CIMS 
eliminates any means of enforcing these designations and sends a clear message that 
OEM lacks any real authority.  
Similarly, the decision to remove OEM from its role of “on-scene interagency 
coordinator” was designed to ensure that the NYPD would not be overruled at emergency 
scenes. And while CIMS states that OEM “may respond to multi-agency incidents and 
participate in the Unified command, if established”,183 [emphasis added] Commissioner 
Bruno’s stated vision for OEM clearly indicates he has no intention of stepping into the 
middle of disputes between the NYPD and FDNY at operations. Upon being appointed to 
the role of OEM Commissioner, he told the New York Times that he “envisioned the 
office as a ‘think tank’ on preparedness. ‘I look to O.E.M. more as a planning agency and 
preparedness agency, an information agency, an information conduit, more than a 
response agency,’ he said.”184 
The decisions to remove OEM from their on-scene presence at operations and to 
remove their decision-making power regarding which agency should perform what 
operation has undermined the credibility and authority OEM previously held in serving as 
an independent arbiter at emergency operations. These actions have removed an effective 
and rational means of settling interagency disputes, replacing it with an ambiguous 
political document.  
4. AAR’s are Ineffective and Rarely Held  
While CIMS takes a major step in the right direction in allowing for an After 
Action Review (AAR) process to resolve interagency conflicts that arise at the scenes of 
emergencies, the frequency with which they occur and the manner in which they are 
conducted has rendered them completely ineffective leading several of the FDNY leaders 
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interviewed to conclude they are a “waste of time”.185 During the comment period on the 
second draft of the CIMS protocol, the FDNY urged that “a standing group be formed to 
conduct After Action Reviews (AAR), with representatives assigned from each agency. 
The group’s recommendations should be binding and the group should have enforcement 
authority.”186 This recommendation, like most of its others, was ignored.  
Despite numerous disagreements that have inevitably occurred at operations 
during the two years since CIMS was officially instituted, and the subsequent requests 
made for AAR’s to be conducted, to date, only two (2) AAR’s have taken place. 
Predictably, the lack of response to these requests has resulted in a wide spread belief that 
this provision of CIMS is not being enforced. As a result, requests for AAR’s have fallen 
dramatically. 
In addition, those that have been held have been described by FDNY officials 
who attended as being little more than an opportunity to “check a box” stating that an 
AAR was held.187 The most recent AAR is illustrative of why this feeling is prevalent:  
a. AAR on Trench Collapse in Brooklyn 06-27-2006 
This AAR, conducted in August 2006, centered on a rescue operation 
involving two persons trapped in a cave-in of a trench at a construction site (a CIMS-
specified FDNY core competency). Without going into specifics of the incident, the AAR 
review was requested because NYPD ESU officers refused the FDNY Incident 
Commander’s orders for everyone to evacuate the trench until it could be properly 
shored.  
In attendance at the AAR were approximately ten NYPD members 
including the ESU officers in question and Assistant Chief Philip Pulaski. Chief Pulaski 
began the meeting by announcing that he would be the only one speaking on behalf of the 
NYPD. He further claimed that he had conducted an investigation and had the “facts”. He 
argued that because the FDNY Incident Commander had blown a whistle in an attempt to 
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get everyone’s attention and gain control of the scene, that the ESU members “did not 
know if he was in his right state of mind” and therefore ignored the order. He refused to 
allow the members who were present at the scene to testify and further stated that he was 
not there to discuss tactical issues at the event, only whether CIMS protocols were 
followed, which he argued were.188 
After the FDNY had presented its arguments, OEM Commissioner Bruno 
said he had no authority to discipline anyone from either agency, recommended that both 
agencies review the CIMS document again, and declared the AAR a success. In reality, 
however, the message sent to the agencies is that OEM is powerless to take any action 
and that there will be no repercussions for operating outside of the protocols established 
in CIMS. 
This failure to empower OEM with any enforcement authority and the 
lack of frequency and substance to the meetings that were held reinforces the perception 
that OEM is little more than a puppet of the police department. And while the concept of 
holding AAR’s to “document response activities; identify issues arising during 
emergency operations; analyze the effective ness of CIMS; recommend changes to CIMS 
or interagency protocols and internal agency procedures; and identify best practices”189 is 
commendable, the manner in which it is practiced undermines its stated intent and helps 
perpetuate the problems that do exist.  
 
5. Ineffective and Unrealistic Drills (showcasing) 
Although CIMS specifies that Joint Training will be conducted to ensure that the 
agencies can operate effectively together, the training that has been conducted to date has 
been woefully inadequate to fulfill the City’s needs in this respect. The majority of the 
interagency drills that have been conducted have taken the form of tabletop exercises or 
local drills involving only a handful of participants from each agency. Consequently, only 
a very small fraction of the NYPD’s 36,000 members or the FDNY’s 14,000 members 
ever take part in these exercises and therefore gain nothing from them. 
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Since the implementation of CIMS two years ago, very few large scale 
interagency drills have been conducted. The largest one to date, known as “Trifecta”, 
involved over 1500 response workers from over 20 local, state, and federal agencies.190 
This type of large-scale drill is exactly what is needed to ensure that a sizable number of 
responders participate in these exercises. It also provides and opportunity for an after 
action review to be conducted so that lessons learned can be used to allow the City “to 
test and refine its preparedness plans and emergency response protocols”191 as the OEM 
press release states. However, an examination of Trifecta illustrates that this drill was 
little more than a carefully scripted exercise in showcasing capabilities designed for 
media consumption to make the case that CIMS will work in a large scale emergency. 
a. Trifecta (March 26, 2006) 
Planning for Trifecta began in August 2005 with the stated intent to “test 
CIMS to the breaking point”.192 All agency representatives were told that they were 
“trusted agents” and were not at liberty to discuss any of the specifics of what the 
exercise entailed or even the location where it was to be held. Disagreements over the 
design of the exercise and the incident command structure began almost immediately.  
It was decided that the scenario would involve a terrorist detonation of an 
explosive device next to a tank of a poisonous chemical on a freight train just as it was 
passing a commuter train in a rail yard. The FDNY argued a Unified Command should be 
established because it was an explosion. The NYPD argued that it was a Haz-Mat 
incident and therefore a Single Command should be established. Ultimately, OEM stated 
it would be a Single Command.  
The next point of contention was the incident objectives submitted by each 
agency. The NYPD, FDNY, and DEP all had issues with the wording of the objectives by 
the other agencies, feeling that they were exceeding their authority under CIMS. A 
special meeting had to be held just to agree on how these would be worded. 
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Finally, there was a great deal of disagreement over the response 
sequence. The FDNY wanted its units on the scene within five minutes of the explosion 
since that is the citywide average response time. NYPD argued it would have a large 
number of officers on the scene within a few minutes also and therefore their units should 
be first. DEP even claimed that they would respond within minutes despite the fact that 
they would not be notified unless specifically called by either the FDNY or NYPD and 
that they often take up to an hour to arrive when they are called. 
Approximately a week before the exercise was to take place, the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), a New York state agency on whose 
property the exercise was being conducted, stated that they wanted a Unified Command 
to be established. Since CIMS applies only to NYC property, the NYPD had no choice 
but to agree to a Unified Command. 
Despite the supposed secrecy surrounding the details of Trifecta, the 
NYPD was seen setting up its decontamination equipment on the exercise site for several 
weeks prior to the drill. The FDNY conducted three drills with the Technical 
Decontamination Task Force assigned to Trifecta the week before the drill. And the DEP 
made sure its equipment was set up to properly identify the chemical in the scenario. 
The drill began realistically with two MTA police officers investigating 
the explosion. They were told by exercise facilitators that they were experiencing 
difficulty breathing and a burning sensation (the decision had already been made that no 
first responders would be “killed” because it did not look good for the media) and that 
they had to leave the field. At that point, any semblance of realism to an actual event like 
this ended. 
Within minutes, the first arriving agency was not FDNY nor NYPD, but 
the DEP with no fewer than ten vehicles including its mobile lab. They drove right up to 
the where the “hot zone” started and began donning Level “A” protection and setting up 
their environmental metering equipment. Immediately behind them was the NYPD’s 
decontamination unit who began setting up a decon corridor for emergency responders 
and donning personal protective equipment exactly where they had been seen practicing. 
99 
All of this was done prior to the site even being declared a Haz-Mat scene. To the 
television cameras, however, it all looked very impressive. 
As a result of this response sequence, victims had to be dragged through 
DEP’s and NYPD’s operational areas, to reach the FDNY decontamination area several 
hundred yards away. And since the command structure and all objectives had been 
argued over and agreed upon during the months leading up to the exercise, it greatly 
facilitated determining the incident objectives at the command post. When the exercise 
was completed, OEM Commissioner Bruno told the assembled reporters that the exercise 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the Citywide Incident Management System and said 
“I’m happy and I’m actually a little surprised that it worked as well as it did”.193 
While the overall intent of Trifecta was good and the exercise did give 
many agencies an opportunity to practice their operations alongside others with whom 
they will have to operate at an actual event, the aspects that would have added a sense of 
realism and demonstrated the flaws with CIMS were carefully orchestrated to avoid 
having them come to light. Meaningful lessons learned most often come from observing 
and studying what went wrong at operations. This is most often the catalyst for making 
changes to tactics, procedures, protocols, and strategies. Conducting unrealistic drill 
scenarios in which all the players know the specifics prior to participating eliminates 
these mistakes and makes the exercise meaningless in terms of a learning experience 
where procedures can be adjusted to correct deficiencies noted, since none occur. But 
given the political environment and process through which CIMS was developed, that 
was most likely the intent. 
It is also important to note that an AAR of the exercise was performed by 
Titan, the company contracted to design Trifecta. This document has been known to be in 
the possession of OEM since at least October 2006. Despite repeated requests to obtain a 
copy of the document, however, OEM claims to still be reviewing it and has not 
produced it, even as the one-year anniversary of that exercise approaches. 
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b. Bio Detection System Exercise -- Staten Island Postal Facility 
The next largest multi-agency drill conducted by OEM was a joint 
exercise involving the U.S. Postal Service simulating the City’s response to the activation 
of one of its Bio Detection Systems (BDS) located at the Manor Road Postal Facility on 
Staten Island. Once again, most of the difficult decisions were worked out at meetings 
leading up to the actual exercise negating the reality of having to make those decisions on 
the scene. 
In this case, since this simulated a potential release of a biological agent, 
there would be no need for any life-safety operations on the part of the FDNY after 
conducting a preliminary search of the facility. However, there would be a need for the 
FDNY to perform its other core competency of “mass decontamination”. In addition, it 
also needed to set up a decontamination area for rescue workers who entered the facility. 
The NYPD, in addition to performing its various law enforcement functions at this 
exercise, also set up its own decontamination area separate from the FDNY for the 
decontamination of law enforcement personnel. It argued that this was necessary because 
the FDNY was not capable of securing firearms. 
An additional disagreement developed when it was decided that one of the 
postal inspectors would suffer a “heart attack” during the operation requiring him to be 
removed and decontaminated prior to triage. The FDNY argued this was a life safety 
operation and therefore should perform this operation. However, it was ultimately 
decided that the NYPD would perform this function. 
This exercise highlighted two weaknesses both with CIMS and the manner 
in which these exercises are conducted. First is the lack of attention to core competencies 
illustrated by the NYPD performing life safety and decontamination procedures. CIMS 
was specifically written in a vague enough manner to allow the NYPD to claim 
responsibility for these actions. It does not define the term “mass decontamination”, 
leaving it open to interpretation. It also includes a clause that says “Life Safety 




arriving resources capable of these operations…[and] will not be disrupted or suspended 
because of transition of command to other agencies”, leaving open the door for ESU to 
perform an FDNY core competency.  
The second shortcoming it illustrates is that there is a clear and 
unnecessary overlap in resources that are defended at exercises such as this with 
deceptive arguments about the need to “secure” weapons. The dubious nature of this 
claim is illustrated by the fact that when the UN Security Council is in session, the FDNY 
is pre-staged to perform decontamination in the event of an attack. The Secret Service 
personnel, who are more heavily armed than NYPD officers, have no such concerns 
about the FDNY performing decontamination of their members, belying concerns about 
this need. The fact is the member could simply take the weapon with them through the 
decontamination process or a single officer can be assigned to the decon area to secure 
them. This would be a far more efficient use of resources and would foster a greater sense 
of cooperation between the agencies than having the NYPD devote approximately ten 
members to perform a function that is already being performed a hundred feet away by 
the FDNY. The reason this is not done, however, is because it would undermine the 
justification for the duplication that exists in this area.  
This situation closely parallels one described in an article by former 
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, David C. Jones. In it he notes that the emergence of 
the airplane during World War I as a major military asset should have alerted the military 
to the need to adjust its doctrines and organizations, particularly as airpower began to 
blur the traditional lines between land and naval warfare.194 (Similarly, the use of 
chemicals or WMD by terrorists has begun to blur the lines between fire department and 
law enforcement functions.) General Jones observed that instead, the branches of the 
military reacted to this phenomenon in a traditionally bureaucratic manner: each service 
developed its own airpower “and protected it with artificial barriers to obscure costly 
duplications.”195 
                                                 




The need to conduct medium to large scale exercises on a regular basis is 
one of the most intuitive and important steps that can be taken to ensure that multi-
agency operations run smoothly. Equally important is the need for them to be realistic 
and for the details of them not to be shared with the agencies ahead of time. Only in this 
way will weaknesses be discovered and plans adjusted to take advantage of lessons 
learned. Military doctrine says “train as you fight and you will fight as you train”. 
Conducting unrealistic, scripted drills designed to showcase capabilities rather than truly 
test them will ultimately hurt NYC’s preparedness for a large-scale attack.  
The 9/11 Commission realized this when they stated “Regular joint 
training at all levels is…essential to ensuring close coordination during an actual 
incident”. They went on to state that they strongly supported the decision to make 
homeland security funding contingent on adoption of ICS and Unified Command 
procedures and that “In the future, the Department of Homeland Security should consider 
making funding contingent on aggressive and realistic training in accordance with ICS 
and unified command procedures”.196 [emphasis added] 
 
6. Inconsistent Applicability of a Single Command Structure 
As was illustrated during the Trifecta exercise, the provision of CIMS that 
mandates the use of a Single Command structure at Haz-Mat / CBRN events only applies 
on NYC-owned property. At all facilities owned or controlled by federal or state entities, 
a Unified Command will be established. It should be noted that the most likely targets of 
a terrorist attack in NYC are generally agreed to include mass transportation hubs and 
lines, bridges, tunnels, military installations, and internationally recognized symbols such 
as the World Trade Center, Empire State Building, Statue of Liberty, etc. All of these are 
located on property owned or controlled by state or bi-state authorities, or by federal 
agencies. 
Perhaps owing to this fact, Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly held a 
press conference on September 29, 2005 in which they put forth a plan that would have 
the NYPD take command at all major incidents that take place in New York City at train 
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stations, seaports, airports, bridges or tunnels run by the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. This proposal, however, 
was met with a cool reception from the governors of New York and New Jersey whose 
approval would be required to make this change and it has therefore never been 
enacted.197 Coincidentally, seven days after this press conference was held, the City went 
on a state of high alert for the threat of a terrorist bombing in the subway system which 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed non-credible minutes after it was 
announced.198 
In addition, if another major terrorist attack does occur, it will undoubtedly bring 
in federal and state assets to assist with the mitigation and recovery. Every other 
jurisdiction in the country and the federal government all subscribe to the National 
Incident Management System which mandates a Unified Command at these incidents. It 
is extremely unlikely that these resources will abandon a nationally recognized and 
mandated incident command system and subjugate themselves to the wishes of a city 
agency. Therefore, once again a Single Command structure will not be used. Contrasting 
Commissioner Kelly’s arguments that it is the “stakes” that make a Single Command 
necessary with the recognition that a major attack will bring in resources that will 
mandate a Unified Command, the stated necessity for a Single Command and the 
likelihood of its use seem unrealistic. 
Considering the testimony of the Police Commissioner that “Unified Command is 
what CIMS is all about”;199 the realization by everyone that this command structure does 
work; the confusion and animosity surrounding a Single Command structure; and the 
inconsistent manner in which it can be applied, the argument for placing the NYPD in 
overall command at these incidents rings hollow. 
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The confusion that this provision of CIMS potentially creates can be illustrated by 
the fact that two identical incidents, one occurring on city property and another on state 
property within NYC, will be managed using two different command structures. The 
confusion is further illustrated using an explosion scenario: This would initially be treated 
as a potential crime scene, but managed using a Unified Command structure. If, however, 
at some point during the operation a hazardous material was found to be involved, it 
could be argued that a Single Command should be used. However, if criminal activity 
was then ruled out, it would once again become a Unified Command. 
 
7. Unified Operations Section 
Another area where CIMS deviates from NIMS is in the Operations Section of the 
command structure. According to NIMS, this section is under the leadership of a single 
Operations Section Chief who directs all tactical operations. However, CIMS institutes a 
Unified Operations Section at all multiagency incidents, regardless or whether it is a 
Single or Unified Command.200  
This provision is often cited by proponents of CIMS as a means to justify a Single 
Command structure. In the Unified Operations section, each of the Operations Section 
Chiefs is responsible for directing the tactical operations of their individual agency’s 
members in the areas of their core competencies. Proponents argue that this allows 
critical information to be shared and a collaborative operation to be conducted. However, 
in reality, the Unified Operations section results in parallel operations being conducted 
since no single person is in charge of this section. Rather, each agency conducts the 
operations it deems necessary for its agency with little coordination between them. 
In his testimony before the New York City Council regarding CIMS, Chief James 
Schwartz, the Arlington County Fire Chief who commanded the response to the attack on 
the Pentagon on 9/11, remarked “I know of no other organization anywhere that has 
constructed a system where there is in effect a Single Command at the top but a Unified  
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Operations section. While reading all your materials, I hesitated to use this term, but this 
morning’ testimony got me around to it, to realizing that it flies in the face of logic.”201 
[emphasis added] 
 
C.  OUTSIDE EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CIMS 
In response to Chief Hayden’s criticism of CIMS in the New York Times and the 
mayor’s decision to sign off on CIMS without any review or input by the New York City 
Council, the Council held hearing on CIMS on May 9, 2005. During the opening 
remarks, Chairperson Vallone stated: 
Now that [an Incident Command System] has been adopted, many 
concerns have been raised, particularly from the FDNY, including its top 
uniformed officer, Chief of Department Hayden. Unfortunately it took the 
issuance of a subpoena to force the Administration to change its initial 
position articulated directly to me and my staff that no one from the 
FDNY or NYPD would be permitted to testify. Let me just run through 
that time sequence again, because there was some confusion about this. 
We asked for the fire department and the police department, we were told, 
myself directly to my face, that no one other than Joe Bruno would be 
here. We then issued a subpoena. We then were assured of their 
appearance here. That is the way it occurred. There was apparently some 
revisionist history after that from the Administration.202 
In addition to the testimony of the Police, Fire, and OEM commissioners and of 
various NYPD and FDNY officers, the Council also called several noted experts in the 
field of emergency management and response to testify as to their opinions on CIMS. 
Among them were Jerry Hauer, OEM’s first director under Rudy Giuliani; James 
Schwartz, Arlington County Fire Chief who served as the IC at the 9/11 attack on the 
Pentagon; and Glenn Corbett, an associate professor of Fire Science at John Jay College 
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1. James Schwartz 
The bulk of his prepared remarks were dedicated to explaining how Unified 
Command is used routinely at natural and man-made emergencies including the terrorist 
attack on the Pentagon and at anthrax incidents in the months after. He also testified that 
CIMS fails to maximize the expertise and resources of the FDNY at Haz-Mat / CBRN 
incidents.203 At one point he broke away from his prepared remarks and said: 
A comment was made early on about the evolutionary nature of your 
CIMS and the fact that over time best practices will be included in the 
CIMS. From my perspective and in my opinion, your CIMS will never be 
among the best practices. It will not be on anybody’s list of best practices 
unless you can deal with the issues that were discussed at length this 
morning… 
There is no reason whatsoever the Fire Department of New York should 
not be involved at the Unified Command level at a minimum for the kinds 
of incidents that you are talking about.  
Later, in response to a question regarding what happens in the event that there is a 
conflict between the NIMS ICS template and the CIMS template, Chief Schwartz added: 
I was going to say, if by some stretch it does in fact become recognized as 
compliant with the National Incident Management Systems, it is not -- it is 
in word only, not in spirit. Because the 9/11 Commission was very clear, 
other groups that have reviewed the responses of 9/11 have been very 
clear that unified command is the only way to go. 
 
2. Jerry Hauer 
Mr. Hauer, who had been critical of CIMS in newspaper editorials as it was being 
developed and before the 9/11 Commission, was less reserved in his criticism. Among his 
statements to the council were: 
…after listening to the testimony this morning, anybody that tries to 
follow the convoluted logic that you heard this morning, and tries to make 
heads or tails out of what you heard from the three commissioners this 
morning is better than me, because it was the most incredible double-
speaking I’ve heard in my life… 
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The fundamental issue is, and will continue to be the fact that there is a 
duplication of effort in New York, and the issue has never been resolved. 
The notion that police officers should be managing hazardous materials 
emergencies of any type, any type, is simply wrong, and no amount of 
justification by the Office of Emergency Management is going to put 
lipstick on this towel… 
How can one reasonably justify that the Department with the greatest 
training and resources dedicated on a 24-hour basis, specifically to do one 
thing and only one thing, and that’s hazardous materials response, is 
restricted from performing assessments of a hazardous materials 
incident… 
What we are seeing in New York is a greater duplication of effort, which 
not only cost taxpayers more, but will lead to continued confusion at the 
scene of hazardous materials incidents and jeopardize the safety of New 
Yorkers. 
For this so-called CIMS document to remove the fire department from the 
incident command structure and relegate it to the operations level, lacks 
any basic logic and it’s flawed. 
It appears to me that OEM simply regurgitated the wishes of the Police 
Commissioner and lacks any independence in thought or in input, the 
basic essence of what OEM was created to do… 
Furthermore, for the Commissioner of OEM to dismiss what is being done 
in every other city in the country by saying that New York is going in a 
different direction, is the type of arrogance that puts this city at greater 
risk, particularly when there’s no logical basis to do so, and the reasoning 
in the CIMS is flawed and inconsistent with the National Incident 
Management System.204 
 
3.  Glenn Corbett  
Professor Corbett raised concerns regarding about how mitigation would be 
performed at Haz-Mat incidents and whose role that would be. In addition, he pointed out 
the potential conflict in giving life-safety operations to the FDNY but giving overall site 
management to the NYPD.205 He, too, identified the duplication of capabilities as the 
underlying cause of the rivalry between the NYPD and FDNY: 
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…New York City has a long history of duplication and overlap of 
responsibilities between the FDNY and NYPD. This is the very heart of 
the issue we’re discussing today. It’s in my opinion that there is no reason 
to have police officers and firefighters both rescuing people from auto 
accidents, from under collapsed buildings or hanging window washing 
equipment on the outside of a building. 
There’s one good reason why virtually no other city in this country does it 
that way, it makes no logical sense. It wastes limited financial resources, 
defies every management principal, and is just plain dangerous. 
The recent expansion of the NYPD into the field of hazardous materials 
response makes this wasteful duplication overlap even larger.206 
There were no outside experts who testified in defense of CIMS. As mentioned 
earlier, the council did reach out to numerous experts in emergency preparedness around 
the country in search of some who could testify in support of CIMS. In addition, the 
council asked the mayor’s office to put them in touch with any third parties that were 
consulted in its development. There were none. 
 
D.  CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CIMS 
When looking back at the historic rivalry between the NYPD and FDNY and the 
underlying cause of it, duplication of effort, it is plain to see that parochial interests and 
political considerations have unfortunately been placed ahead of sound and cost-effective 
emergency management practices in NYC for decades. The recent decision to circumvent 
NIMS and its core guiding principal of a Unified Command structure is indicative of the 
manner in which politics outweighs common sense and established best practices in the 
City. The initial resistance to even accepting an incident command system in the first 
place and then the timing and process used to virtually eliminate any outside objective 
critique of CIMS both prior to and after its implementation clearly shows its lack of 
compliance with the National Incident Management System, in spirit, if not in word. 
The question going forward then is what can be done to transform the mindset of 
the NYPD and FDNY and end the decades of institutional rivalry that has squandered 
scarce resources and led to a lack of collaborative capacity as each agency puts its own 
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parochial requirements ahead of the best interests of the City. To answer that question, a 
review of the GNA and the historical context that led to it is presented. In addition, 
parallels between conditions that existed within the DoD prior to its enactment and the 
current situation in NYC are described. Finally, a review of the successes and failures in 
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VI. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT: AN ANALYSIS 
In response to a series of perceived military failures including the Viet Nam War, 
the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran, the embassy bombing in 
Beirut, and the interoperability problems that occurred during the invasion of Grenada, 
Congress began a series of hearings and investigations over a four-year period to analyze 
what could be done to improve military coordination, preparedness, and operations.207 
Despite intense resistance from the Department of Defense (DoD), this examination 
resulted in passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 
of 1986.208  
This legislation was the most comprehensive reorganization of the Department of 
Defense since the National Security Act of 1947. It is largely credited with transforming 
the culture of the military from service-specific to “joint” and has created a paradigm 
shift in the doctrine of the DoD. Many observers attribute the overwhelming military 
successes in Panama, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and early stages 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom to the changes brought about by the GNA. These campaigns 
stand in sharp contrast to the failures noted above that provided the impetus for the 
GNA.209 
 
A. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
As was discussed earlier, understanding the historical context of the rivalry 
between the NYPD and FDNY and the events, politics, and decisions that have led to the 
current situation in NYC is essential to understanding the problems inherent in that  
system and necessity for reform. Similarly, understanding the pre-GNA structure of the 
DoD and its inherent difficulties is required to appreciate the need for and implications of 
that act. 
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For those unfamiliar with the command structure of the DoD, the diagram in 
Figure 2 and a brief description of the responsibilities of each position will prove useful 
to understanding the significance of the changes enacted by the GNA: 
 
Figure 2.   Macro Organizational Chart of the Department of Defense (post GNA) 
 
• President—Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
• Secretary of Defense (SecDef)—The principal civilian advisor to the 
President with authority and control over the entire DoD. 
• Military Departments—The individual branches of the military 
responsible for training and equipping the members of those services. 
(Note: the United States Marine Corps falls under the Department of the 
Navy) 
• Unified Commands—These are the Combatant Commanders who have 
responsibility for carrying out missions and conducting operations in 
accordance with their assigned roles. There are currently nine (soon to be 
ten) Combatant Commands that have either regional (i.e.,, geographically 
defined) or functional areas of responsibility throughout the world. 
President 
Secretary of Defense 
Unified 
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• Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—The top uniformed officer in each branch of 
Service (Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force) is referred to as a Service 
Chief. Together, they and their support staff make up the JCS. They are 
responsible for long-term strategic planning initiatives and coordinating 
the respective missions of their Service with their counterparts. It is 
important to note that while they are members of the Joint Chiefs, they 
also act as advocates for the priorities of their respective Services. 
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS or “Chairman”)—The 
principal military advisor to the President. Although a member of one of 
the military services (the position alternates between the services), he does 
not advocate for his branch while in this position. He receives the differing 
opinions of the members of the JCS and the Combatant Commanders and 
then advises the SecDef and President based upon that information. 
• National Security Council (NSC)—The President's principal forum for 
considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior 
advisors and cabinet officials. Its function is to advise and assist the 
President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also 
serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies 
among various government agencies. 
 
1. History 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were informally established by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
1942 during the early days of World War II in an effort to organize the structure of the 
armed forces for that conflict. It became institutionalized by the National Security Act of 
1947 to serve as an advisory committee to the President and Secretary of Defense. At the 
time Congress insisted that the chiefs, although members of the JCS, retain their 
responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping their individual services. This 
decision set up a dual-hatted role for the service chiefs where, on the one hand, they were 
responsible for advocating for their service, and on the other, were responsible for  
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advising the President and SecDef on what was in the best interest of the defense 
establishment as a whole. This role has been criticized by both civilian and military 
reformers ever since.210 
Powerful military forces, fearful that integration of the services would allow 
another branch to dominate the military, were behind Congress’ decision to oppose 
unifying the services. The result was a loose confederation of large, rigid service 
bureaucracies, with a Secretary of Defense who was powerless against them. 
Amendments were added to the act in 1949, 1953, and in 1958 which strengthened the 
SecDef’s authority; however, they did little to alter the relative influence of the JCS and 
the services. This lack of integration was highlighted during the Viet Nam War as each of 
the services attempted to carve out a large mission for itself and agreed only to limited 
measures for a coordinated effort.211 
Motivated by this and other military failures noted above, and by the frustration 
he felt with the organizational structure of the JCS, General David C. Jones, USAF, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attempted in 1981 to conduct an internal 
reorganization of the joint system. After meeting substantial resistance from the 
Pentagon, he began to speak out publicly. On February 3, 1982, five months before he 
was to retire, he went before a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee 
and said, essentially, “The system is broken. I have tried to reform it from inside, but I 
cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary reforms.”212 
The following month he wrote an article entitled “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Must Change”213 for Armed Forces Journal International in which he argued for reforms.  
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In November of that year, Jones published an article in New York Times Magazine 
entitled “What’s Wrong with Our Defense Establishment”214 that outlined problems in 
the way the DoD was organized.215  
A month after Jones’ first article, he was joined in calling for reorganization by 
Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer. Meyer embraced Jones’ recommendations 
and went a step further by advocating the abolishment of the JCS, replacing it with a 
National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) made up of distinguished active flag and 
general officers who were serving on terminal assignments or who had retired. The 
rationale was that these members would not be dependent on, and would never return to, 
their respective services. He believed this would eliminate the inherent conflict of interest 
caused by the dual-hatted role of advocate for one’s branch of the service and member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.216   To date, however, the service chiefs still wear both hats. 
Due in part to the issues raised by Generals Jones and Meyer, the House of 
Representatives began to hold hearings on defense reorganization in 1982. This began a 
process that lasted several years culminating with a staff report published in late 1985 to 
the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services entitled “Defense Organization: The Need 
for Change”.217  This report, commonly referred to as “The Locher Report” for the study 
director who oversaw this inquiry, James R. Locher III, became the basis for the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
 
2. The Locher Report 
The report began by stating that it was critical of the organization and decision-
making procedures of the DoD and of Congress. It blamed the complexity of the DoD, 
rather than a lack of attention to or examination of the problems identified, for frustrating  
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previous attempts at reform. It then went on to identify 16 problem areas that were 
responsible for failing to rectify the gap between the structural arrangements and the 
organizational needs of the DoD. 
The 16 problems identified were: Limited Mission Integration at DoD’s 
Policymaking Level, Imbalance Between Service and Joint Interests, Imbalance Between 
Modernization and Readiness, Inter-Service Logrolling, Inadequate Joint Advice, Failure 
to Adequately Implement the Concept of Unified Command, Unnecessary Staff Layers 
and Duplication of Effort in the Top Management Headquarters of the Military 
Departments, Predominance of Program Budgeting, Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals, 
Insufficient Mechanisms for Change, Inadequate Feedback, Inadequate Quality of 
Political Appointments and Joint Duty Military Personnel, Failure to Clarify the Desired 
Division of Work, Excessive Spans of Control, Insufficient Power and Influence of the 
Secretary of Defense, and Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional 
Oversight.218 
In addition, this report made 91 specific recommendations to solve the problems 
that were identified above.219  Where applicable, some of those suggestions have been 
incorporated into the recommendations, outlined in the next chapter, for resolving NYC’s 
interagency coordination problems. 
 
B. PARALLELS BETWEEN PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THE LOCHER 
REPORT AND THE CURRENT SITUATION IN NYC 
The table below contains a generic restatement of the 16 problems noted above 
and rates their applicability to NYC’s current situation. Where there are parallels, each 
problem identified in the Locher Report is detailed below, and the parallel situation in 
NYC is described. Following each problem statement title, applicability to NYC is scored 
on a scale of one to five with the following significance for each value assigned: 1=Not 
Applicable; 2=Somewhat Applicable; 3=Applicable; 4=Very Applicable; 5=Extremely 
Applicable. 
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Table 5. Applicability of Problems Noted in the Locher Report to NYC 
Problem 
Number 
Problem Description Applicability 
to NYC 
1 Limited Mission Integration at the Policymaking Level 3 
2 Imbalance Between Service and Joint Interests 5 
3 Imbalance Between Modernization and Readiness 1 
4 Inter-Service Logrolling 2 
5 Inadequate Joint Advice 1 




7 Unnecessary Staff Layers and Duplication of Effort in the 
Top Management Headquarters of the Military Departments 
1 
8 Predominance of Program Budgeting 1 
9 Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals 2 
10 Insufficient Mechanisms for Change 4 
11 Inadequate Feedback 5 
12 Inadequate Quality of Political Appointees and Joint Duty 
Military Personnel 
3 
13 Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work 5 
14 Excessive Spans of Control 1 
15 Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense 5 




Limited Mission Integration at the Policymaking Level – 3  
The report criticizes the DoD for excessively focusing on functional areas, 
inhibiting integration of capabilities along mission lines. It notes that material inputs, 
rather than mission outputs are emphasized and goes on to say “Service interests rather 
than strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping program decisions.”  It also states 
that “insufficient mission integration at the policymaking level would lead to critical gaps 
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in warfighting capabilities, wasted resources through unwarranted duplication, 
interoperability problems, unrealistic plans, inconsistent doctrine, inadequate joint 
training, and ineffective fighting forces.”221 
The parallels to NYC are that the interests of the individual agencies are placed 
ahead of any grand strategic plan the City may have. Particularly, building up and 
replicating the capabilities of the individual agencies not only wastes resources, but 
creates an environment where parallel, rather than integrated, operations are conducted. 
Due to inadequate joint training and inconsistent doctrine (CIMS), gaps in the City’s 
ability to effectively coordinate its response to the next major disaster will emerge.  
Imbalance between Service and Joint Interests – 5  
The Locher Report is very critical of the excessive power and influence that the 
military departments and services wield. It states:  
…the problem of undue service influence arises principally from the 
weaknesses of the organizations that are responsible for joint military 
preparation and planning. This overwhelming influence of the military 
departments works at cross-purposes to efforts to integrate [the 
military]…Correcting the imbalance between service and joint interests 
will require the strengthening of the authority, stature, and support of joint 
organizations….222 
It also notes, however, that simply strengthening the joint organizations will not 
be enough to correct this imbalance between these competing interests: 
The problem is more deep-seated; it involves the basic attitudes and 
orientations of the professional officer corps. As long as the vast majority 
of military officers at all levels gives highest priority to the interests of 
their service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important 
national security needs – and believes that their behavior is correct – the 
predominance of Service influence will remain a problem. Whatever 
changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance 
to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of 
military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their services. This 
dimension of the problem will require changes in the system of military 
education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened 
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awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine 
multi-service perspective, and an improved understanding of other services.223 
The problem of Service influence has more of a direct correlation to NYC’s 
current situation than any other. In fact, the word “service” can be substituted with 
“agency” to see the parallels. The “joint interests” responsible for training and planning 
could similarly be substituted with “OEM”. What has happened over the past few years is 
that OEM’s effectiveness has been eroded as its authority has been largely been usurped 
by the NYPD. By any standard OEM is currently only a shadow of its former self. 
The report also correctly notes that nothing will change as long as the officers’ 
first allegiance is to their respective organization and that they believe that this behavior 
is correct. That is identical to the attitudes of members of both the NYPD and FDNY and 
has resulted in a lack of attention and commitment to the broader and more important 
needs of the City as a whole. 
Imbalance between Modernization and Readiness – 1  
This criticism focused on the emphasis of the DoD to plan for future capabilities 
at the expense of current needs.224  It has no direct applicability to NYC.  
Inter-Service Logrolling – 2 
The term “logrolling” refers to the practice of exchanging political support for 
someone else’s program in order to gain support for one’s own. The report was very 
critical of military leaders who engaged in this practice and avoided central issues of 
concern to them in order to provide a united front to the Secretary of Defense. This had 
the effect of politically weakening the SecDef and denied the opportunity for effective 
decision-making.225 
This practice does not have much of a direct parallel in NYC, however, the 
continued “united front” of denying that any interagency rivalry exists eliminates the 
opportunity to discuss options to resolve the situation and improve coordination and 
cooperation. 
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Inadequate Joint Advice – 1 
This portion of the report dealt with the manner in which the advice of the JCS 
was often disregarded for a number of reasons, most notably the inherent conflict of 
interest resulting from the “dual-hatted” role the Service chiefs played. The report notes 
that the inability of the chiefs to subordinate the interests of their parent Services to the 
larger interests of national defense resulted in “weak JCS advice that simply reflects what 
ever level of compromise is necessary to achieve the four Services’ unanimous 
agreement.”226  
Since there is currently no such organization that parallels the JCS, this problem 
of weak joint advice does not occur in NYC. However, in formulating recommendations 
for the City, the issue of dual-hatting will be addressed. 
Failure to Adequately Implement the Concept of Unified Command – 2 
Unified Command in this case has a different meaning for the military than it does 
in an incident command structure for first responders. Here the report criticizes the fact 
that the unified commanders (i.e., the combatant commanders) only had weak authority 
over the individual service components that made up their command. This resulted in 
commands that remained “loose confederations of single-service forces” that were unable 
to provide effective unified action and that the “unification” of the command and the 
forces were “more cosmetic than substantive.”227 
Because NYC does not have the equivalent of a combatant commander with 
overall responsibility for an entire regional or functional area, the applicability of this 
flaw is minimal. However, the comment regarding the loose confederations of single-
service forces and the observation that the unification is mostly cosmetic does parallel the 
current situation in the City. 
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Unnecessary Staff Layers and Duplication of Effort in the Top Management 
Headquarters of the Military Departments – 1 
The report found fault with the fact that the services maintained two (or in the 
case of the Navy, three) separate headquarters staffs: the Secretariat and the military 
headquarters staff.228  The resulting duplication and unnecessary level of supervision led 
to problems that are not applicable to NYC since no such structure exists there. 
Predominance of Program Budgeting – 1 
The report also criticized the amount of effort the DoD put into programming and 
budgeting phases of resource allocation leading to insufficient attention being given to 
strategic planning and operational matters. NYC does not suffer from a similar problem. 
Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals – 2  
The Locher Report concludes that inattention to strategic planning led to many 
problems in the DoD including a lack of clarity of its strategic goals calling them “vague 
and ambiguous.”  It explains that clarifying these goals can enhance unity and integration 
and recommends establishing and maintaining a well-designed, highly interactive 
strategic planning process. 229 
In NYC, OEM is officially the city’s “planning agency” with regard to 
emergencies and as such spends a great deal of time developing plans to deal with them. 
However, the NYPD and FDNY also develop their own plans and tactics for dealing with 
what they perceive as their respective missions. Although interagency exercises are held 
to comply with federal mandates, very few of the over 50,000 members in these two 
agencies actually participate in them. Therefore, if the City does have clear strategic 
goals for preparedness, they are not well known to most. 
Insufficient Mechanisms for Change – 4  
The report identifies four systematic problems that impeded the U.S. Military 
establishment from making needed changes:  First, bureaucratic agreements that had been 
worked out among the Services were “off-limits” for discussion, even when serious 
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deficiencies were identified. Second was the predominant influence of the services, 
especially when compared to that of joint organizations. Third was the issue of inter-
service logrolling identified earlier. And fourth was the absolute service control over 
promotions and assignments of all officers, even those in joint billets. It goes on to state 
that in spite of substantial evidence of poor performance, the DoD expended a lot of its 
energies defending the status quo.230 
Similarly, NYC spends a good deal of effort defending its decisions regarding 
homeland security measures. Statements to the media and testimony before the 9/11 
Commission, the city council, and congressional committees who are sometimes critical 
of NYC’s plans and expenditures, often focus on how NYC is “different” than the rest of 
the country and how funding should just be provided to NYC, but without restrictions on 
how the City uses the money. 
In addition, most of the impediments to change identified in the report are also 
present in New York. CIMS is an example of a bureaucratic agreement that is off-limits 
for discussion despite the flaws that were identified in the city council hearings. 
Likewise, the predominant influence of, and loyalty to, the individual agencies, rather 
than to the City overall, mirrors the influence of the Services as compared to joint 
organizations. And most importantly, the control the individual agencies have over 
promotions and assignments of members, even those detailed to other agencies such as 
OEM, guarantees that their actions and their loyalties are controlled by their home 
agencies. 
Inadequate Feedback – 5  
The report also criticizes the DoD for not establishing a tradition of 
comprehensive, critical evaluations of its performance and for not having a useful 
mechanism in place to provide feedback on many activities. It states, “Effective 
management control is not possible without useful and timely feedback on actual 
operations and implementation of plans.”  It further notes that this lack of feedback “also 
precludes learning important lessons from poor organizational performance. Past 
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mistakes…do not receive the critical review that would prevent them from recurring… 
[the] lessons go unlearned and the mistakes are repeated.”231 
This problem is virtually identical to the AAR process in NYC discussed in 
Chapter V. Since a critical review that identified shortcomings with CIMS or problems 
involving interagency operations would provide an impetus for change to the current 
system, it is likely that the absence of meaningful feedback is intentional. The fact that a 
copy of the AAR for the Trifecta exercise, as scripted as it was, has still not been made 
available a full year and counting since the exercise was held is indicative of the 
administration’s desire to maintain the status quo. 
Inadequate Quality of Political Appointees and Joint Duty Military Personnel – 3  
In this case the report is referring to political appointees who are problematic 
because of their relative inexperience and high turnover rates. It also notes that the DoD 
had not given sufficient attention to developing military officers capable of performing 
joint duty assignments and that there were substantial disincentives to serving in such 
assignments.232 
Other studies at the time had also identified the lack of desirability of joint duty 
assignments as a major impediment to attracting quality officers to fill them. Some of the 
deterrents noted were:  removing officers from the environment in which they sought to 
advance, having their fitness reports entrusted to officers of other services, a perception 
that Joint Staff work was unproductive, and a perception that a joint assignment was the 
“kiss of death” for continued military advancement. Conversely, assignments in the 
Service Staffs offered much greater possibilities for an officer to be noticed and for career 
enhancements.233  
A RAND Corporation study of the background of Goldwater-Nichols concluded 
that “the military services had little respect for joint service or for assignments outside 
their individual service organizations. The Services typically sent second-rate officers to  
 
                                                 
231 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 8. 
232 Ibid., 8-9. 
233 Graves and Snider, Emergence of the Joint Officer, 56. 
124 
such assignments and removed them as quickly as possible. Joint assignments were not 
desired by military officers, who viewed them as a hindrance in their career 
progression.”234 
There is a degree of similarity between the problems noted above and the way in 
which OEM is currently staffed in NYC. That is not to say that there is a lack of quality 
personnel at OEM. Many of their employees have been there for years and are very 
competent and motivated in their jobs. However, in the past few years the diminishing 
authority of OEM has begun to create the perception, both outside and within OEM, that 
that agency no longer has the influence to effect change that it once had. At the same time 
there has recently been a great deal of turnover among the staff. While exact figures are 
not available, some sources within OEM have put the turnover rate at as high as 50 
percent every six months, while others have said that the average tenure is approximately 
two years.235  Naturally, this has led to a great deal of inexperience in these positions, 
closely paralleling the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era conditions in joint duty assignments. 
Additionally, taking a position at OEM is not seen as a career-enhancing measure, 
at least from the FDNY’s perspective. Personal experience and discussions with other 
FDNY officers interested in being detailed to OEM demonstrate that top level chiefs in 
the FDNY look unfavorably at OEM as a career path. In some cases there was an outright 
refusal to permit that officer to go. And while civil service testing for promotions 
prevents this detail from becoming the “kiss of death” for one’s career, it is certainly not 
seen as a career-enhancing position. 
Failure to Clarify the Desired Division of Work – 5  
The Locher Report specifically criticizes the DoD’s inability to objectively 
examine the roles and missions of the Services and to divide the operations and workload 
accordingly. It states “One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational 
efficiency is to rationally divide the work among the various structural components. 
Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately clarified in many 
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instances; in others, the assigned division of work is ignored in practice…The absence of 
a rational and enforced division of work leads to greater complexity, friction, delay, 
duplication, and inefficiency.”236 
As discussed earlier, this situation is identical to the current circumstances in 
NYC where considerable time, effort, and money are spent on duplicating existing 
capabilities. This situation results in a lack of clarity in the division of labor, and in cases 
where assignments are spelled out, they are often ignored in practice. Inevitably, rivalries, 
friction, inefficiency, and waste result.  
Excessive Spans of Control – 1  
This section of the report identifies the problem of having key managers in 
positions that have excessive numbers of subordinates reporting to them due to the 
relatively flat organizational arrangement of the DoD.237  It is not applicable to NYC, 
particularly in the NYPD or FDNY where the use of hierarchical organizational 
structures eliminate this problem. 
Insufficient Power and Influence of the Secretary of Defense – 5  
As discussed in the “History” section of the GNA, the influence of the services 
and the JCS combined to weaken the authority of the SecDef despite several amendments 
to the National Security Act of 1947 designed to strengthen this position. The report 
determines that the SecDef’s actual power and influence are insufficient to enable him to 
manage the DoD. It also states that the reason for this is not from a lack of formal 
authority, but rather from “powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their 
own agendas has substantially weakened the office of Secretary of Defense.”238 
This situation closely parallels NYC where the authority of the Office of 
Emergency Management has been steadily eroded in the past few years by individual 
agencies, particularly the NYPD, pursuing their own agendas. Whereas OEM once had 
the ability to dictate which agency should perform what mission, the current 
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commissioner has virtually eliminated OEM’s response role to act as on-scene 
interagency coordinator and relegated its function to that of a “planning agency”.239 
Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight – 2  
This section of the report criticizes the Congress for failing to help centralize the 
DoD under the SecDef because it could wield more influence in directing allocation of 
resources under a decentralized system. It also condemns the Congress for its review 
procedures which produce an inconsistent and sometimes conflicting oversight 
process.240 
The problem in NYC is not one of inconsistent oversight; it is one of lack of 
oversight. There is no central agency with authority over long-term strategic planning and 
procurement across agency lines. Instead, each agency determines for itself what its 
strategic goals and priorities are and submits its investment justifications based on them. 
There is little coordination between the agencies and a great deal of duplication as a 
result. Similarly, the city council is powerless to take any action other than holding 
hearings as they did after CIMS was finalized. This lack of oversight is a primary cause 
of the inefficiency, waste, duplication, and the rivalry that exists. 
 
C. OBJECTIVES OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
Based largely on the problems identified and suggestions made to correct them 
listed in the Locher Report, Congress declared eight specific objectives intended to 
transform the DoD from four individually stove-piped services to one cohesive war-
fighting organization. Listed below are those objectives and a brief explanation of what 
was done to accomplish them: 
Strengthen Civilian Authority 
Goldwater-Nichols sought to reassert civilian control over the DoD by enhancing 
the power of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The report which accompanied the 
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legislation stated “The Secretary of Defense has sole and ultimate power within the 
Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act.”241 
Improve Military Advice 
This legislation also removed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
from the operational chain of command and designated him as “the principal military 
advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.” 
This transferred duties to him that had previously been performed by the JCS who were 
criticized for providing watered-down advice in order to get unanimous consent. It also 
created the position of vice chairman to assist and gave the chairman full authority over 
the Joint Staff.242 
Ensure the Combatant Commanders Had Authorities Commensurate with Their 
Responsibility    
This objective resulted in giving the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) direct 
responsibility for implementing and directing a campaign plan. They report directly to the 
Secretary of Defense although in practice they do coordinate with their superiors on the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Increase Attention to Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning 
Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the staffs of the individual services were principally 
involved in crafting operational plans. Since its passage, that responsibility has been 
shifted to the chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Undersecretary for Policy, and 
the COCOMs. 
Achieve a More Efficient Use of Defense Resources 
By enhancing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s role in assessing the 
programs and budgets of the various services the GNA has allowed the chairman to 
provide advice to the president and SecDef based on the need to promote a joint 
perspective in the requirements and acquisition process. 
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Improve the Management of Joint Officers 
To accomplish this, the GNA created new incentives and requirements for 
military advancement. Foremost among them was the necessity for an officer to have 
served in a joint billet as a prerequisite for advancement to the staff level of an 
organization. In addition, it also made specific reforms improving the Professional 
Military Education System. Together these steps served to advance “jointness” as an 
operating concept. 
Enhance the Effectiveness of Military Operations 
Based on the success of the military campaigns in the two decades since 
Goldwater-Nichols became law, the overwhelming consensus is that this objective has 
been accomplished.  
Improve the Management and Administration of the Department of Defense 
To accomplish this, Goldwater-Nichols reduced the number of officials reporting 
directly to the SecDef. It also created mechanisms to better supervise the defense 
agencies. 
 
D. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
To determine the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in meeting the objectives 
set out for it by Congress, a critical look must be taken at the results. Two independent 
and highly qualified sources have done so. The first is James R. Locher III (the director 
of the Senate Committee on Armed Services that published “Defense Organization: The 
Need for Change”243 in 1985)  who wrote an article for Joint Forces Quarterly on the 
ten-year anniversary of the act entitled “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols”.244  The 
second is the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) who published Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era: Phase I Report 245 in 2004. 
Below are the conclusions they reached regarding the success of the act in meeting its 
objectives.                                                   
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Both assessments agree that this legislation has succeeded in strengthening 
civilian authority. Clearly the SecDef’s power and overall control over the DoD has been 
enhanced. Some have claimed that by giving the chairman a more influential role it has 
somehow weakened civilian authority, however, there is very little evidence to support 
this assertion and those who make it are known to favor having a greater degree of 
service influence.246 
There is also widespread agreement that the quality of military advice has greatly 
improved since Goldwater-Nichols. The act clearly designated the chairman as the 
principal military advisor, with the service chiefs relegated to roles as “advisors”. Former 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that this change resulted in advice that “was a 
significant improvement” over the “lowest common denominator of whatever the chiefs 
collectively could agree upon.”247  On the negative side, though, there is a case to be 
made that having only one military voice in the situation room of the White House does 
not allow room for dissenting perspectives. And although Goldwater-Nichols did not 
envision that the President and SecDef would no longer seek military advice from the 
service chiefs, that has been the predominant practice.248  
The objective of ensuring that the COCOMs have authority commensurate with 
their responsibility has also been met. Locher states that “Opinion is universal that this 
objective of Goldwater-Nichols has been achieved.”249  Likewise, the CSIS report 
explains that in theory, the COCOMs now directly report to the SecDef with little 
interference from military of civilian supervisors in Washington. In practice, however, 
they are frequently asked to submit proposed campaign plans, functional plans, and 
concept plans for review. The report concludes that this balance between discretion and 
oversight is “probably right.”250 
There is also agreement that the quality of strategy formulation and contingency 
planning has greatly improved. Locher concludes that “in every case their value has been                                                  
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superior to their pre-Goldwater-Nichols predecessors.”251  Likewise, CSIS states that 
“these new institutional arrangements have proven much superior to the prior system”, 
although it is somewhat critical of the grand strategy plans produced for not being 
specific enough to make trade-offs among competing resource demands.252 
Regarding the goal of achieving a more efficient use of defense resources, both 
assessments agree that while more attention has been given to promoting a joint 
perspective in the requirements and acquisition process, the act has not lived up to its 
potential. They conclude that the parochial interests of the individual Services continue to 
be decisive over joint perspectives when it comes to setting procurement and requirement 
priorities. The act does give the chairman the power to advise the SecDef on priorities for 
combatant command requirements and to submit an alternative program and budget 
recommendations if necessary, but in practice, chairmen have seldom provided definitive 
resource advice to the SecDef.253 
Both evaluations also agree that the objective of improving the quality and 
management of joint officers has been accomplished. According to Locher, the 
“incentives, requirements, and standards prescribed by the act have notably improved the 
performance of those selected to serve in joint duty assignments.”  He goes on to say that 
“these positive results have occurred despite indifferent implementation of the joint 
officer provisions by OSD and the Joint Staff.”254  The CSIS report agrees that the steps 
spelled out in the act serve to advance “jointness” as an operating concept, but that the 
requirements and assignments continue to have an arbitrary dimension and recommends a 
review of how billets are selected for joint status.255  
Perhaps the most important objective of Goldwater-Nichols was to improve the 
operational effectiveness of the military overall. All of the other objectives and reforms 
were ultimately designed to aid in accomplishing this and here the record appears to 
indicate a decisive success. The operational failures evident in Viet Nam, the seizure of                                                  
251 Locher, Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols, 14. 
252 Murdock, et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 1 Report, 16. 
253  Ibid.; Locher, Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols, 14. 
254  Locher, Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols, 14-15. 
255  Murdock, et al., Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 1 Report, 17. 
131 
the Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue mission, and the incursion into Grenada which 
gave rise to the Goldwater-Nichols Act were followed with overwhelmingly successful 
military campaigns in Panama, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the 
war in Iraq. And while technological advances and other forces coincided with defense 
reform to provide the DoD with the decisive victories noted, it is certain that the 
transformation brought about by the GNA played an integral part in these successes.256 
The final explicit objective of the GNA was to improve the management and 
administration of the DoD. The analyses studied indicate that this objective met with the 
least success of them all but still managed to make some improvements. Goldwater-
Nichols sought to address specific structural problems that were hindering sound 
management by creating mechanisms to better supervise the defense agencies. It was 
successful in reducing the number of officials reporting directly to the SecDef and 
eliminated some of the unnecessary staff layers thereby reducing the headquarters staffs 
by some 15 percent. However, both examinations found that problems remain. Locher 
contends that the defense bureaucracy remains too large and that duplication of effort still 
exists. CSIS found that the OSD is still too involved in managing programs rather than 
developing and overseeing policy and that the GNA did not adequately clarify the 
relationships between the service chiefs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD).257 
The overall consensus of both studies is that despite not completely meeting all of 
its specified objectives, the GNA has succeeded in accomplishing most of them and has 
made progress in the others. The tremendously successful military campaigns that have 
taken place since its enactment support the assertion that these reforms were needed and 
were successfully implemented. As the Locher article concludes, “…a significant body of 
evidence and numerous public assertions by senior defense officials and military officers 
argue that the act enormously contributed to the positive outcomes of recent years.”258 
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E. PERSONNEL PROVISIONS OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
For over four decades the organizational problems addressed by Goldwater-
Nichols had existed and been studied. But the same powerful military forces that 
prevented Congress from unifying the services after World War II also prevented any 
meaningful reforms to the structure of the DoD. In addition, Congress also tried to limit 
the authority of the SecDef in the past because of its links with the services and the 
industries that served them. These ties worked to the benefit of members of Congress in 
local politics. So, it speaks volumes about how intolerable the system had gotten that 
Congress collectively acknowledged that it would have to give up prerogatives in the 
defense area and take the steps necessary to finally address these issues.  
The number one problem plaguing the DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols was the 
imbalance between service and joint interests in which the services absolutely dominated. 
A special study group of retired officers put together by General Jones wrote that while a 
“certain amount of service independence is healthy and desirable…the balance now 
favors the parochial interests of the services too much, and the larger needs of the 
nation’s defense too little.”  In order to strike a balance between the joint and service 
interests and break the stranglehold the services had on the loyalties of its members, 
Congress included elaborate provisions to improve the quality of officers assigned to the 
Joint Staff and the staffs of the Combatant Commanders.259 
In an article entitled “Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization 
Act” written in 2001, Locher points out that “the services saw that if they retained 
absolute control of promotions and assignments, Congress could pass all the laws it 
wanted—not much was going to change in the Department of Defense.”260  To remedy 
this; improve the quality of officers in joint-duty positions; and instill a “joint culture” 
(i.e., attitudes, values, and beliefs about joint service) among the officer corps, Congress 
took steps to reward officers who accepted and performed well in billets outside of their 
service.261  Title IV, the Joint Officer Personnel Policy, of the GNA is the section that 
deals with these personnel provisions. This section did three things: 
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First, it required the SecDef to define “joint duty assignment” and limit it to 
assignments where an officer “gains a significant experience in joint matters.”  It also 
specifically excluded assignments within an officer’s own military department. Second, it 
created a new category of officers known as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO’s). To become 
a JSO an officer must complete a two-phase program at a Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) school and serve a full tour in a Joint Duty Assignment. The law also 
stipulated that a certain number of positions had to be filled by JSO’s. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, the law specified that a joint duty assignment was a prerequisite for 
promotion to general or flag officer, although it did allow for waivers initially and a 
phase-in period.262 
The act also contained certain “protections” to ensure that “quality” officers 
would be sent to these joint duty assignments and that when they completed these 
assignments they would not be penalized in any way by their services. To that end the act 
mandated that officers designated as JSO’s should be promoted at a rate at least as high 
as the average of comparable officers throughout their Service and at least as high as 
those who had served on their Service headquarters staff. In addition, it required the 
SecDef to provide a semi-annual report to Congress on these promotion rates.263 
In addition to creating the category of JSO’s and taking steps to make joint duty 
positions coveted ones, Title IV also revamped the content of military science as it 
applies to the education of JSO’s by focusing on emerging joint doctrine. It did this by 
making the chairman, rather than the JCS, the principal advisor on all military issues 
including PME; by defining “joint matters” for education as well as other purposes; by 
mandating that “rigorous standards” at JPME institutions be maintained; and by requiring 
that all newly promoted flag and general officers attend a Capstone Course designed 
specifically to prepare them to work with all the services. 
By linking assignments, education, and promotion potential to joint duty, the law 
had dramatic effects on service policies related to professional development. This was 
especially true regarding the widely held belief that officers did not serve outside their 
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service for fear of falling behind their contemporaries who remained in the service’s 
mainstream. What Goldwater-Nichols has done through the personnel provisions 
contained in Title IV, is to change the attitudes of our military leaders regarding the 
importance and desirability of joint duty assignments. This has given rise to the 
emergence of a new culture among the leaders of the armed forces, one that is truly 
“joint”.264 
 
F. CRITICISMS OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS  
While it is almost universally accepted that overall, the effects that the GNA had 
on military operations and the structure of the DoD were positive ones, some criticisms 
have been raised regarding its unintended consequences. Among them are: 
 
1. Institutional Costs 
Assigning promising officers to joint duty assignments that would otherwise be 
given positions deemed important within their own service in order to comply with the 
requirements of Goldwater-Nichols is not without costs. While there has been a marked 
increase in quality of officers serving in joint assignments, there has also been a 
corresponding decrease in the quality of service headquarters and operational staffs. In 
addition, issues have arisen over the amount of time these officers spend outside of their 
services, not only in the joint duty assignment, but also attending JPME. In many cases 
this can add up to almost 20 percent of an officer’s professional career.265  
However, these costs must be weighed against the benefits derived from them. 
Better educated and more well-rounded officers have become the leaders of our military 
institutions over the past 20 years setting the stage for the joint culture that has emerged. 
The unparalleled military successes that have resulted from joint warfare leave little 
doubt that integration of the services has been a decidedly successful endeavor. On 
balance, the record indicates that the sacrifices that the individual services have had to 
endure are more than offset by the benefits the nation has realized from these provisions. 
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2. Interservice Rivalry is not Inherently Bad 
There is a theory being advanced by some that deviates from the generally 
accepted wisdom that interservice rivalry is bad. The logic is that it can be channeled as a 
motivating force to improve the proficiency and capabilities of the individual services. 
Mayor Giuliani alluded to this when he testified before the 9/11 Commission regarding 
the NYPD-FDNY rivalry and how each agency feels they can perform certain emergency 
operations better than the other, when he said, “You want to retain this tremendous pride 
[that the agencies have]…At the same time you want to be able to use it correctly.”266  
In an article for Airpower Journal entitled “The U.S. Military in Transition to 
Jointness”, Dr. Don M. Snider argues that “…interservice rivalry is not inherently bad. 
Rather, when seen as the flip side of the post- [GNA] process of increasing jointness, it is 
a ‘good’ thing.”267 
He cites the findings in the final report of DoD’s Commission on Roles and 
Missions, Directions for Defense, to bolster this claim. Snider writes that the commission 
concludes “it is time to ‘set aside outdated arguments’ about ‘who should do what’ 
among the U.S. military services and instead, given the joint structure in which America 
now fights wars, it is time to focus on ‘who needs what’ from the perspective of the 
unified commander.”268 
Snider believes that in identifying the conventional wisdom regarding interservice 
rivalry as “outdated arguments”, the commission “has taken account of the changed 
roles” that the services and their commanders now play. He notes that in the 1940’s and 
1950’s “roles and missions were bitterly debated”, but now “that is no longer the case”. 
He goes on to say that “if each service focused…on its unique ‘core competencies’—
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building blocks for joint forces—the commissioners felt confident in concluding that ‘a 
conventional criticism of the services, unrestrained parochialism and duplication of 
programs, is overstated.’”269 
This argument, however, is not applicable to the situation in NYC for a number of 
reasons. The first is that NYC has neither a “joint structure” nor the equivalent of a 
“unified commander” (i.e., a single person who is responsible for overall strategic and 
tactical decisions within a geographic or functional area) who will make decisions based 
on the needs of the incident and the capabilities available, rather than on political or 
parochial considerations. Another reason is that while the military has resolved its 
historical disagreements over roles and missions, NYC has not. Most of the public and 
private disagreements between the NYPD and FDNY center on exactly this issue. 
Finally, the commission’s confidence that each service would focus on its “core 
competencies” is a wholly unrealistic expectation in NYC. As was discussed in Chapter 
V, the list of core competencies is incomplete and has been used as a tool to marginalize 
the FDNY’s role. In addition, both the NYPD and FDNY regularly train for and operate 
at incidents outside their CIMS-specified core competencies. While Mr. Giuliani’s 
comments about maintaining the esprit de corps of the individual agencies as a 
motivating factor have merit, the context in which they were made was to illustrate the 
need for a strong OEM to essentially act as a referee. 
 
3. Creates Only One Military Voice 
As was discussed in the section on the successes and failures of Goldwater-
Nichols, the designation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the “principal 
military advisor” has resulted in the unintended consequence of limiting military advice 
provided to the President and SecDef. The common practice is for the chairman to listen 
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recommendations to the President and SecDef based on them. The argument is that this 
filtering process does not allow sufficient consideration to be given to dissenting 
perspectives.270 
 hile this critique may be accurate as it is practiced, it was never the intent of the 
GNA to limit the advice provided to the President and SecDef. In fact, there is nothing in 
the law that prevents the President and SecDef from soliciting other opinions. If at any 
time they felt the advice they were receiving from the chairman was inadequate, they are 
certainly free to receive advice from the service chiefs as well. In addition, while the JCS 
have a tendency to build consensus when it comes to long-range strategic planning, the 
individual combatant commanders have more immediate concerns and provide input as to 
more urgent needs. 
 
4. Jointness Comes at the Expense of Specialization 
Another criticism that has been raised regarding the effects of Goldwater-Nichols 
is that the expertise the individual services had as they pertained to their core missions 
has diminished somewhat as additional cross-training and new mission sets were added. 
The argument is that time which was previously spent training on service-specific roles 
and missions is now used to focus on joint operations. New procedures and equipment 
have to be mastered to allow the services to operate together and support each other more 
effectively. These additional responsibilities inevitably leave less time available to devote 
to more traditional training. 
While there is a case to be made that some reduction in proficiency has resulted 
due to these reforms, the overall increase in military capabilities that results from the 
synergistic effects of the Services being able to support each other far outweighs this 
disadvantage. 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
While some unintended consequences have inevitably arisen from the changes 
brought about by the GNA, the overwhelming consensus is that the act has greatly 
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improved the planning and operational capabilities of the U.S. military overall. Although 
some of the literature takes issue with these consequences and makes recommendations 
for mitigating their effects, no one advocates returning to the system that was in place 
prior to its enactment. 
A review of the historical circumstances that gave rise to the passage of the GNA 
demonstrates that there are many significant similarities between the conditions that 
existed within the DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols and the current situation that exists in 
NYC between its first responder agencies, particularly the NYPD and FDNY. With that 
in mind, the following recommendations, based on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, are made to improve interagency collaboration and 
cooperation in NYC by creating an environment in which parochial interests are 
subjugated to the greater needs of the City as a whole and a culture of “jointness” 
replaces one of rivalry. 
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VII. A GOLDWATER-NICHOLS SOLUTION FOR NYC 
The authors of Goldwater-Nichols realized that service parochialism had become 
so entrenched in the DoD that substantive structural changes needed to be made if that 
was to change. The act aimed at reducing the power of the individual services by: 1) 
Increasing the exposure of officers to a central staff and shifting responsibility for 
acquisition of major weapons systems to the office of the SecDef; 2) Diminishing control 
exercised by each service over careers by insisting on specified qualifications for career 
advancement; and 3) Changing military education by altering service college curricula to 
emphasize interservice cooperation.271 If NYC is to truly put an end to the interagency 
rivalries that have existed for decades and prevented it from utilizing its capabilities 
efficiently and to their true potential, similar dramatic changes need to be implemented.  
New York City is frequently cited as the most extreme example of interagency 
rivalry in the nation. Indeed, the phrase “battle of the badges” was coined to describe the 
very public disputes that arose from this relationship between its police and fire 
departments. The 9/11 Commission held two days of hearings and conducted hundreds of 
interviews in an attempt to ascertain the cause of it and the effect it had on operations at 
the WTC. President Bush even went as far as to mandate adoption of the National 
Incident Management System as a prerequisite for homeland security funding. His 
decision to do this was based on the findings of the commission regarding operations at 
the WTC. NYC’s decision to comply with the letter, but not the spirit, of NIMS has not 
only ignored the underlying causes of the rivalry, it has inflamed it. 
Few would argue that if New York City was to start from scratch in developing an 
integrated emergency management system that minimized interagency conflict and 
maximized the effectiveness of its extensive resources, that it would establish the system 
in place today. As was discussed earlier, this system is a product of decades of 
interagency rivalry, various protocols and mandates, service parochialism, and political 
clout that has fostered an atmosphere of resentment and distrust particularly between its 
first responder agencies. In a post-9/11 world where, in addition to being prepared for 
                                                 
271 Cropsey, The Limits of Jointness, 73. 
140 
everyday emergencies, the City needs to remain vigilant to the constant threat of 
terrorism in the face of diminishing homeland security funding, it can ill-afford to waste 
limited resources on unnecessary duplication and inefficiency.  
Any proposals put forward to improve the City’s ability to manage and coordinate 
its resources must look beyond the parochial desires of its individual agencies and be 
based solely on the overarching needs of the City as a whole. Central to maintaining the 
credibility of such a system is the need for oversight and transparency in the process of 
how that system is developed and implemented. In addition, it needs to bring about 
increases in efficiency and foster a collaborative atmosphere where the agencies view 
each other as mutually dependent partners rather than as independent rivals. 
 
A.  RECOMMENDATION 1: OEM SHOULD BECOME THE CITY’S 
CENTRAL AGENCY FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING ALL 
PREVENTION, PREPARATION, RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
EFFORTS 
Just as the individual services presented the biggest challenge to creating a 
collaborative environment within the DoD prior to the GNA, the influence of the 
individual agencies, particularly the NYPD, present the biggest impediment to doing so 
in NYC. As was noted in the last chapter, this parallel has the strongest correlation to 
NYC out of all the problems identified in the Locher report. Reiterating what the report 
says on this issue: 
…the problem of undue service influence arises principally from the 
weaknesses of the organizations that are responsible for joint military 
preparation and planning. This overwhelming influence of the Military 
Departments works at cross-purposes to efforts to integrate [the 
military]…Correcting the imbalance between service and joint interests 
will require the strengthening of the authority, stature, and support of joint 
organizations…272 
In the case of NYC, OEM is the agency charged with preparation and planning 
for emergencies. It is also a “joint organization” in as much as the majority of its staff is 
made up of members detailed to it from other city agencies. However, individual 
agencies also develop their own plans and procedures based on their own priorities and 
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what they see as their role at various emergencies. This serves to undermine the mission 
of OEM and their credibility as a coordinating agency. In addition, OEM’s lack of 
authority over any agency (as evidenced by the AAR’s that have been held and the 
commissioner’s statements to the city council273) further weakens its influence. 
The reason that the parochialism exhibited by these agencies is such an 
impediment to interagency cooperation is that there is no system of checks and balances 
to ensure that resources are used wisely and in the best interest of the mission, rather than 
the individual agency. When police and fire units arrive on the scene together and both 
have the capability to manage a particular emergency, both agencies look to their own 
personnel to accomplish that mission regardless of which agency is better qualified to do 
so. This is done for reasons of institutional pride and organizational bias as discussed in 
Chapter II. As a result there is often a great deal of animosity and little coordination 
between them. The introduction of “core competencies” under CIMS has done little 
rectify this situation because of the careful crafting of how they are worded and the 
failure to address certain situations, such as decontamination of individuals as opposed to 
groups. 
Under Mayor Giuliani’s protocol, OEM had the authority to determine which 
agency would take the lead at various emergencies. In addition to designating OEM as 
the “on-scene interagency coordinator”, the directive stated that when an incident is “so 
multifaceted that no one agency immediately stands out as the Incident Commander, 
OEM will assign the role of Incident Commander to an agency as the situation 
demands”.274 
Empowering OEM in this manner was a primary reason for its success in being 
able to coordinate multi-agency responses. However, the comments made by its current 
commissioner stating that he sees OEM as more of a “planning agency”275; that under 
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CIMS “there is no tie breaker”276; and that he has “no authority over [the police or fire 
departments]”277 confirm the belief that OEM has been stripped of its role as mediator 
and that there is no central agency that can act as an honest broker. 
In spite of the testimony by the former mayor and both of his former OEM 
commissioners that a strong and empowered OEM is necessary to effectively coordinate 
the City’s emergency response agencies,278 the current administration has chosen to bow 
to the wishes of the NYPD when it argued that OEM should not have the authority to 
choose which city agency would take the lead role, the authority to resolve interagency 
disputes, or any operational authority at all.279 This policy has only served to embolden 
the parochial plans of the NYPD, weaken the Office of Emergency Management, and 
inflame the rivalry that exists between the NYPD and FDNY. 
The primary reason for giving OEM the authority to determine the incident 
commander, and the most likely reason for the NYPD’s opposition to that policy, is that 
it allowed the incident to be managed from the perspective of what is the most effective 
method to resolve the situation at hand, without political or parochial interests entering 
into the equation. Since OEM does not have any resources of its own with which to 
handle an emergency, they do not possess the organizational bias that the first responder 
agencies do. It is dependent on those agencies to accomplish the mission and therefore 
utilizes them in the most efficient manner possible.  
The system of checks and balances is provided by the fact that OEM would 
coordinate and the individual agencies would perform the assignments with which they 
were tasked. In much the same way that the framers of the Constitution granted the office 
of Commander-in-Chief to the President, but not the function of commander;280 assigning  
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OEM as the coordinator of the operation, but not assigning it the duties or capabilities to 
carry out operations, ensures a mutual dependency that fosters interagency collaboration 
and a sensible division of labor. 
Just as the Locher report recommended, and Goldwater-Nichols accomplished, 
“strengthening the authority, stature, and support of joint organizations” was what was 
required to correct the imbalance between the Service and joint interests.281 In NYC that 
would entail once again empowering OEM and strengthening its authority to offset the 
undue influence of the individual agencies, primarily the NYPD. The GNA “shifted 
power from individual military services to officials responsible for coordinating 
them.”282 This is exactly what needs to be done in NYC to allow OEM to effectively 
integrate all of the City’s resources to better serve its needs. In order to accomplish this, 
several changes need to be made in how OEM is organized and what its mission is: 
 
1. The Position of Commissioner of OEM Needs to be Enhanced 
One of the stated objectives of the GNA was to reassert civilian control over the 
DoD by enhancing the power of the Secretary of Defense.283 While the issue of having 
“civilian” control is not really a concern when dealing with first responder agencies as 
opposed to the military, the matter of having “control” is. The Locher Report states:  
The actual power and influence of the Secretary of Defense are not 
sufficient to enable him to effectively manage the Department of Defense. 
The problem arises not from his formal statutory authority which provides 
him a full measure of power. Instead, the problem emanates from 
powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own 
agendas has substantially weakened the office of Secretary of Defense.284  
This problem noted in the report is also extremely applicable to NYC’s current 
situation. The “powerful organizational forces” at work here are the NYPD and to a 
lesser degree, the FDNY, who continue to pursue their own agendas independently of 
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each other and of OEM. As discussed earlier, the OEM commissioner’s statements that 
he sees the agency more as a “think tank” or “planning agency”285 than as a response 
agency as it had been, underscores the perception that OEM’s authority has been severely 
weakened. In fact, had OEM not been given the status of a charter agency by a 
referendum vote two months after the 9/11 attacks, the evidence suggests that the current 
administration would have designated OEM as an office within the NYPD, just as it was 
prior to Mr. Giuliani transforming it into the Mayor’s Office of  Emergency Management 
in 1996. 
Although the position of OEM commissioner is theoretically equivalent to the 
status of police or fire commissioner, a brief look at the organizations and budgets they 
control illustrate that in reality that is far from the case. 
 
Table 6. FY ‘06 Budgets and Number of Employees in the NYPD, FDNY, and 
OEM286 
Agency Annual Budget ($ Millions) Number of Employees 
NYPD 3,870.1 35,773 (uniformed) 
16,212      (civilian) 
FDNY 1,438.8 11,643 (uniformed) 
   4,497      (civilian) 
OEM      25.8 59      
(Note: Of the 59 OEM employees, approximately 45 are funded by grants. City funds to OEM in 
FY ’06 totaled just over $4.6 million. In addition, there are approximately 69 additional personnel 
detailed to OEM from the various city agencies. These members, however, remain employees of 
their sponsoring agency and their salaries, assignments, and promotional opportunities are 
controlled by those agencies.) 
 
For NYC to effectively integrate all of its agencies and resources, one 
organization needs to be put in charge of coordinating that effort. As NYC’s 
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“coordinating agency”,287 that task should fall to OEM. For that to occur, it is not enough 
for the commissioner of OEM to be the “equal” of the other commissioners. He needs to 
have authority over them. Therefore, the position of OEM commissioner should be 
elevated to the status of a deputy mayor in charge of public safety who reports directly to 
the mayor. The police and fire commissioners, as well as all the other agency heads, 
should report to him / her. The figure below, modeled on the organizational chart of the 
Department of Defense depicted in Figure 2, illustrates how this system would work in 
NYC. 
 
Figure 3.   Proposed Organizational Chart for Public Safety Agencies in NYC 
 
As the head of the organization charged with ensuring that the City is as prepared 
as possible for any emergency, the OEM commissioner would be ultimately responsible 
for coordinating the City’s resources, including police and fire, to respond to any event. 
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As the superior to the commissioners of the individual agencies, the OEM commissioner 
would have authority over them to ensure that their parochial interests do not interfere 
with a coordinated and unified approach to managing emergencies. 
Part of the mandate of the OEM commissioner should also include ensuring that 
public safety is provided in the most economical means possible. Eliminating costly and 
unnecessary duplication, and the friction it creates, would be one of prime responsibilities 
of this office. To avoid any perceived or actual bias on the part of the commissioner, this 
position, at least initially, should be filled by a recognized public safety expert with no 
ties to either the NYPD or FDNY. 
Since this position would carry such a great deal of responsibility for ensuring the 
safety of the citizens of NYC, it must be filled with an extremely qualified person who 
has the experience and credentials to fill that role. That is currently not the case. In a 
world where the threat of terrorism is omnipresent, particularly in NYC, the days of 
awarding commissions in public safety organizations based on political considerations is 
unacceptable and should not enter into designating this responsibility. Therefore, as is the 
practice in the federal government, a confirmation process should be held when selecting 
officials to fill these vital roles. The mayor should nominate the persons he/she wants to 
fill the roles of commissioners for OEM, Police, and Fire. The city council would then 
hold hearings on their qualifications and confirm them if appropriate. 
 
2. Senior Management at OEM Should be Modeled after the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 
As indicated in Figure 3, top level management at OEM should report to the OEM 
commissioner, but serve in an advisory capacity to the mayor to offer dissenting opinions 
and alternative advice on public safety matters, much in the same way the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff do for the President. To ensure that these personnel are qualified experts in public 
safety and emergency response and are familiar with local NYC issues, they should be 
made up senior level members from the NYPD, FDNY, and other city agencies. 
However, to guarantee that the problem of “dual-hatting” identified in the Locher 
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Report288 does not occur, where these members would be directed to provide unbiased 
advice to the OEM commissioner and mayor and still be advocates for their respective 
agencies, certain precautions need to be taken. 
To overcome this inherent difficulty, staffing the senior positions at OEM should 
be based on the National Military Advisory Council (NMAC) proposal advocated by 
General Meyer289 but never implemented. To that end, this group should be made up of 
retired members from these agencies or from members who have chosen a career path at 
OEM (as described in section B 2 below) who will not be returning to their home agency. 
Not only will this eliminate their dual-hatted role, it will also remove any unwanted 
influence that could be exerted by the home agency on an individual who would be 
returning to it. 
 
3. All Equipment Purchases and Grant Requests Should be Coordinated 
Through OEM 
To minimize the duplication of resources that exists, take advantage of economies 
of scale, and ensure that all money spent conforms to the City’s overall strategic plans; 
OEM should coordinate the purchase of all emergency equipment and the submission of 
all grant requests made by individual agencies. OEM, in conjunction with the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), would make the final determination on if the grant 
request should go forward and on whether the equipment should be purchased by that 
particular agency. All requests would have to conform to the City’s overall plans so that 
individual agencies do not waste money duplicating existing resources and expanding 
their mission into areas outside their core competencies which are already covered by 
other agencies. Training programs would also be included in this policy and be 
coordinated by OEM. 
To accomplish this, a committee should be established consisting of 
representatives from OMB, OEM, NYPD, FDNY, and other agencies. This committee 
should come under the jurisdiction of OEM and be loosely based on the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) which operates under the Chairman of the Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff. Among the functions of the JROC are the responsibilities to support the 
acquisition review process and determine and evaluate “joint requirements”290 Rather 
than each military department designing specifications and purchasing equipment and 
systems independently of each other, as had been done in the past, they are now designed 
collaboratively by the Services to meet their mutual and individual needs. This has saved 
enormous amounts of money in research and development, maintenance, and replacement 
costs. It has also resolved many of the interoperability problems that had plagued joint 
operations in the past. 
The most obvious advantage to a centralized and coordinated approach to 
purchases and grant requests is that it will save millions of dollars in unnecessary 
duplication in training and equipment. Regardless of how compelling grant justifications 
submitted to DHS may be, the political reality is that any jurisdiction will be limited in 
the amount of homeland security funding it receives. With overall federal funding levels 
decreasing each year, NYC can expect to receive less financial support in future years. It 
can ill-afford to waste finite resources procuring equipment to increase the capabilities of 
one agency when another agency already has those capabilities. 
Even more important than the financial advantages of this arrangement, however, 
is the effect it will have on interagency cooperation, coordination, and efficiency. 
Empowering OEM by giving it some authority over how agencies utilize homeland 
security funding enables it to ensure that such funding is utilized in a manner consistent 
with the needs and strategic plans of the City, rather than the parochial desires of an 
individual agency. Limiting the capabilities of the agencies forces them to work together 
to accomplish common goals. This builds trust and interpersonal relationships between 
members of those agencies, both factors identified in Chapter II as enhancing 
collaboration. The current system utilizes funding to expand capabilities, encouraging 
independence and competition between agencies, but with no added value to the City 
overall. 
Controlling the purchase of new equipment would also encourage a clear 
delineation of roles for the individual agencies. Removing the capabilities of an agency to 
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perform certain duties eliminates the controversy over who should perform them. 
Therefore, OEM should also have the authority to reallocate equipment currently in the 
possession of any agency that does not have a core competency in using it to the agency 
that does. 
The final benefit of a centralized procurement process is that it would allow the 
City to take advantage of its size and purchasing power to negotiate reduced prices for 
items currently purchased and maintained separately by individual agencies. Much in the 
same manner as the military used to operate; city agencies determine their own priorities 
and create specifications for equipment which they then purchase independently of each 
other to meet their own needs. Much of this equipment is very similar in nature to what 
other agencies have purchased. Examples of such items would include Haz-Mat suits, 
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA’s), radiation detectors, power generators, 
gas meters, etc. By standardizing this equipment across agency lines utilizing a system 
such as the JROC, the cost per item would decrease due to larger numbers being ordered. 
In addition, the associated costs of maintenance and replacement would decline as those 
functions could also be centralized.  
Establishing a joint committee such as the JROC within OEM would also create 
an environment in which several “success” factors identified as enabling collaboration in 
Chapter II would be present. They include a “formalized coordination committee”; 
“technical interoperability” (as this equipment would be standardized across agency 
lines); and collaboration as a prerequisite for funding or resources. This would assist in 
accomplishing the overall goals of improving interagency cooperation and coordinating 
the plans of individual agencies to ensure they are in line with the City’s strategic plans. 
 
4. OEM Should Once Again Become a Response Agency 
In order for OEM to effectively coordinate interagency responses, it must first 
respond. Although notifications can be made and records can be kept regarding the 
response from a remote location, truly coordinating it requires a presence at the scene. 
Restoring the role of on-scene interagency coordinator to OEM would go a long way 
toward restoring the credibility it once had as the City’s “coordinating agency”. A review 
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of the number of incidents to which OEM “responded” over the past four years 
demonstrates how that role has steadily deteriorated. 
 
Table 7. Multi-agency incidents coordinated by OEM since FY03291 
Performance Statistics FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
Total incident responses 896 1,743 2,391 2,619 
• On-site coordination 591 457 319 257 
• Coordinated from OEM Watch Command  305 1,286 2,072 2,362 
 
As can be seen from the table above, although the total number of incidents in 
which OEM was involved almost tripled between FY03 and FY06, the number to which 
it actually responded during that time dropped by more than half. During that same time 
frame, the number of incidents it “coordinated” without being on the scene increased 
almost eight-fold. By FY06, less than 10 percent of the multi-agency incidents in which 
OEM was involved had a representative from that agency present on the scene. 
Under the current system not only has OEM been stripped of its authority to 
determine which agency should take the lead at emergencies, it has largely been stripped 
of its response duties as well. Subsequently, when a dispute does arise at the scene of an 
incident over what should be done and by which agency, there is no mechanism to 
resolve it. While the former system did not address the underlying causes of the rivalry, it 
did at least establish OEM as a means of controlling it. That authority must be restored to 
OEM and OEM must once again become a response agency if it is to live up to its role of 
NYC’s coordinating agency.  
 
5. OEM Should Conduct Far More Interagency Exercises Than are 
Currently Being Held 
During the interviews conducted for this thesis, virtually all of those who were 
asked the question “What is necessary to improve interagency operations and relations?” 
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responded “more local drills”, “more full scale exercises”, “more tabletop exercises”, or 
some variation thereof. This was true of respondents from NYPD, FDNY, and OEM. 
These answers should come as no surprise. It is intuitive that to improve multiagency 
operations, the organizations need to practice together. Doing so not only improves how 
the agencies function together at operations, but also helps to develop trust and 
interpersonal relationships between members of these agencies. This sets the stage for 
more efficiency and collaboration at future events. 
Part of the reason for the military failures noted earlier that led to the GNA was 
the fact that the armed forces built up their capabilities independently of each other and 
did not train together. To borrow a phrase from the 9/11 Commission: “Each considered 
itself operationally autonomous”.292  As a result, the Services had gotten very proficient 
at their individual operations, but during times of conflict, when they were required to 
operate together as part of a team, they were not prepared to do so. 
There are three areas where problems can arise when differing capabilities are 
brought together: Gaps, Overlaps, and Seams. 
• Gaps – This is a lack of capability, often discovered at the scene. It is an 
area that can be exploited or cause problems in trying to perform other 
actions. (e.g. a motor vehicle accident at which medical equipment is 
available but no one has extrication equipment to remove the victims.) 
• Overlaps – These are areas in which more than one Service or agency has 
a capability. This causes problems when they are not mutually reinforcing 
and / or not applied in the same manner. It is inefficient and leads to 
confliction. (e.g. two agencies performing a rescue of a window washer 
from collapsed scaffolding equipment, each using its own rescue 
equipment, procedures, and techniques without coordinating with the 
other.)  
• Seams – This is where capabilities meet. There must be coordination in 
how the operation is handed off or seams can be exploited. (e.g. at a 
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chemical attack, victims clothing will need to be removed prior to 
decontamination being performed by the fire department. That clothing, 
however, will become evidence collected by the police department. If 
there is no coordination in how that clothing is collected or turned over, 
that evidence will be lost.)  
It is crucial that organizations that will be expected to operate together at the 
scene of an emergency continually train together to close the gaps, reduce the overlaps, 
and identify the seams. Failing to do so will inevitably lead to unforeseen difficulties at 
the scene of operations. There are three ways in which the coordination of multi-agency 
operations can be expressed: Conflicted, Deconflicted, and Synchronized.  
• Conflicted – When agencies do not work together and interfere with each 
other’s operations. (e.g. when the police department is trying to preserve 
evidence at a suspicious fire but the fire department is throwing material 
out the window as part of their overhauling procedures.) 
• Deconflicted – This is when the agencies essentially stay out of each 
other’s way, but there is no real coordination between them. This can be 
accomplished by deconflicting: 
o Time – each organization controls the area for a period of time. 
(e.g. The fire department controls the building until the fire is 
under control. They leave and the police department takes over). 
o Geographically – each organization controls a certain area. (e.g. 
The fire department controls the area of a building where the fire 
occurred and the police department controls the rest of the 
building.) 
o Mission – each organization is in charge of a different 
responsibility at the scene. (e.g. The fire department is responsible 
for rescuing victims at a terrorist event and the police department 
is responsible for catching the perpetrators.) This is the approach  
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that has been tried, with limited success, for the past few decades 
in NYC. The core competencies in CIMS are an attempt to spell 
out what those missions are. 
• Synchronized – This is when actions taken by organizations are 
complementary or mutually reinforcing toward a common goal. (e.g. 
establishing a triage area in the decontamination area at a Haz-Mat event 
so that patients can be prioritized prior to being decontaminated.) 
The true benefits of interagency operations are attained when the actions of the 
agencies are synchronized. This is the way in which the present-day military plans and 
fights and is a direct result of the reforms enacted under the GNA. In order to maintain 
their capabilities, however, the services continually conduct joint training exercises to 
overcome the challenges associated with gaps, overlaps, and seams. If NYC is to be 
prepared for future emergencies that will require a multi-agency response, it, too, must 
conduct frequent joint training exercises. 
The chart below shows the number of drills in which OEM was involved either in 
conducting the exercise or as a participant in an exercise conducted by another agency. 
 
Table 8. Drills in which OEM participated since FY03293 
Performance Statistics FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 
Field drills 1 4 6 6 
Tabletop drills 1 1 2 3 
Participation in drills coordinated by other agencies 8 22 20 12 
 
For the most part, the drills that are coordinated by other agencies are usually 
single-agency drills designed to test that agency’s capabilities and procedures. OEM 
generally has a limited role at these events. The field and tabletop exercises are true 
multi-agency drills designed to not only test capabilities and procedures, but also to give 
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the agencies an opportunity to work together and coordinate their efforts. It is at these 
events that gaps, overlaps, and seams become apparent and where procedures can be 
established to deal with them. 
Unfortunately, the sheer size of NYC in terms of population (over eight million) 
and numbers of first responders (over 50,000), means that the number of drills held to 
coordinate their efforts are wholly inadequate. The overwhelming majority of these first 
responders never take part in these exercises nor do they build the relationships and trust 
necessary for effective interagency operations. At best, operations conducted by agencies 
who rarely or never practice together can be deconflicted, but only if they are carefully 
coordinated. More than likely, some conflict over mission will occur given the duplicate 
capabilities the agencies have. Given this lack of joint training, however, at no point will 
they be able to achieve a synchronistic relationship. 
To overcome the institutionalized rivalry between its primary response agencies, 
far more interagency drills need to be conducted by OEM. These do not necessarily need 
to be large scale, expensive exercises like Trifecta. They can also take the form of local 
drills conducted at the battalion / precinct level. To coordinate these, OEM could 
establish localized offices in each of the five boroughs that would conduct these drills and 
bring together various agencies who would respond to different emergencies in these 
areas. 
In addition to simply conducting more interagency drills, however, these drills 
need to be more realistic and designed to identify the gaps, overlaps, and seams that will 
occur at real events. Carefully scripted exercises such as Trifecta are designed to conceal 
these problems; however, if the problems are not brought to light during exercises, they 
will instead develop at actual events. 
   
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: MODEL NYC’S PERSONNEL PROVISIONS 
AND PROMOTION POLICIES ON THOSE OF THE GNA 
In his article for New York Times Magazine, General Jones lamented that officers 
who perform duty outside their own services generally do less well than those assigned to 
duty in their services. He attributed this to the control the services had over the careers of 
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their members regardless of where they were serving. In the article, he wrote “I cannot 
stress this point too strongly: He who controls the dollars, promotions, and assignments 
controls the organization—and the services so control, especially with regard to 
personnel actions.” He went on to say “A service chief has a constituency which, if 
convinced that he is not fighting hard enough for what the service sees as its fair share of 
defense missions and resources, can destroy the chief’s effectiveness.”294 
Similarly, the Locher Report noted that the predominance of service influence 
would remain a problem as long as officers gave the highest priority to the interests of 
their service, while losing sight of more important national security needs. It warned 
“Whatever changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance to a 
more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply 
immersed in the culture of their Services.” To resolve this problem, the report said, “will 
require changes in the system of military education, training, and assignments to produce 
officers with a greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine multiservice 
perspective, and an improved understanding of other services.”295 
One of the overriding concerns of Congress was that “military officers, especially 
the general and flag officers, had little understanding or appreciation of the policies, 
procedures, operations, or capabilities of the other services. As a result, they had little 
experience in or knowledge of the conduct of joint operations.” They felt that something 
had to be done to instill a joint culture among the officer corps that would lead to an 
appreciation and understanding of how the services could and should operate together. As 
a result of these conclusions, Congress incorporated several provisions into the GNA 
designed to reduce service influence and increase the desirability of joint duty in an effort 
to change the culture of the services.296 
As noted earlier, the similarities between the parochial nature and influence of the 
services described by Locher and Jones and the current situation in NYC are striking. 
Therefore, based on the success of the personnel provisions of the GNA in achieving a 
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“joint culture” within the DoD, NYC should implement the following recommendations 
to instill a similar culture within its emergency response organizations. 
 
1. A Detail in a Joint Duty Assignment Should be a Prerequisite for 
Promotion to the Staff Ranks of an Agency 
To improve the quality of officers serving in joint assignments, enhance the 
stability and experience of those officers, and ensure that top level commanders were 
well-rounded in joint matters; the GNA required service in a Joint Duty Assignment 
(JDA) as a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag officer. The law also required the 
SecDef to define the term “joint duty assignment” and limit the definition to assignments 
in which an officer “gains a significant experience in joint matters”. It specifically 
excluded assignments within an officer’s own military department from receiving this 
designation and required the SecDef to publish a list showing the positions that qualify as 
JDA’s.297  
The immediate result of this provision was to make these assignments highly 
coveted ones. Quality officers began competing over them as this became the most 
established means of achieving promotions, particularly to the highest levels of each 
Service. And although the law did initially allow for some waivers to this requirement 
and for a phase-in period, it did specify that that period would be limited to two years 
from the date the law was enacted.298 
In NYC, the most logical choice for the majority of positions designated as JDA’s 
would be within the Office of Emergency Management. Currently, over half of its staff is 
made up of representatives from various city agencies, although most tend to be lower 
level officers than those on the verge of reaching the staff ranks. Another logical choice 
for selection as a JDA would be liaison positions in which members of one agency are 
stationed at another agency’s headquarters working on joint projects. Still another 
position would be in the City’s 911 center, ensuring that all affected city agencies are  
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dispatched to the scene of various emergencies as appropriate, and working on a city-
wide response matrix based on agency’s capabilities and core competencies. (See section 
D 3 below) 
To fulfill the recommendations proposed in this thesis and simultaneously create a 
sufficient number of positions that qualify as JDA’s, OEM needs to be greatly expanded 
and fully funded by the City rather than by grants which may not be renewed as is 
currently the practice. In addition, agency lines (or billets) within OEM need to be 
established for members of other agencies who are detailed there in a JDA. Currently, the 
sponsoring agency keeps that member on its payroll, creating a disincentive for the 
agency to detail members there. It also gives that agency a measure of control over that 
member in much the same way as the services retained control over their members’ 
careers prior to the GNA.  
One possible solution to the problems of too few billets, OEM not responding to 
most emergencies, and too few interagency drills being conducted is to create satellite 
branches of OEM around the City with at least one in each of the boroughs. Those 
branches would be staffed as JDA’s by members of the NYPD, FDNY, and other 
agencies who would respond to multi-agency incidents to act as the on-scene interagency 
coordinator. In addition, they would be responsible for organizing and evaluating small-
scale drills designed to bring together local responders and build relationships between 
them as described in the previous section of this chapter. There are three main advantages 
to the City in having members from various city agencies staff these joint duty positions:  
 
a. It Will Build Personal Relationships Between These Members 
During interviews conducted with current and former members of the 
NYPD, FDNY, and OEM, most said that getting people from different agencies together 
(be it at drills, at cross-training, or informally) was essential for interagency collaboration 
to be successful. Similarly, one of the most commonly identified factors chosen by the 
panel of Homeland Security professionals noted in Chapter II, as a success factor 
affecting interagency collaboration was “social capital” (i.e., interpersonal relationships). 
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Also identified as success factors were “effective communication and information 
exchange”, “formalized coordination committee or liaison roles”, and “trust”.  
Mandating that the members who will become the future leaders of their 
respective agencies first serve in positions that require them to work collaboratively with 
each other creates a structure that supports the development of all these factors. 
Stereotypes and barriers regarding other agencies built up early in an individual’s career 
will be broken down by personal experiences.  
In addition to the benefits derived from better collaboration during the 
course of these assignments, the personal relationships developed between these 
members will continue long after they return to their home agency. Having leaders of 
these agencies who know each other personally and who have worked together in the past 
will go a long way toward fostering better relationships between the agencies in the 
future. As noted by Alan Brunacini, a fire chief from the Phoenix, Arizona Fire 
Department who helped develop the Incident Command System, “Unified Command 
begins at lunch.”299  
 
b. It Will Familiarize These Members with the Priorities, Concerns, 
and Goals of Other Agencies  
Disputes often occur between agencies as a result of differing priorities 
and a lack of familiarity with the capabilities and roles each agency has to play. The 
study in Chapter II listed a “lack of familiarity with other organizations” as one of the 
main barrier factors affecting interagency collaboration. It also identified a “lack of 
formal roles or procedures for managing collaboration” as another. 
Creating just such a formal role by having individuals from each agency 
work side by side with their counterparts from other agencies allows for a better 
understanding of the capabilities, concerns, and needs of those groups. It also allows 
those members to gain a better perspective as to what each agency is trying to accomplish 
and why, making consensus on how to best achieve these goals easier.  
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c. It Will Place Members from Each Agency in an Environment 
Where They Can Collaborate Freely 
The Locher Report noted that the “predominance of service influence” and 
the “absolute service control over promotions and assignments of all military officers, 
including those in joint duty billets” were the greatest barriers to integrating the 
military.300 General Jones observed that a service chief, who was not viewed as fighting 
hard enough for his service’s parochial needs, could see his effectiveness destroyed.301 
Similarly, the study cited in Chapter II identified “focus on local organization over cross-
agency (e.g. regional) concerns” as another barrier to collaboration. 
In addition, the peer pressure associated with loyalty to one’s own 
organization should not be underestimated. Human nature leads people to identify with 
the group to which they belong. The subconscious effect of being surrounded by 
members from that group leads one to pursue the group’s interests, and to believe that 
that is the right thing to do. The City can use this dynamic to its advantage by placing 
members into a group environment, surrounded by others in a similar situation, where 
they identify with the overall needs of the City rather than their individual agency. 
 
2. Safeguards Need to be Established to Prevent Retaliation against 
Members by Their Sponsoring Agency 
The primary reason the Services retained so much power despite efforts to 
strengthen the role of the SecDef prior to the GNA was that they retained complete 
control over the careers of their members, even those serving in joint duty 
assignments.302 Consequently, the behavior of those members was heavily influenced by 
how they thought their superiors would react to them. Naturally, allegiance to one’s 
service was valued over all else since being seen as “too joint” could effectively end 
one’s career. To diminish the power of the services over careers and change the culture 
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that encouraged parochialism, Goldwater-Nichols took steps to reward officers who 
accepted and performed well in billets outside of their services.303 
Similar steps need to be taken to ensure that members detailed to OEM or other 
JDA’s are not retaliated against by their sponsoring agency for failing to represent that 
agency’s parochial interests. To that end, the following safeguards should be established: 
• Prior to accepting a detail to a JDA, the terms and expectations would be 
worked out between the member, the sponsoring agency, and OEM. The 
details would include the duration, location, and responsibilities of the 
assignment. 
• This agreement would clearly spell out what the member’s position, rank, 
and assignment will be upon successful completion of the detail and return 
to the home agency.  
• The determination as to the success of the detail would be based solely on 
personnel evaluations conducted by that member’s supervisor(s) at the 
JDA.  
• Poor performance evaluations would negate any promotions or 
assignments previously agreed to. In addition, it would prevent the 
member from receiving credit for the JDA, thereby ending their chances 
for promotion to the staff level. 
• Officers who demonstrated exceptional commitment to joint concepts 
during their JDA would be offered the opportunity to pursue a separate 
career path at OEM. This would include the opportunity for promotions 
and salary increases within OEM. Members who chose this path would 
eventually make up the senior management positions at OEM (as 
described in section A 2, above). 
Instituting these protections for members serving in JDA’s and providing 
incentives for them to abandon their agencies’ parochial interests and deterrents for 
pursuing them, will limit the influence of the individual agencies and promote a more 
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centralized approach to homeland security. Requiring members to successfully complete 
a tour in a JDA prior to being promoted to the staff level will ensure that agencies send 
quality personnel to these assignments since only they will be eligible for such positions. 
Assigning OEM the authority to certify that these members have successfully completed 
these assignments provides a system of checks and balances to ensure the intent of these 
reforms is followed. OEM will be dependent on the agencies to provide the personnel for 
these assignments and the agencies will be dependent on OEM to certify their members 
for promotion, inhibiting them from pressuring their members to pursue a parochial 
agenda. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: THE CITY SHOULD MANDATE A 
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAM EMPHASIZING “JOINT 
DOCTRINE”  
As discussed in Chapter VI, the personnel provisions of the GNA also made use 
of the military education system as a means of emphasizing and institutionalizing 
“jointness” among the services. It did this by revamping the content of military science 
courses by focusing on emerging joint doctrine.304 In an article for Joint Force Quarterly, 
Michael Vitale writes “…synchronized joint military education, which increases 
cooperation among all officers at the expense of service parochialism, is a key intent and 
successful result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. When this is coupled with teaching 
newly approved joint doctrine at these institutions, jointness is enhanced 
significantly.”305  
Just as the GNA mandated successful completion of a two-phase Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) program through its war colleges as a 
prerequisite to becoming certified as a Joint Specialty Officer, NYC should mandate a 
similar program for members of the NYPD and FDNY as a precondition for promotion. 
A curriculum devoted to promoting interagency cooperation and collaboration should be 
developed and taught as a means of educating officers in each agency in the City’s 
strategic plans and in joint operations. This would also serve to reinforce the City’s 
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emphasis on the importance of approaching homeland security from a city-centric 
perspective. Where practical, these courses should be taught jointly by current and former 
members of the NYPD and FDNY to give the curriculum credibility. 
Since civil service testing is the sole means of attaining promotions up to the rank 
of captain in the NYPD and to the rank of deputy chief in the FDNY, the City has little 
discretion over who receives promotions for the vast majority of its officers. It does have 
the ability, however, to require an officer to receive a certain number of college credits 
prior to granting that promotion and currently has policies in place in each agency 
regarding what those standards are. One of the main criticisms of those policies is the 
argument that these credits can be in courses completely unrelated to public safety and do 
not improve the quality of the officer. By modifying those policies to mandate that an 
officer complete a particular number of credits in a curriculum specifically designed for 
NYC police officers and firefighters negates that criticism. It also gives the City the 
opportunity to require those officers to take classes designed to instill a joint culture. The 
number of credits required would then be increased for each successive promotional rank.  
The content of each of these courses could also be customized so that it 
corresponds to the phase of one’s career and the requirements of each position. Beginning 
with the training academies, an introduction to joint doctrine and an overview of how the 
City expects its first responders to operate together could be taught. At the first line 
supervisor level the courses would then focus on areas such as Incident Command, CIMS 
and NIMS and on specific policies and procedures governing interagency operations. At 
the chief ranks, the courses would concentrate on areas such as improving interagency 
relations, and at the staff level courses such as strategic planning and budgeting would be 
taught.  
The logical choice of institution to administer these courses would be the City 
University of New York (CUNY) system since the City helps to finance its operations. In 
addition, there is already an established relationship between these agencies and the John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice which specializes in public service fields with courses 
such as criminal justice and fire science. 
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In addition to utilizing the City university system to enhance interagency 
relations, a program should also be instituted where members of each agency are utilized 
to teach courses in the academies of the other. For example, police officers could be 
detailed to the Fire Academy to teach courses such as crime scene preservation, evidence 
collection, chain of custody, etc. Similarly, firefighters could teach courses in the Police 
Academy to familiarize rookie police officers with the capabilities of the fire department 
in handling various emergencies. The advantage to such a program is that it would give 
new recruits some exposure to members from the other agency and familiarize them with 
the priorities and concerns of that agency and how they can assist the overall operation. 
 
D. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS NOT BASED ON THE GNA 
 
1. Independent Oversight Must be Established 
While the Locher Report criticizes Congress for inconsistent and sometimes 
conflicting oversight procedures regarding the DoD,306 NYC has no legislative body or 
empanelled organization with oversight authority on matters pertaining to public safety. 
The city council does maintain both a Committee on Public Safety and a Committee on 
Fire and Criminal Justice Services. However, as was evidenced by testimony given 
before these committees on May 9, 2005, not only were they not consulted during the 
drafting of CIMS, they were not even notified that that it had been signed into existence 
despite repeated requests for an advanced copy.307 
To ensure that these recommendations are sound and are not circumvented or 
ignored during or subsequent to implementation, independent oversight needs to be 
established over this entire proposal. The logical choice for fulfilling this role would be 
the Committee for Public Safety (or another committee established by the city council 
specifically for this purpose) since it already has subpoena power and can hold public 
hearings. The key to making this plan a success is to make this process as transparent as  
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possible with all sides being given an opportunity to voice their concerns and outside 
experts being consulted to review and comment on the implementation and quality of the 
plan.  
As part of this oversight, the committee needs to be given powers to deal with 
non-compliance by any agency so that it does not resemble the current toothless AAR 
process provided for in CIMS. The committee should also be required to make its 
findings public through the use of quarterly reports on the progress and failures of 
implementation. In addition to its oversight powers, this committee should also act as an 
advisory panel to the mayor on issues of public safety, much the way the National 
Security Council does to the president on issues of national security (see Fig. 3). 
 
2. CIMS Needs to be Revised to Be More Logical, to Truly Recognize 
Core Competencies of Agencies, and to More Closely Follow NIMS 
The Citywide Incident Management System, as discussed in Chapter V, has some 
very positive aspects to it, particularly where it follows the national model (NIMS) and 
where it provides for AAR’s and interagency training. However, the manner in which 
these provisions are practiced and the areas where CIMS deviates from NIMS are critical 
failings in this system. As has been shown, the rationale given for making such 
controversial decisions as placing the NYPD in Single Command of Haz-Mat / CBRN 
incidents, does not stand up to scrutiny. In addition, the inconsistent manner in which a 
Single Command can be applied (depending on the location the incident occurs and the 
resources that respond) suggests that at large-scale events, it will not be used. Ultimately 
this was little more than a power grab by the NYPD using the threat of terrorism to 
justify further duplication of existing resources and expansion into non-traditional police 
roles. 
In addition, the evidence strongly suggests that the decisions made regarding what 
constitutes the “core competencies” of the individual agencies were specifically designed 
to marginalize the role of the FDNY by failing to recognize its true capabilities. Ignoring 




successfully for over 20 years by the FDNY) and identifying “mass decontamination” but 
not “decontamination” of individuals as core competencies stand as three glaring 
examples of where this was done. 
The oft-repeated claim that NYC is somehow “different” than the rest of the 
country and should therefore be given leeway in how it manages emergencies is 
beginning to be called into question. The fact that no one outside of NYC government or 
the NYPD who has seen CIMS has concluded the changes made to NIMS in adapting it 
to NYC are positive ones, tells a great deal about the quality of the document and the 
process used and influences involved in developing it. The real “difference” between 
NYC and the rest of the country is the fact that its first responder agencies have the 
highest level of duplication and resulting interagency conflict of any municipality in the 
nation.  
As was discussed in the last chapter, the Locher Report identified a “failure to 
clarify the desired division of work”308 as one of the main problems plaguing the DoD. It 
states: 
One of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency is to 
rationally divide the work among the various structural components. 
Within DoD, the desired division of work has not been adequately 
clarified in many instances; in others, the assigned division of work is 
ignored in practice…The absence of a rational and enforced division of 
work leads to greater complexity, friction, delay, duplication, and 
inefficiency.309 
This problem was rated as extremely applicable to NYC’s current situation 
wherein unnecessary duplication is allowed to persist and there is a notable absence of a 
rational and enforced division of work. The manipulation of core competencies and 
ineffective AAR process do nothing to remedy this situation. 
To help resolve these issues and create a cooperative environment between these 
agencies, CIMS needs to be revised. A Unified Command should be established initially 
at all multi-agency incidents and the roles and responsibilities of the individual agencies 
should be based on their true capabilities and what is actually occurring at the scene, 
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rather than on the potential cause. Both agencies need to focus on what their core 
missions are and allow themselves to become dependent on the other for successful 
completion of the overall operation. 
For example, acknowledging that the FDNY has a core competency in 
“decontamination” (rather than “mass decontamination”) would require cooperation 
between the agencies at “powder runs”. The NYPD would be responsible for 
investigation and evidence collection and preservation. The FDNY would handle medical 
issues and decontamination of any persons potentially exposed. Both agencies would 
share command, but each would have a unique role to play that would require them to 
depend on each other to accomplish their respective missions. 
As noted in Chapter II, a large percentage of homeland security leaders who 
participated in the survey identified both “felt need to collaborate” and “common goal or 
recognized interdependence” as success factors in affecting interorganizational 
collaboration.310 Clearly and realistically delineating agency roles and keeping them 
close to their core missions will minimize the level of duplication that exists and enhance 
collaboration through mutual dependence. 
 
3. The 911 System Needs to be Revamped to Include Fire Department 
Representation and Dispatchers 
In NYC, the entire 911 system is staffed by civilian employees of the NYPD. 
There is no fire department representation in the 911 center. Any calls that come into 911 
go to police dispatchers who, depending on the nature of the call, may conference in an 
FDNY dispatcher. Each agency then dispatches its own units in accordance with its own 
response matrix. There is no coordination of resources between the two. 
One of the most common complaints cited by NYC firefighters regarding 
responses is a failure to be notified of emergencies in a timely manner. In fact, of the 71 
reports filed in the “FDNY CIMS After Action Review Report”link311 on the FDNY 
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intranet, 45 of them state that there was a delayed notification to the FDNY. In most 
cases where this has been investigated, “human error” or the caller failing to use certain 
key words that would prompt notification to the FDNY are identified as the reason for the 
delay. In the best of circumstances, this system delays FDNY response. Many times the 
FDNY is not notified at all of emergencies at which they could play an integral part. As 
mentioned earlier, this happens so frequently that many FDNY units monitor the NYPD’s 
Special Operations frequency to enable them to receive the runs.  
Despite repeated requests by the fire department to station an officer inside the 
911 center312 to act as a liaison, ensure calls are routed appropriately to FDNY, and 
provide expert advice to callers trapped in burning buildings, the NYPD has refused to 
allow this. This behavior is reminiscent of Police Commissioner Ward’s comments to an 
audience of 911 workers at an awards ceremony in 1988 when he said “'If there's a fire 
and someone makes a call on the phone, you don't call the fire department, you call the 
police department. Is there anyone in the room that knows the telephone number of the 
fire department?” The police employees shouted “911” and applauded wildly.313 
This is not to suggest that 911 operators and dispatchers intentionally delay 
notifications of emergencies to the FDNY. To do so would border on criminal behavior. 
However, those in power who allow a system which has been shown to cause a delay in 
response to continue to operate while rejecting methods of improving it should be held 
responsible for the consequences. Refusal to allow FDNY representation as an interim 
measure to a more comprehensive system is most likely explained by a parochial desire 
to control information. 
The City needs to revamp the 911 system so that both PD and FD dispatchers are 
working side by side in the same control center. In addition, it needs to institute a 
response matrix for emergencies that simultaneously dispatches units from multiple 
agencies including NYPD, FDNY, EMS, and OEM based on the needs of the incident as 
determined from the information received. The current system of passing along 
information, having callers repeat information to another operator, and / or monitoring 
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another agency’s radio frequencies not only wastes valuable time, but also leads to 
mistakes in the information given or simply failing to make the required notifications. 
 
E.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The conclusions of this thesis are that there are numerous similarities between the 
current dysfunctional manner in which NYC’s emergency response agencies fail to work 
together synergistically and the rivalries that existed between the branches of the military 
in the years leading up to the GNA. There are also many of the same causes. Parochial 
interests of the individual agencies have been allowed to take priority over the greater 
needs of the City as a whole, just as the interests of the Services dominated the DoD. In 
both cases, the individual organizations had become extremely proficient in performing 
their core missions, however, they continued to plan, train, and attempt to operate 
independently of each other. As a result, dramatic failures occurred when they were 
required to work together. In the case of the military this was illustrated by events such as 
the Viet Nam War and the failed mission to rescue the hostages in Iran. In the case of 
NYC, it has been seen at numerous interagency clashes, and most dramatically on 9/11, 
when there was a complete lack of coordination between them. 
The extraordinary success that the GNA had on changing the very culture of the 
military from one of service parochialism to one of jointness led to vastly improved 
communication and coordination between the services and dramatic improvements in 
their war-fighting capabilities. The benefits of these changes were clearly shown during 
the first Gulf War only five years after the legislation was signed, and have been seen in 
many operations since then. Based on the years of unparalleled military successes 
following its passage and the volume of literature touting the improvements that have 
resulted, NYC should adopt its own version of the GNA to resolve many of the same 
problems that exist today between the NYPD and FDNY that existed between the 
services prior to its enactment.  
That is not to say that it will be easy. Achieving this will take sweeping changes 
in the emergency command structure of the City, the assignment and promotional 
policies of the individual agencies, and the education requirements of their officers. The 
same political factors that have prevented previous mayors from taking the steps 
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necessary to address the underlying causes of the rivalry are still present today. However, 
accomplishing these goals is not an insurmountable task. Goldwater-Nichols was able to 
accomplish the even larger mission of transforming the culture and mindset of the entire 
DoD, the largest bureaucracy in the free world, despite strong resistance from all of the 
individual services and powerful forces within Congress. 
If NYC is to maximize its efficiency and end parochial rivalries, it must end the 
duplication between these agencies, make them mutually dependent, clearly delineate 
their roles and responsibilities, foster an atmosphere of “jointness”, and conduct frequent 
small- and large-scale interagency drills with meaningful and timely AAR’s. To ensure 
that the process of reorganizing NYC’s emergency management system is credible and 
not dominated by political considerations and parochial interests, it will have to be as 
open, public, and transparent as possible. It will also take some sacrifice on the part of the 
individual agencies and even the mayor as power is shifted and oversight is established. 
Secretary Rumsfeld noted this when he reminded the 9/11 Commission each of the 
services had to “give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives” to achieve 
better joint capability under Goldwater-Nichols.314  
Similarly, Mayor Bloomberg told the 9/11 Commission, “…those in charge in our 
city on 9/11 showed us what must be done. Following their example and showing the 
willingness at the local and national levels to put aside parochial interests in the service 
of our common good can and will keep us safe and free.”315 
Unfortunately, given the power and influence the current police commissioner has 
with the mayor, and given the amount criticism they have withstood over the wording of 
key portions of CIMS, it is extremely unlikely that these proposals will be implemented 
under the current administration. However, it is hoped that the next mayor will see the 
value, both operationally and financially, of addressing the underlying causes of the 
rivalry and will take the steps necessary to resolve them, rather than simply stifle the 
discord they create. With that in mind, the following obstacles to implementation would 
have to be addressed. 
                                                 
314 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 403. 
315 Transcripts from Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, Day Two sess., 82 
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Aside from the aforementioned political pressures, particularly from the NYPD, 
that would have to be overcome to apply these recommendations, there is a cost factor as 
well. The centerpiece of the proposal revolves around empowering and expanding a 
central planning and response agency, namely OEM. To accomplish this and create a 
sufficient number of JDA positions, that agency would have to be greatly enlarged. 
Therefore, OEM should have its own budgeted lines (or billets) to fulfill its personnel 
needs. Members who are detailed to OEM should be removed from their sponsoring 
agency’s payroll and added to OEM’s so as not to create a financial burden on the 
agencies for supplying these members. 
Creating hundreds of new positions to fulfill the expanded planning, training, and 
response duties that OEM would undertake is typically an expensive endeavor. However, 
some of those costs can be offset. For example, some planning positions that currently 
reside within each agency could be eliminated and those responsibilities shifted to OEM 
where they could be synthesized to conform to the City’s overall strategic plans. In 
addition, homeland security funding could probably be used to subsidize many of the 
interagency training positions that would be created. Typically DHS does not approve of 
funding for personnel; however, new positions created for training related to new 
homeland security missions are frequently approved. Being that NYC’s experience on 
9/11 was the impetus for mandating compliance with NIMS in order to qualify for 
homeland security funding, it is likely that DHS would approve funding for interagency 
training teams. 
In addition, cost savings would be achieved through the elimination of duplication 
and by standardizing equipment across agency lines. The increased purchasing power that 
such standardization would result in and the cost reductions associated with a centralized 
maintenance and support programs for these items would also provide long-term 
financial benefits to the City, further reducing the fiscal impact of these proposals. 
The dramatic success that the GNA has had in changing the culture of the 
military, and the successful campaigns that have resulted due in large part to these 
reforms, demonstrate that it is not only possible to enact such sweeping changes, but that 
doing so would greatly benefit NYC in its ability to coordinate its efforts to prepare for, 
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prevent, respond to, and recover from various emergencies. While it will not necessarily 
take an act of Congress, as it did with the GNA, to make the necessary changes in NYC, 
it will take the full backing of a mayor who wants to end the destructive rivalry between 
the NYPD and FDNY and maximize the efficiency of NYC’s considerable resources. It 
will also take meaningful oversight to ensure that the Office of Emergency Management 
is empowered and the reforms suggested are not circumvented to accommodate parochial 
interests. And with all due respect to the police commissioner, it will certainly take more 
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